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# OUTLINE OF HISTORY

## PART II

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VOLUME II

# OUTLINE OF HISTORY

## PART II

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# OUTLINE OF HISTORY

PART II

## XI

## INTRODUCTION TO THE MODERN WORLD

It can be said with some assurance that the European man of the Middle Age was in many aspects in a state of passive childhood parented by two institutions: Feudalism and the Roman Catholic Church. The Feudal System has already been described. It remains to be emphasized that it provided for man's physical needs; it gave food, shelter, and protection. Furthermore, so far as things material were concerned, each unit of the Feudal System was sufficient unto itself. Each manor maintained an isolated, self-supporting village community—producing the food, tools, and clothes needed by its occupants. There was nothing the medieval man needed to satisfy his body that could not be found within the manor's walls. And those who dwelt therein were not inclined to look beyond those walls.

Just as the manor provided for the physical wants of the European man of the Middle Age, the Roman Catholic Church took care of his

mental and spiritual needs. Preserving the structure of imperial Rome, cherishing in monopoly the knowledge and learning of the time, more powerful than any feudal baron, the Church in the Middle Age reached the height of its influence. Indeed it was the only organized force of its period. It provided education when no other agency was capable of doing so. The monastic libraries preserved and copied books—printing was an unborn art. Monasteries and cathedral schools were the only bulwarks against absolute illiteracy. The Church kept alive the Latin language, on which literature depended, and it made Latin the universal tongue.

In the realm of the spiritual the Church through the sacramental system quite literally led the medieval European from the cradle to the grave. And the spiritual realm had none of its modern limitations. To the Church all belonged, and the Church fulfilled many functions now partially or wholly secular. At birth the child was baptized by the Church. In youth it confirmed him. In manhood it married him. Throughout his life it forgave his sins. In the service of its mass it sustained him. And he passed to death with its blessing.

The faith of the Church in the Middle Age, accepted like the admonitions of a wholly trusted mother, bade man to take but little thought of this world and feast his eyes on the

world to come. And to the glories and joys of that world the Church held the only keys. What is more, the Church, under the leadership of the medieval schoolmen, buttressed its faith with the most complete and adequate philosophical system the world has ever witnessed. For once in the annals of man's wonderings, mind and soul accorded well.

Finally, the Church of the Middle Age achieved a scheme of society in which the efforts of the individual were completely subjected to the greater glory of the whole group. True in varied departments of life, this is no better exemplified than in the medieval Gothic cathedrals, impressive monuments of towering beauty to the greatest communal effort ever put forth by the brain and brawn of mortal men.

Small wonder, then, that the European man of the Middle Age exhibited the passiveness of contented childhood. The feudal manor nurtured his body. The Church sustained his mind and soul, and commanded him to forsake the joys of this world for the prophet's paradise to come. All earthly ambition was quelled. By thousands men renounced the worldly life and sought the seclusion of cloistered cells.

Feudalism and the Church, the twin guardians of medieval Europe, reached the height of their influence in the thirteenth century. From that time forward their complete dominion over the European man gradually lessens.

Until the middle of the fifteenth century the parental hands are firm, but weakening. The forces are almost unconsciously gathering which make of the childlike European a revolting youth.

Feudalism begins to decline. The causes of the decline are varied and complex. There evidently came a time when serfdom no longer paid. It was cheaper to hire labor. When the Black Death (1348-1349) reduced Europe's man-power by half, wages became higher. There is also the probability that the feudal baron needed payment in money rather than in products of the soil and services; perhaps the overlord needed money to compensate hired soldiery. At any rate it seemed wise to lease out land to a "middleman" for money rent. He, in turn, would use hired labor. The hired laborer was no longer strictly bound to the land. But, as in every phase of life, increased freedom brings increased responsibility. The childlike European was, by the necessity of his condition, learning self-dependence.

From the eleventh century forward there grew another movement which undermined feudalism and accentuated the independence of the medieval European: the rise of the towns. They rose with the growth of trade and manufacture —new forms of wealth. At first the towns were bound to the feudal lord on whose land they were situated. Later they won their freedom

from feudal obligations and for their citizens servile conditions ceased. Between nobles and peasants now arose this middle class, the burghers. Feudalism was dealt another blow. What is more, many towns later allied with the kings against the feudal barons. Increased numbers of the men of the Middle Age were caring for their individual physical needs. When gunpowder was invented they managed their own protection.

And in almost the same period the passive European man began to break his mental and spiritual as well as his physical bonds. Not for a long time was there widespread open revolt, but in the fourteenth and earlier centuries there were those first forebodings of restlessness and discontent under the Church's unquestioned authority. Abelard, the founder of the University of Paris, was condemned for heresy in 1122. From around 1170, the followers of Peter Waldo in Lyons rejected the sacramental system. John Wyclif in England during the fourteenth century translated the Bible, proposed that the State should confiscate the property of the clergy, and attacked the central miracle of the Church, transubstantiation—the changing of bread and wine into body and blood. The Hussites in Bohemia, after their leader was burned, were granted the right to communion in both kinds and represented the first sect within the Church. Not least of all historical thinkers

was the thirteenth-century Roger Bacon, who by his insistence on scientific experiment began the still-persistent questioning of all authority.

The papacy, too, by the thirteenth century had reached the height of its influence. Then it was that the successors of St. Peter sought to extend to the full the prerogative given to the great fisherman-disciple; the popes, notably Innocent III and Boniface VIII, asserted that theirs was the power on this earth to bind and loose not only things spiritual but also things temporal. And even the Holy Roman Emperor dared not say them nay.

Early in the following century both England and France challenged this supremacy. The latter nation even took the Holy Father prisoner, an action which hastened his death and evoked from the poet Dante the taunt: "Christ had been again crucified among the robbers." There followed the Babylonian Captivity—1309-1376—when the popes were mere vassals of the French kings. Then came the "Great Schism," when rival popes ruled in Rome and Avignon. All this detracted from the prestige of Mother Church.

But the hold of the Church on man's spiritual and mental life was beginning to be lessened not so much by specific revolts as by a slow and subtle but fundamental change in the attitude of the people. Men grew restless and wondered. They were commencing to be a bit dissatisfied

with just the anticipation of the world to come; they grew curious about and eager for the things of this world. For this change the Church itself was not without responsibility. Throngs had followed the Cross in the Crusades. They had seen all the luxuries of the East and longed to taste of them. Friar John and Marco Polo had traveled to the Orient and brought back reports of not unattractive worldliness. The merchants, too, contacted with the East. The childlike European was having the curiosity of youth aroused.

There was more. Universities arose. National literatures had their beginnings, and significant beginnings some of them were: in Italy there was Dante's *Divine Comedy;* in England Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales,* and Wyclif's Bible.

It was also in the fourteenth century that Petrarch the lyric poet spread his enthusiasm for the works of classical writers. Men began collecting Greek and Latin manuscripts, and in so doing they recaptured some of that spirit of inquiry which would soon move them to ask questions of great consequence: "What of the world in which we are living?" "Whence is authority derived?"

Furthermore, the rise of the towns hastened this slow intellectual expansion in the late Middle Age. Where men congregated in numbers, where they felt for the first time the freedom from the bonds of feudalism, where individual

and communal problems demanded solution, where opportunity was offered for discussion between man and man—there arose questionings the answering of which might upset any rigid system of thinking or living.

Thus slowly, almost imperceptibly, but none the less surely, the European man began to put away childish things, to relinquish his contentment in the care of Feudalism and the Church. Modern Europe, so called, did not then come suddenly. Many historians—for reasons chiefly of convenience—date it from 1453. And in that year an event occurred which undoubtedly gave it tremendous impetus. The Turks under Mohammed II captured Constantinople, last stronghold of the Byzantine Empire.

As a result the northern land-routes to the East came under the control of the Turks. This gave temporary triumph to the city of Venice, which controlled a route by Alexandria and the Red Sea—the Turks didn't overrun Egypt until 1517. As a result of this loss of their lucrative trade with the East the Italian towns entered upon a long period of decline, from which they did not emerge until the nineteenth century. Portuguese and Spanish navigators were stimulated to search for an all-water route to the Indies. More than curiosity prompted Columbus, and it was no accident that he sailed for Ferdinand and Isabella instead of for his native town, Genoa.

Constantinople, moreover, had been a center of learning. When it fell, classical scholars fled with their manuscripts to western Europe. The influence of the culture they brought was not long unfelt. Paradoxically, the medieval man was discontented with the present when he learned of the past.

With the fall of Constantinople the Middle Age seems definitely to have passed into history. Judgment upon it must not be pronounced hurriedly. The vitality and the vigor, the freshness of modern times it lacked; it also achieved a beautiful serenity which the western world has not since enjoyed. There are those, and not a few, who label the thirteenth "the greatest of centuries."

And now, for better or for worse, the European man passes from serene and satisfied childhood to daring, sometimes foolhardy, youth. The bonds of authority are broken, the fledgling has left the nest to fly full-blown into a new phase of the history of western Europe—starting with what is called, inappropriately perhaps, a rebirth or Renaissance.

## XII

### THE CULTURAL RENAISSANCE

History is a continuous stream—not a succession of sharply separated eras. Nevertheless, for purposes of clear study we arbitrarily cut into that stream at a particular point or curve, and say, Here begins a new period. Even the broad divisions of history—ancient, medieval, and modern—are not at all clear-cut divisions. Yet for the sake of convenience and clarity we identify these periods by beginning and ending them at specific times, the exact dates of significant, concrete happenings, which, after all, are only milestones not reached by leaps and bounds but by the slow march of generations.

For purposes of convenience only, then, can we say that the Age of the Renaissance began with the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and ended with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Many of the forces which brought it about were marshaled before 1453; many of the characteristics of the age persist after 1648. Even the name Renaissance fits only in a narrow sense; it was not so much a rebirth as a new birth; it was a rebirth only in that its fundamental spirit found confirmation in a revived culture of the past.

It has been said that the Renaissance consists

of three great discoveries: the discovery of man by himself, the discovery of the past, and the discovery of the world. And yet all these discoveries took place somewhat simultaneously, and they were interacting. The European man gradually—as if crossing from childhood to youth—broke with authority and found himself aware of new capacities of self-expression, new possibilities of enjoyment, assuming a new importance as an individual. He is no longer just a unit in a group. For this spirit of free and enlarged and intensified individualism he found a parallel and confirmation in the lives of the ancients revealed in classical works; the European man discovered the past because he began to feel himself at home in it. Both stimulating and stimulated by the new exuberance, this sense of his own new powers, was man's discovery of the world, evidenced in the Renaissance chiefly by geographical explorations and opening of new routes of trade, but also by the beginnings of exploration into the world of nature and the finding of the laws which governed that world.

We may perhaps best understand these three great discoveries of man if we divide the Age of the Renaissance into several large phases: the economic Renaissance, the Renaissance of culture, the geographical discoveries and colonization, the Commercial Revolution, and the two Reformations. These phases represent constantly

interacting forces separated here only for the sake of analysis and the gaining of a unified view of this tremendous movement.

The economic Renaissance and the Renaissance of culture may be well considered somewhat together; the former was a natural preface to the latter. Before Michelangelo came the Medici.

We have noted briefly the decay of feudalism and the rise of the towns. By the middle of the fifteenth century, owing to a great many causes, numbers of the towns had progressed a great way. Many of them had successfully overcome feudal influence and either allied with monarchs or become free cities. Other groups had organized themselves into powerful commercial leagues. The towns became wealthy and constituted a powerful factor in Renaissance life.

Leading all others in their progressiveness were the Italian towns. Feudal opposition was weakest in Italy, and Italy, too, occupied a geographical position particularly advantageous to the activities of the towns. Consider her place in the fifteenth-century world. She controlled the Mediterranean, then necessarily the center of trade. West and north of Italy were the crude but rising Spanish, French, English, and German territories. To the east lay the Byzantine Empire and the dominion of the Arabs.

Broadly speaking, the East had an abundance of the luxuries of life and the West an abun-

dance of certain necessities; and the Italian merchants quite naturally became the middlemen of Europe. The Crusades had aroused in many backward Europeans the taste for oriental luxuries. The Italian coastal cities, with Genoa, Pisa, and Venice in the leadership, pushed their galleys to the east, Alexandria, Jaffa, and Constantinople, and came back with ivory, gold, silks, dyes, spices, and slaves. Caravans hauled them over the Alps to western Europe. Sometimes, as their skill in navigation increased, the Italians sailed their galleys past Gibraltar on an all-water route to cities on the North Sea.

Such splendrous wares excited the crude Europeans hardly less than the gold of the explorers aroused the desires of the North American Indian. Gladly did the natives in France, Germany, and even England exchange their scarce coins, their linen, wool, furs, and leather for these glittering oriental goods. Back to the Levant with these staples sped the Italian galleys; the circle of exchange was complete. Modern commerce was born; commercial regulations came into being; roads were built. The Italian cities set up banks, started currency reforms.

Growing trade also changed the towns of the West. If they wanted oriental luxuries they must give in exchange goods of their own. Raw materials would not do; they cost too much to transport. Hence there arose side by side with the already-established merchant gilds the craft

gilds with their workers in linen, leather, furs, and other commodities. So powerful did the gilds become that they often controlled the towns economically, socially, and governmentally. At strategic points all over Europe towns developed with the new trade.

But the increase of export trade marked the end of the dominance of gild control. The sending of a galley fleet to the Levant demanded individual initiative and enterprise free from the minute rules and regulations of the gilds. The individual business genius arose, who took great risks but made fabulous profits. The capitalist was born.

Combination, in the form of the merchant company—a group undertaking enterprises too large for the individual capitalist—was also born. Many of these combinations—since blood is thicker than water—were made up of members of the same family. These combinations engaged also in financial operations, particularly banking. Such operations reached in Italy great proportions. Florence, like New York City to-day, became the banking center of the world. The House of Medici in that flourishing city, by the time Constantinople fell before Mohammed II, operated branch banks in every important commercial city of Europe. And the Medici gradually controlled Florence.

More than any other city, too, Florence was the center of that great Renaissance of learning

and culture which, starting in Italy, radiated its life-giving influences over the length and breadth of Europe. To the furtherance of the new culture, the new life, indeed, the Medici and their ilk lent the strength of their genius and money-power.

The occurrence in Italy of this rebirth of culture and learning can be ascribed to no particular cause. Feudalism was weakest there. Italy was nearest the Orient. Towns rose there more quickly, became more powerful. Greek scholars from the East filtered in. When the Byzantine capital fell in 1453 there was an influx of these learned men from the East. Petrarch, the first of the neo-classicists, was an Italian. But all these explanations leave still mysterious the wondrous flowering of life—gay, artistic, bubbling, joyous, sophisticated and sometimes cruel, but free—which took place in those Italian cities of the fifteenth century.

The Italian revival of learning at once eloquently exemplified both man's discovery of himself and his discovery of the past. The Middle Age had placed but small premium on the individual self and individual expression. Each human unit was subjected to the whole. The focus of attention on the world to come had involved denial of self in this sphere. The strong arm of authority exercised by the Church stimulated no individual initiative. The accomplishments of the Middle Age were communal.

To the Italian cities had now come wealth. They were close to the luxuriant East, which knew not self-denial. There came a new sense of power, a heightened pulse-beat. There was joy in living one's life. Capitalism emphasized individual accomplishment. The vision of the world to come dimmed; a new and nearer vision of the possibilities of this life took its place. The individual assumed an importance unequaled since the Age of Pericles. "Whenever you draw close enough to a Renaissance situation to see what is really happening," says Mr. Ferdinand Schevill, "you discover that the men who figure as leaders in the field under examination are liberating themselves from the fetters of the past and aiming at fuller self-expression. Philosophically stated, the Renaissance is therefore an age of emerging individualism, the essence of which is freedom."[1]

Emphasizing Renaissance worldliness in contrast to Middle-Age otherworldliness, Mr. John Herman Randall, Jr., maintains that the foundation of the new spirit was "an increasing interest in human life as it can be lived upon earth, within the bourne of time and space, and without necessary reference to any other destiny in the beyond or hereafter. . . . It meant that when society offered more than a rude mining-camp existence of blood and toil, the monastic temper declined, and gave way to a new and

[1] *A History of Europe* (Harcourt, Brace), 1925, p. 49.

vital perception of the dignity of man, of the sweetness and glory of being a rational animal.'' [2]

Fired by ideals of liberty and individualism, it is not surprizing that the men of the Renaissance period, particularly in Italy, turned to whatever sources they could to confirm and enlarge those ideals. The literatures of Greece and Rome were an inexhaustible storehouse; only when they felt the same stirrings and passions known of old could the Renaissance students grasp the real content of these rich heritages. To quote Mr. Randall again:

> It happened that those who felt the call of human experience had a great literature to which they could turn, a literature written by peoples who had been stirred by the same passion for the free life of man in its natural setting. . . . But if the manuscripts of Greece and Rome had perished every one beneath the monk's missal, the outcome would not have been essentially different.[3]

Man had discovered himself. Looking backward he found in the records they had left a civilization of men who also had known ''the happy, natural, and wholesome enjoyment of the goods of human life in a refined civilization.'' The man of the Renaissance had discovered his past, his spiritual ancestry.

[2] *The Making of the Modern Mind* (Houghton Mifflin), 1926, pp. 114-115.
[3] *Ibid.*, 1926, p. 115.

The part played by Petrarch (1304-1374) in the Renaissance discovery of the past we have already mentioned. In espousing a reform of the curriculum of the schools he urged that Latin be studied not just as a dead language, the medium of theological disputes, but as a means towards the comprehension and the recreation of the full, genial, and comparatively happy outlook on life set forth in Latin literature. He used the word *humanitas* in its broadest connotation. Petrarch has been called the father of humanism, the first modern man. And he was the first of the group of collectors who spent their lives unearthing the now-treasured classical manuscripts. Among his confrères in this notable effort were Aurispa, who found texts of Sophocles and Æschylus, and Poggio Bracciolini, who recovered works of Cicero, Tacitus, and Livy.

Humanism, this movement to recover the genial spirit of the ancients, found, as the sixteenth century opened, its most brilliant exponent in the remarkable scholar and reformer, Desiderius Erasmus. Born in Rotterdam on the lower Rhine in 1467, he became ere his three-score years and ten were finished a resident of every country in Europe. He was in truth a citizen of the world, whose brilliant cosmopolitan spirit was broadened and deepened by scholarly delving into the realms of the past. Erasmus's most notable contribution to scholarship was a Greek New Testament with Latin translation made in 1516,

which discredited the Church's Vulgate version of the Bible. His *Praise of Folly* merrily lashed what he held to be the materialism and hollow traditions of the Renaissance Church which he hoped to reform. His activities in that direction belong to the history of the Reformation.

Suffice it to say that the names of Petrarch and Erasmus must be writ at the head of that honorable roll of humanists who vitalized the Renaissance by leading men back to the past.

And what did it yield, this twin discovery by man of himself and his past? What was the contribution of the Renaissance? Consider the flowering of art and literature in but a single Italian city, Florence. To literature it gave those great giants: Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio; and to the fine arts such names as Giotto, Ghiberti, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, Botticelli, and Cellini.

What geniuses they were! What myriad-minded men!

Michelangelo (1475-1564) was by preference a sculptor, and his chisel has left such monumental works as his *Moses* in Rome and the figures on the tombs of the Medici in Florence. Michelangelo was a painter, not of his own will, but at the command of a pope. His scenes of creation achieved with a brush on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel are still one of the richest artistic treasures of the Church. Michelangelo was an architect; in witness whereof let it only

be said that he designed and built the dome of St. Peter's.

Side by side with Michelangelo on the Renaissance canvas stands Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), painter, sculptor, architect, poet, musician, anatomist, botanist, and physicist. The *Last Supper* and the *Mona Lisa* have made Leonardo as universally appreciated as he was himself universally-minded. The airplane is among the most modern of inventions, yet not a few of the principles of aerodynamics are to be found in the notebooks, almost five centuries old, of this Florentine artist.

Benvenuto Cellini (1500-1571), master of all sorts of metal working, whose autobiography furnishes an unexcelled picture of the fullness, the gaiety, the abandon—and the cruelty—of Renaissance life, is another of the Florentine galaxy. Which of the great nations and empires of the modern world, we may ask, can rival this single city of Florence in its contributions to the fine arts? And Florence had by no means a monopoly on the Italian Renaissance. From Urbino, a mountain town, came Raphael, whose madonnas still charm a world. Venice, too, did not lag behind; she gave Giorgione, Paul Veronese, Tintoretto, Titian, and Bellini.

For the Renaissance this flourishing of Italian art has especial significance, for art, too, broke away from tradition and literally took on new life. The works of these immortals had a style

of their own, the Renaissance style. Of it Mr. Ferdinand Schevill writes:

> Defining that style by its elements, we may . . . say first, that it represented a revival of classical forms; second, that it was inspired with the freshness of nature; and third, that, while by no means wholly emancipated from religion and the Church, it served the interest and outlook of energetic groups which had risen to influence through the opportunities of trade and industry.[4]

In art as in life man was discovering himself, his past, and in nature something of the world. And over the Alps there was, as in Italy, a similar flowering of the spirit, and painting showed the same realism and vitality. We can but mention in passing the names of Albrecht Dürer and Hans Holbein in sixteenth-century Germany, Franz Hals and Rembrandt in seventeenth-century Holland, and Rubens and Van Dyck in the southern Netherlands at the same period.

Literature, while not as flourishing as painting and other fine arts during the earlier Renaissance, made great strides even in Italy. We have referred to Benvenuto Cellini, the metal worker. But his immortality is equally assured by his autobiography. Of more political than literary significance is *The Prince* of Niccolo Machiavelli, a manual of the theory and prac-

[4] *A History of Europe* (Harcourt, Brace), 1925, p. 39.

tise of despotism and of the doctrine of expediency.

But across the Alps literature reached great heights. The extreme riotousness and abandon of the period finds its great champion in the Frenchman, Rabelais (1483-1553), whose laughter and satire found supreme expression in his *Gargantua,* a merry tirade against the old system of thought and education. Another Frenchman, Montaigne (1533-1592), the father of the essay, espoused a spirit of toleration.

And in the British Isles literature flourished as never before or since. The literary Renaissance in England probably received its impetus when around the opening of the sixteenth century the great humanist, Erasmus, visited there and left his impression chiefly on John Colet and Sir Thomas More. Colet, an eloquent preacher, founded St. Paul's school, where Latin and Greek and the Christian studies were presented in a new and vital fashion. More crowned his work with a single volume, *Utopia,* criticizing the order of the day and limning an ideal commonwealth where men would be equal, peaceful, and above all, happy.

The true literary Renaissance, however, came in the spacious times of great Elizabeth, an era which gave us Christopher Marlowe, Ben Jonson, Webster, Beaumont and Fletcher, and the majestic Shakespeare. Of Shakespeare's place

in the Renaissance Mr. Sidney Dark makes admirable estimate:

> If the Renaissance was a definite revolt against dogmatic condemnations, then Shakespeare was its supreme victor. Shakespeare was too experienced to condemn, too interested not to be eager to find explanations for villainy as well as for virtue. He had the typical Renaissance contempt for asceticism and the ascetic life, a contempt expressed in the beautiful line in which he speaks of cloistered sisters "Chanting faint hymns to the cold fruitless moon." [5]

And again:

> In Shakespeare one finds a reflection of nearly all the outstanding figures of his century. He had the love of color and splendor that characterized the Medici and the Italian painters. His laugh, "broad as ten thousand beeves at pasture," as George Meredith described it, reminds one of Rabelais. His tolerance, his sympathetic understanding of men of all kinds and all opinions, and particularly the disillusionment so evident in his later work, all suggest comparison with Montaigne.[6]

But the Renaissance of Learning was not only a forward movement in literature and the fine arts; there were almost equally revolutionary advances in science and invention. Again, man was discovering not only himself and his past, but something about the natural world in which he lived.

[5] *The Story of the Renaissance* (Doran), 1925, p. 102.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

Highly important were the physiological and anatomical discoveries of Dr. Vesalius, who in 1543 revolutionized anatomy; of Ambroise Paré in surgery; of William Harvey, who in 1628 announced his theory of the circulation of the blood; and of a list of other devoted scientists. But the most notable scientific achievements of the Renaissance were those in the realm of physics, mathematics, and astronomy, which led to the rise of the scientific method.

Copernicus (1473-1543) it was who, as every high-school lad has studied, discovered that the earth was but a single, not-too-large planet in the universe; that with other planets it revolved around the sun; and that it spun every twenty-four hours around its own axis. This discovery was a great shock; the medieval theory upheld the somewhat egotistical view that the earth was the center of the universe. Copernicus knew the radical nature of his discovery; his views were not published until a year after his death, and as late as 1600 Bruno was burned at the stake for championing them. The Copernican theory, as it soon came to be called, aroused widespread interest and curiosity and led to an intense development of mathematics.

Kepler's laws of planetary motion and Galileo's formulation of the laws of falling bodies, together with Francis Bacon's *Novum Organum* and Descartes's modern philosophy, are significant because each is a milestone on the road to

the use of the "scientific method," which, exactly contrary to Aristotle and the medieval schoolmen, demands that conclusions be reached only after careful observation of all the necessary phenomena involved in a particular situation. After numbers of units have been examined, some new truth may be induced. The Renaissance scientists never said: "We hold these truths to be self-evident."

More revolutionary in its immediate effects than any of the purely scientific discoveries was the series of inventions which led to the beginnings of modern printing. Before the Renaissance all books were made by the laborious work of copyists. Each copy required the same labor as the original, and parchment was costly. Most important were the inventions of paper and movable type. In 1454, the year after the fall of Constantinople, the first book was printed from movable type, and it was a version of the Bible. Thenceforward books multiplied. Knowledge, once the virtual monopoly of the Church, was rendered accessible to thousands. Reformers and innovators now had at their command the fundamental and most powerful instrument of propaganda—the printing press. Its effects were soon felt. Man's three great discoveries—himself, his past, and the world—were given tremendous impetus.

One other group of scientific advances must be considered in the Renaissance of learning: those

in geography and navigation. Geographical knowledge began to increase by no deliberate effort; rather the increase was a by-product of the search of sailor-merchants for markets and new routes of trade. Marco Polo, too, left an account of his perilous journey to the Far East, which stimulated imagination. In the fifteenth century maps were made as much to add to man's knowledge as to give practical information to mariners. Then, too, the broad discovery of the past led to the rediscovery of Greek ideas on geography, particularly the Ptolemaic teachings which held that the earth was not flat but round. Add to these the more extensive use of the astrolabe, a device for determining latitude; the compass, and the construction of larger and stronger sailing vessels, and it becomes quite evident that the time was ripe for the great voyages of discovery. Man's self and his past have been discovered; now, the world! The once passive, childlike European soon becomes an adventurous youth.

## XIII

## GEOGRAPHICAL DISCOVERIES, THE STRONG MONARCHY, COLONIZATION, AND THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION

At least two other factors in addition to particular advances in science are responsible for the geographical discoveries which took place in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. These factors are the rise of nationalities with new commercial possibilities, and man's desire for self-expression and adventure which was a part of the Renaissance spirit of exuberant youth in western Europe. There is still another impetus, minor perhaps, which cannot be overlooked, especially when discoveries resulted in new colonies: namely, the religious motive, the European's desire to convert the heathen and uphold the Christ.

The start in the succession of great discoveries was made by Portugal, a little country on the western edge of the Spanish peninsula. Two circumstances lent impetus to the Portuguese discoveries: Portugal did not share in the profits of the spice trade in which the Italian towns led, and Portugal lay opposite the continent of Africa, the west coast of which was inhabited by Mohammedan Moors who constantly interfered with Portuguese trade. Prince Henry the Navi-

gator (1394-1460), of Portuguese royal blood, purposed reaching the East Indies, source of spices, by sailing around the African continent. His expeditions reached west to the Azores and south to the Cape Verde Islands and almost to the equator. In 1486 Vasco de Gama found the new route and reached Calicut in Hindustan. The opening of the all-water route sounded the knell of the commercial supremacy of the Italian cities and of the Mediterranean.

The Portuguese were pioneers. Their success led others to try, just as in our own day one triumph in aviation leads others to new ventures. Discovery, the finding of new routes to the Indies, became the vogue of late-fifteenth-century Europe.

An outstanding triumph, tho he never knew its real significance, was scored by Christopher Columbus, native of Genoa, whose expedition was fitted out by Isabella of Castile. This hardy sailor, intrigued by the Ptolemaic theory that the earth was round, believed he could reach the Indies by sailing straight west. What he did is well known. On October 12, 1492, he reached the West Indies. He thought he had reached the already known East Indies. Fame came quickly. Three subsequent voyages never revealed that he had reached, not the outskirts of Asia, but a new continent. Fame passed quickly. He died almost in disgrace, and, ironically, the continent he unknowingly but definitely discovered

bears the name of another—Amerigo Vespucci.

In 1497 John Cabot, a Venetian hired by Henry VII of England, reached Breton Island off the North American coast. Other discoverers penetrated the new land until it became apparent that it was neither Asia nor the East Indies, but a new continent, a view confirmed in a three-year expedition from 1519 to 1522, on which Magellan, a Portuguese in Spanish service, and his companions rounded the world. (Magellan himself was killed in the Philippine Islands.)

One important phenomenon is to be noted regarding the geographical discoveries and the great colonizing undertakings which resulted from them: both discovery and colonization were successfully carried on largely by those national groups which had by the end of the fifteenth century developed into relatively strong monarchies. Discovery and colonization were assured by the support of a strong home government. And the strong monarchy, triumphant by one means or another over the decentralized feudal system, was one of the chiefest developments of the Renaissance.

All over Europe the rise of the towns had been a great boon to the power of the king. Under the feudal system the king had been among the great feudal barons simply the first among equals. The growth of towns and cities changed this. The king naturally wished to assert his supe-

riority in fact as well as in name; he had to gain sufficient power to lower the great feudal barons to a secondary position. They were the obstacle to be overcome. Feudal barons, too, were an obstacle for the growing towns and their citizens, who did not wish to pay feudal dues. Traders and merchants wished to be free from outside influences. It was natural then that the king should ally with the towns against feudal barons. The king got money and support from the towns; the towns received charters of privileges from the king and admission to the feudal assembly.

It is significant that Germany and Italy, where nationalism did not develop, had no part in the subsequent colonization efforts. Both these countries during the Middle Age were under the rule of the Holy Roman Emperor. In Germany a landed nobility and in Italy powerful independent towns militated against him. It was not until the nineteenth century that these two countries ceased to be mere geographic expressions and became united under powerful central governments.

In the countries where the monarchy waxed in strength, particular forces—in addition to the alliance between the king and the towns—aided the movement. And these countries initiated the discoveries and reaped their harvest.

Portugal was unified territorially by 1263. A line of able kings and the stimulus of a foe—the

Mohammedan—to be vanquished had undoubtedly aided the process of union. Portugal was the first of European states to gather the fruits of discovery, and altho overcome by Spain in 1580, she regained her independence in 1640.

At the close of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries Spain made great strides toward the establishment of a strong monarchy. Nothing did more to make this possible than the marriage, happy both personally and politically, of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile. Ferdinand was an able ruler. He secured in 1504 from France recognition of Spanish rights in Naples, Sardinia, and Sicily. Spain, too, faced the Mohammedan foe. Granada, the last Mohammedan stronghold, fell in 1492, the year of Columbus's first voyage. Successful voyages, of course, while made possible by the support of strong monarchy, in turn added prestige to the monarchy whence they emanated.

Altho England did not fare so well territorially in the Hundred Years' War, which ended in 1453—she lost all her rich French provinces save the town of Calais—there occurred almost immediately afterward an internal struggle, the Wars of the Roses (1455-1485), which did much to hasten the establishment of the strong monarchy in the island kingdom. The Wars of the Roses were a series of combats among rival claimants to the throne. When

Henry VII, first of the great Tudor monarchs, finally triumphed, it meant the beginning of absolutism in England. And at that time the English people welcomed it, for the Wars of the Roses had been so destructive to the common people that they accepted readily any innovation which promised peace and security; the Tudor monarchy promised to be that force. Henry VII's aim to create a strong monarchy was further facilitated by the fact that the Wars of the Roses had virtually wiped out many noble families; he could seize their lands, strengthen his position, and increase his wealth.

While the Hundred Years' War lessened England's hold on the Continent, it served to strengthen, unify, and solidify France under a strong monarchy. There was an awakened sense of patriotism. Louis XI (1461-1483) crushed the power of the barons; his son, Charles VIII (1483-1498) married Anne of Brittany and that duchy was brought under the French crown. This same Charles VIII started France on her century-long struggle for European hegemony.

Several other developments, more or less common to all the growing monarchies, aided the king in the increase of his power. There was the emotional element of nationalism, a feeling, a loyalty, based on a community of interests social, economic, and linguistic. Nationalism, beginning and developing at this period, rises with unfailing crescendo until the late World War—

and still continues. At the beginning of the sixteenth century this sentiment worked towards the enhancement of the king. Local loyalties, particularly in the towns, widened and came to include those who spoke the same language and had the same customs. The loyalty gradually grew into love of country. The personification of the country or nation came to be the king—ultimately most loyalties must have a personal or personified object.

The trend towards increased monarchical power was buttressed by the works of certain political observers and critics of the time. *The Prince* of Niccolo Machiavelli, written in 1513, was an apologia for absolutism and even tyranny. *The Leviathan* of Thomas Hobbes, altho it appeared almost a century and a half later, was almost a full-fledged acceptance of the necessity of absolutism to avoid "perpetuell warre of every man against his neighbour."

The kings were not slow to take advantage of these new influences. National assemblies—the Cortes in Spain and Portugal, the Estates-General in France, and to a lesser degree the English Parliament—waned in power. The king became the head of the country's judicial system. Crown officers began to replace feudal officials in collection of taxes, in preservation of the peace, and in administration of justice. And the king began to build his own armed force. The point especially to be remembered at this junc-

ture is that in the geographical discoveries, the efforts at colonization which followed, and the resulting expansion and change in commerce and trade which revolutionized the world, nay almost made a new world—in all these advances it was the strong monarchies which took the lead and reaped both the profits and the problems. The colonization and territorial expansion movement followed fast upon the heels of the discoveries.

Vasco de Gama returned to Lisbon from Calicut with a cargo valued at sixty times the cost of his expedition. The Portuguese had found an all-water and paying route to the Indies. Portuguese fleets regularly rounded the Cape of Good Hope. Goa was made the capital of extensive Portuguese possessions in the East which included Ormus and Muscat, Madras, Ceylon, the Spice Islands, Java, Sumatra, Celebes, and Borneo. In addition, they possessed Brazil and trading posts on the coast of Africa. They began trade with China in 1517 and Japan in 1542. Portugal replaced the Arab trading empire, and Lisbon became the trading depot for the coveted eastern commodities. Portugal made no effort to colonize; the Portuguese merely set up trading posts. Her dominion over half the world—all Africa, her Eastern possessions, and Brazil—did not last for long. She had neither the population nor the resources to provide products of her own for Eastern shipment, nor had she the power to defend her carrying trade. Hence, most

of the Portuguese possessions were lost to the Dutch in the seventeenth century. (It should be remembered that Portugal was under Spanish rule from 1580 to 1640.) Brazil became independent in 1822.

When Columbus made his famous voyage, Spain immediately claimed the right to share the world with Portugal. Pope Alexander VI intervened and drew the famous "papal line of demarcation" on May 4, 1493. The imaginary line was drawn from pole to pole, 100 leagues west of the Azores. It was shortly changed to 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands. All the uncivilized world east of the line went to Portugal; all west to Spain.

The Spanish Empire was built largely by the Conquistadores, a colorful group of men who searched for ideal cities and fountains of perpetual youth. Ponce de Leon discovered Florida in 1512; Cortez defeated the Aztecs and conquered Mexico in 1519; Pizarro defeated the Incas and conquered Peru in 1531. The Spanish Empire ultimately included the West Indies (Haiti, Cuba, Porto Rico, Jamaica, etc.); Florida, New Mexico, Central America, and all South America save Portuguese Brazil; and the Philippines.

The Spanish colonies were at first disappointing. They yielded no spices, no silks, and scarcely any gold, but the disappointment was not for long. There was some gold and silver in Mexico

and still more in Peru. And there was sugar, a new commodity, in the West Indies. In 1580, it is to be remembered, Spain conquered Portugal, and the East and Brazil became Spain's. Small wonder that the Spanish Empire dazzled Europe almost to the close of the sixteenth century!

Maladministration at home and abroad in the course of time sounded the death knell to this magnificent monopoly of trade and commerce. Philip II of Spain was the ruler who bore the brunt of his own shortsightedness. Cruelty and enslaved labor in the Peruvian and Mexican silver mines reduced alarmingly the native population there. There was at first no attempt to develop agriculture and industry—necessary fundamentals—in the colonies. Exorbitant taxes were levied on trade with the colonies; commerce with America was grabbed by smugglers, chiefly English and Dutch. Heavy property taxes at home, the driving out of Jews and Moors, who had been the enterprising business men of Spain, seizure of financial control by German bankers —all these things abetted the decay of the Spanish monopoly.

But the worst came when the Netherlands, richest province of the empire, revolted in 1566. We shall see when we study the two Reformations that Philip II's harsh measures against Protestants were largely responsible for the revolt; its effects for a time on trade were stupendous. Antwerp, a Flemish city, had been the

commercial and financial center of Europe. This supremacy now passed to the Dutch city, Amsterdam. During the revolt Dutch sailors captured the rich eastern routes and trading possessions formerly belonging to Portugal. They even got a foothold in Brazil. By virtue of the discoveries of Henry Hudson in 1609 and settlement in 1621, the Dutch claimed territory around the mouth of the Hudson River. Here, on Manhattan Island, they founded New Amsterdam, the present New York City. To add to Spain's losses, England and France claimed the finest portion of North America.

France, and especially England, entered somewhat later into colonial and commercial competition. Both, with no success, attempted to wrest from the Dutch a share of the Far Eastern trade. They then turned, almost simultaneously, westward to America. In 1607 a company of daring Englishmen settled at the mouth of a river in what is now Virginia. The river they called James in honor of the sovereign who had given them their charter, and the settlement on that river they called Jamestown. Thirteen years later, another but different group, refugees from the persecutions carried on by the same King James, namely, certain radical Protestants called Separatists, landed with a small ship, the *Mayflower,* on the bleak New England coast off Cape Cod. There, after hardships almost unbearable, they established the colony of Plymouth. The

seed of English colonization in America was sown. But a year after the first English settlers had implanted themselves at Jamestown, a great French explorer founded Quebec on the St. Lawrence and staked out the whole basin of that mighty river as the New France. What happened when the expanding English settlements clashed with the Dutch in New York and the French in the north constitutes another colorful chapter of history.

The effects of the discovery of the world by man in the Renaissance period were tremendous. To grasp the significance of the results of discoveries, colonization, and expanding trade staggers the imagination. In 1400 the known world stretched from the British Isles to the little-frequented Far East, north to the Scandinavian peninsula, and south to the northern coast of Africa. Scarcely more than a century later the present extent of the earth was known. Europe was started on world conquest; the world was Europeanized. The focal point of European commerce moved from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. The financial center shifted from Florence to Augsburg, to Antwerp, to Amsterdam. The American continent furnished a new frontier for the adventurer, as well as a haven for the refugee. New markets, new sources of material simultaneously opened. Well may the whole movement be called the Commercial Revolution. The middle class grew

in strength. Let us now briefly examine some of the secondary effects of the movement.

There was the importation—from the seemingly inexhaustible mines of newly-discovered America—of gold and silver, a phenomenon which was most influential in substituting a money system for the system of barter and exchange in kind. This instituted a money-economy, the detailed results of which are examined in the Outline of Business. It is sufficient to say here that there followed an amazing inflation and a necessary adjustment of prices and wages.

When money became synonymous with wealth, the nations with colonies sought to bring gold into the mother country by exploiting their colonies. This effort crystallized into an economic system called mercantilism, which we shall discuss in a subsequent chapter. It is to be remembered that mercantilism is a direct outgrowth of the Commercial Revolution.

The finding of an all-water route to the Orient allowed spices to be imported in such quantity that they became a widely used commodity. Articles of bulk like tea, coffee, rice, and sugar were also imported and soon added to the European diet. Altho gold and silver were at first the only imports from America, the potato and tobacco ultimately found their places on the list, as did sugar when African slaves were sent to the islands of the Caribbean to work on plantations.

We have noted that the gild system began to decline when the Italians started trading expeditions to the East. Enterprisers were needed to float ventures on a large scale. There arose simultaneously banking houses to meet the increased financial needs. The increased trade resulting from the discoveries caused banking operations to assume multiplied proportions. The Florentine Medici, the richest company of the latter half of the fifteenth century, commanded resources equivalent to $7,500,000; the Fuggers of Augsburg—who incidentally could even influence the election of a Holy Roman Emperor—operated with a capital estimated at $40,000,000.

Increasingly it became apparent that the form of even the merchant-companies would not suffice for the new colonial enterprises. The old companies had been family partnerships, which lacked security and continuity since death or even a quarrel might upset their equilibrium. The new needs gave rise in the last of the sixteenth century to the joint-stock company, father of the modern corporation, with shares which could be bought and sold, a board of directors, and an elected manager of competence and talent. Liability in these new enterprises was limited, furthermore, to the amount any individual had invested. The buying and selling of shares started speculation; there were bear and bull markets in Antwerp and Amster-

dam. After 1600 practically all the great trading companies, the great colonial enterprises, assumed the joint-stock plan. Thus the Virginia Company, the Hudson's Bay Company, the African Company, the Dutch East India Company, the Company of the One Hundred Associates, the Danish African Company, and hosts of others. The evolution of these companies, it will be remembered, played no small part in American colonial history.

All this accelerated activity gave rise to a new class, the middle class, business men, capitalists, residing chiefly in the towns—bourgeoisie they are often called. This class, becoming wealthy, was destined to play an increasingly important rôle in the history of the world.

## XIV

### THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION

A NEW art, a new literature, new science, new inventions, a new monarchy, a new world—these were some of the first fruits of the Renaissance in western Europe. We have considered them as the results, almost inevitable, of the European's passing from childhood to youth; they are phenomena which came into being as a part of the triple discovery of man's self, his past, and the world. We turn now to the final, but by no means least important, phenomenon of the Renaissance period, the breaking of the unity of the Catholic Church. This was somewhat of a threefold phenomenon involving: the Protestant Reformation, in which certain groups broke definitely away from the authority of the Catholic Church and established new forms of the Christian religion; the Counter-Reformation, in which the effort was made to correct abuses in the Catholic Church and regain for her the ground lost by the Protestant Reformation; and, finally, a series of wars which, altho having also a dynastic basis, have almost all an underlying religious motif. In the present chapter we shall consider the Protestant Reformation. But first we must scrutinize briefly the scene on the European stage at the opening of the sixteenth century.

Italy, center of the Revival of Learning, underwent a queer political development during the Renaissance. During the Middle Age the new Italian towns had joined forces with the pope against the Holy Roman Emperor, partly because the principle of feudalism which the emperor seemed to personify threatened to thwart the growth of the towns, and partly because the emperor, who was a German, seemed to represent foreign domination of a growing Italian nationalism. These were the principles that divided the Guelfs and the Ghibellines. The emperor lost. But the Italian towns did not unite. They quarreled among themselves, and in northern Italy the stronger cities overcame the weaker. The same lack of capacity to unify accounted partly for their inability to secure inner harmony and a strong domestic government; they fell prey to factions and despots. Three northern towns, Milan, Venice, and Florence, emerge as powerful by 1500, controlling the provinces around them. They, together with the Kingdom of Naples in the South and the States of the Church, control Italy at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Milan had come in 1450 under the rule of a military despot, the Sforza. Venice, once center of the commercial world, became a commercial oligarchy. Florence, whose wealth and culture were unmatched in Italy, tho she retained a republican form of government longer than her

sister cities, passed towards the end of the fifteenth century into the control of a single family, the wealthy Medici.

The State of the Church was the temporal dominion of the pope built up around the city of Rome during the Middle Age. The popes of the fifteenth century spent most of their time trying to reduce to submission the powerful feudal lords within their realm. In setting out to increase its temporal power the Renaissance papacy was simply accepting rather than stemming the movement of the times towards worldliness. Furthermore, reflecting the Italy of their day, the Renaissance popes took up humanism, pagan philosophy, and the patronage of arts and letters. They were eager for the Church to have her share of the glories of the Renaissance. Hence, while trying to consolidate their Italian states, they laid heavier financial burdens on all Christendom to support a magnificent court at Rome and to allow the Church to act as patron to the painters, architects, and sculptors of the time. That this spirit led them to worldly excesses cannot be denied.

The kingdom of Naples had been since 1435 the possession of Aragon. But it had been wrested from a French ruler. The French crown continued to assert its claim to the Kingdom, which included southern Italy and the island of Sicily, and in 1494 Charles VIII of France set

out to make good the claim by his famous invasion of Italy.

When Italy in the thirteenth century threw off the yoke of the emperor, the Holy Roman Empire included practically nothing outside Germany. Hence Germany and the Empire came to mean one and the same thing. But the feudal lords controlled Germany. During the fourteenth century they made the emperor elective. Seven princes—four lay and three ecclesiastical—elected him. Three houses of the imperial legislature controlled his every action after election. A nationalist movement in the fifteenth century failed. Germany remained disunited until the nineteenth century.

Frederick III, of the House of Hapsburg, Holy Roman Emperor from 1440 to 1493, was a man of remarkable foresight. Had he lived in our time, Frederick would probably have headed some great business combination. He evolved in his day a matrimonial program, furthered by his son Maximilian I, which in 1519 was to bring under the dominion of one individual more lands and more people than under any other Christian sovereign.

Maximilian, Frederick's son, who from his father inherited Western Austria on the upper Rhine, Austria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Tyrol, was joined in wedlock to Mary of Burgundy, heiress of the Netherlands and Franche-Comté. To Maximilian and Mary was born a son, Philip,

who in time by marriage combined his wide possessions with those of an even greater heiress, Joanna, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain. The first-born of this union, Charles, therefore inherited Spain, the Netherlands, and Austria, with all their possessions. Over these he became ruler in 1519. Two years later, on his twenty-first birthday, he was made, by family influence, national sentiment, and the money of the Fuggers (great German bankers) Holy Roman Emperor. This Charles V is the chief actor in the European theater during the first half of the sixteenth century—powerful because he inherited much, reasonably capable, the enemy of the Reformation—a figure sinister to some, fascinating and splendid to others.

Spain, foremost of Charles's inheritances, was a strong monarchy when he received it. We have noted the significance in this respect of the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile. Their final conquest of the Moors, great triumph tho it was, had one drawback—it led to the rise of Christian intolerance in Spain, finding its climactic expression in the Inquisition. This dark institution, placed now in control of the crown rather than of the pope, embarked upon its bloody history. Jews and Moors were bade to accept Christianity or face the Inquisition. Thousands met death. Other thousands left Spain. And Spain was the loser. As in other

countries, strong monarchy developed at the expense of the national legislature.

In France, too, the strong monarchy thrived. The Hundred Years' War, as we have noted, strengthened national sentiment and the monarch. In 1439 the Estates General, the national assembly, had voluntarily given up to King Charles VII its right to confirm the levying of the *taille*, the tax which made up the chief revenue of the land. Louis XI (1461-1483), Charles's son and successor, by diplomacy and cunning broke the power of many of the feudal lords and added province after province to the royal domain. This policy of centralization and union was furthered by the marriage of Charles VIII, Louis's successor, to Anne, heiress of the duchy of Brittany. After the middle of the fifteenth century the Estates General rarely met. Even the pope's power in France had been limited by an assertion of the independence of the French Church in the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges in 1438.

Henry VII, first Tudor king of England (1485-1509), who took the throne when he emerged victorious from the Wars of the Roses, by his wisdom and subtlety overcame to a large degree both the great nobles and a Parliament which earlier had managed to arrogate to itself a goodly part in the government. Henry VII's power was endangered from without chiefly by France and Scotland. He protected himself

against Scotland by marrying his daughter Margaret to James IV of Scotland, and protected himself against France by a dynastic union with the Spanish throne.

We have seen that the Middle Age was—to as great a degree as has ever been attained—an era of European unity. Epigrammatically, there were no states but estates. In the very name, Holy Roman Empire, there was the thought of a great European commonwealth under the double guardianship of pope and emperor. We have now surveyed the rise of national states in three countries of Europe: Spain, France, and England. That these should compete for European hegemony and the control of the resources of the new world and the Far East was almost inevitable. That competition was to precipitate many modern problems and entail numerous wars. The task of maintaining peace—or at least a truce between the contending powers—was solved by the so-called "balance of power." When one nation became dangerously powerful, the others were likely to combine in opposition. The new national states, furthermore, were to constitute a powerful factor in the Reformation.

The first evidence of this international—or dynastic—competition was the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII of France in 1494, marking the beginning of the Franco-Spanish struggle over the unhappy Peninsula. At the same time we

note the decline of Italy, whose towns and states were unable to unite politically or culturally.

Charles VIII led his swashbuckling army into Italy in 1494. None of the five important states, standing separately, offered any serious opposition. The Aragon ruler was driven from the throne of Naples. Ferdinand of Spain was quick to retaliate, and with the aid of some Italian allies he drove Charles back to France. Charles died in 1498 and his successor, Louis XII, took up the cause, but with no avail. In 1504 Ferdinand of Spain secured ultimately his claim to Naples. Milan was tossed back and forth between the contending powers. Venice and the Papal States remained relatively untouched. Florence lost her independence under the tyranny of the Medici, restored to power by Spanish arms.

The sun of Renaissance Italy had set. Her jealous and independent states could not unite; their culture decayed, their brightness faded. They fell before strong nations, as their counterparts, the Greek city-states—also unable to effect union—had fallen before Roman legions. The Renaissance scene shifts across the Alps and merges into the Protestant Reformation.

The Reformation came first in Germany. The Renaissance had not taken the same course in Germany as it had across the Alps in Italy. The Italian humanists, when turning back to the classics, conjured up the philosophy and litera-

ture of pagan writers. Hence Renaissance Italy, as Mr. Sidney Dark says, worshiped Pan while not daring quite to forget Christ. The Church with its headship in Rome was in no small way influenced by Italy's paganized love of beauty, materialism, and luxury.

But across the Alps the German humanists, notably John Reuchlin and Erasmus, in turning to the past, delved not so much into pagan writings as into the writings and teachings of the early Christian fathers and of the Bible itself. They discovered what they believed to be the pristine purity of early Christianity and of the early Church. While remaining loyal to the Church, this group of earnest students could not help but contrast the outward magnificence, luxury, and materialism of the Bride of Christ during the Renaissance with the simplicity and piety of the early followers of the Master.

But the Reformation in Germany had political and economic as well as intellectual causes. It is hard for us to understand to-day the breadth of power exercised by the Catholic Church during the Middle Age. In addition to universal membership, practically everyone was tithed by the Church for its support; there was no easy modern system of voluntary contributions. Attacking the authority or doctrines of the Church was punishable by courts; it constituted a sort of ecclesiastical treason. In each country, too—and the German states constituted

no exception—the Church had extensive property holdings and from these the Church collected taxes. The pope also appointed ecclesiastical officials in the various countries. During the Middle Age, furthermore, the pope asserted that his was the supreme power on earth, both spiritual and temporal. Such power the rising strong monarchies had challenged not without effect. The French Church, indeed, had achieved a certain degree of independence. Spain and England had both demanded the right to nominate their own bishops and had forbidden the appealing of ecclesiastical cases from their realms to Rome.

But Germany, as we have seen, did not develop a strong monarchy, with the result that the Church seemed to try to compensate in Germany for her setbacks in other countries. The fiscal demands of the Renaissance popes led to abuses and to exploitation of the German people. The popes laid heavy taxes there which fell ultimately on the people. They abused their appointive power by taking money from candidates to office—the sin of simony. They used the pretext of a crusade against the Turks—which never took place—for special assessments.

All this the Germans resented, not only because of the injustice involved, but because in the fifteenth century there arose in Germany a strong feeling of nationalism, which, altho it never materialized in a unified nation, neverthe-

less intensified opposition to abuse by an Italian ruler, even tho he were head of Christ's Church. From the German diet went forth protest after protest, but Rome only bore down the harder.

The climax came with the Church's attempt to sell indulgences in Germany on an unprecedented scale. An indulgence is a substitute bought with money for the temporal penalty a sinner must pay for his sins—by good works on this earth or the endurance of punishment in purgatory. Indulgences were dispensed by the pope from the Treasury of Graces, a surplus of good works accumulated by early Christians who had suffered greater penalties than their sins demanded. The selling of indulgences was not an uncommon practise of the medieval Church. Often the proceeds were used for good causes, such as the financing of a crusade. But the widespread abuse of this motive during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, again particularly in Germany, excited opposition. Germany became infested with indulgence salesmen, hawkers representing the pope, who sold for money these certificates absolving the sinner from ordinary penalties. Sometimes, it is said, they were advertised not only as absolutions from penalties but as evidences of forgiveness of sin from God himself.

It was against one of these hawkers, a Dominican friar named Tetzel, that Martin Luther in 1517 arose to protest, declaring that such in-

discriminate selling of indulgences was sin. Who was this Luther? Born in Thuringia in 1483, Martin Luther came of peasant ancestry. He was educated at the university of Erfurt for the law, but became frightened during a thunderstorm in 1505 and took the vow to become a monk. He entered a monastery, studied St. Augustine, who had held that salvation was possible through faith rather than good works, and was led to the conviction that what a man believed, not what he did, would guarantee him the kingdom of heaven. The seed of Luther's fundamental revolt against the existing Church was sown. As a professor of theology at the university of Wittenberg he based his lectures not so much on the teachings of medieval schoolmen as on the writings of the early Christian Fathers and the Bible; Luther became a German humanist, one of the discoverers of the past.

To understand what led Luther to revolt, it is necessary to try to recreate what, as a result of his study and meditation, went on in his mind. Like every medieval Christian, he was interested in salvation, assurance of a life beyond the grave. What was necessary to gain that celestial end? The Catholic Church taught that in addition to faith good works were necessary; the believer must go through the sacraments, perform holy acts. The prescribing of these works was the exclusive right of the Church. Were both faith and good works required for salvation?

That was the question which drove this German monk to agony of spirit. Ultimately he fought it out with himself and decided that faith and faith alone, the simple surrender of one's mind and will to God, was necessary to forgiveness, to peace, to salvation itself. And when Luther searched for confirmation of his new conviction he found it not only in St. Augustine but in St. Paul.

That the position was revolutionary so far as the Church was concerned, is easy to see. When Luther reduced to secondary importance the need of good works as a means to salvation he eliminated the need of a great part of the organizational structure of the Church. Without the need of good works, indulgences, the many forms of penance, in fact the sacraments and the clergy, became superfluous. That extreme, needless to say, was not reached.

It must be remembered, too, that Luther was a German not untrue to the typical characteristics of his people. He had independence, was a bit stubborn, was hot-tempered when aroused, but usually tactful and practical. He was possessed of a real love of knowledge and a devotion to the truth as he saw it. Nor was Luther lacking in a certain mysticism.

He was not, furthermore, without a certain nationalistic feeling. In fact, Mr. Sidney Dark says:

> The most interesting aspect of the work of Luther is that he was a German revolting against international authority. . . . There is immense significance in Luther's provocative inquiry: "What have we Germans to do with St. Peter?" It is perfectly true that Luther was a Christian mystic, preaching, as he believed, a return to primitive and purer Christianity; it is equally true that Luther was a German in revolt against an authority that was non-German.[1]

When Luther became incensed at Tetzel, the indulgence-hawker, he framed his protest against such action in the form of ninety-five theses and nailed them on the door of the church at Wittenberg, October 31, 1517. They were written in Latin for reading by the educated, but were soon translated into German, and in a few weeks spread like wildfire throughout the land. Luther was swept off his feet, for as yet he had no idea of repudiating the Catholic Church. Support gathered on one hand; on the other the Church opposed him. As opposition grew, Luther began to strengthen his position. From 1517 to 1520 he broke farther and farther away from the Church. When drawn into a debate in 1520 he became convinced that the papacy was not an institution of divine origin but of human development. He had visited Rome in 1511 and was shocked at the materialism, luxury, and worldly living of the pope and his court. Now he cleared his own views and wrote pamphlet

[1] *The Story of the Renaissance* (Doran), 1924, p. 140.

after pamphlet attacking clergy, sacraments, and the pope. Pope Leo X in 1520 condemned him as a heretic; Luther burned the papal bull and threw into the fire for good measure the books of Canon or Church Law while the assembled citizens of Wittenberg cheered.

But the climax of the drama had not yet come. The Emperor Charles V was crowned in 1520; his first problem was to settle the heresy of this German monk, who had just been condemned by the pope. Because Luther was supported by a number of princes, Charles was too wise to condemn him unheard. He called the Diet of Worms. Luther was summoned and appeared on April 17, 1521. "Will you recant your heresies?" asked Emperor Charles. Luther demanded to be proved wrong by the Bible. This, not the pope, was final authority to him now. Recant he would not. "Here I stand," he cried, "I can not do otherwise. So help me God. Amen."

Charles V issued his edict against Luther, but circumstances kept the emperor away from the empire for the next decade and the edict went unenforced while Lutheranism spread. Opinion burned into action. Monks and nuns, following Luther's example, renounced their vows and married. Ecclesiastical and monastic properties were confiscated to the profit of the new religion and German princes. The pope's authority was flouted, Catholic practises abandoned. Gradually the reform got out of hand and became radical.

Luther, always a conservative, tried to put on the brakes. He insisted his reform be moderate and only religious. Emerging from his concealment at Wartburg, where he was translating the Scriptures into German, he attempted to quell religious and political anarchy at Wittenberg. When the peasants, maddened by hardship and misery and inspired by the radical doctrines in the air, revolted, Luther sided against them.

Meanwhile Charles V had other affairs to occupy his time. Once again France and Spain locked horns over the spoils of Italy. After a series of wars lasting to 1529, which need not detain us, Charles emerged victorious over Francis I of France in the Italian peninsula. In 1530, following a custom of the Middle Age, Charles had himself crowned Holy Roman Emperor by the pope. When the Emperor came back to Germany the Lutheran thorn was still pricking. The cause had gathered strength. He decided to give the heretics one more hearing. A diet was held at Augsburg in 1530. Melanchthon, a friend of Luther's, restated the new Protestant faith in the Confession of Augsburg, still the fundamental creed of the Lutheran church, but the diet again decided against the Lutherans. Again they were commanded to abandon their heresies, but to no avail. A powerful minority of Protestant princes and followers went out from the diet and formed a league of self-protection.

When civil war seemed inevitable, circumstances again intervened. Charles had to repulse the Turks from Europe and fight a final duel with France, and the wars of religion did not break out until 1546.

In a series of wars from 1546 to 1553 Charles failed to suppress the Lutherans. The French seized this opportunity to embarrass Charles, and he was forced to relinquish three valuable bishoprics, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, to the new allies. He abdicated in 1556, leaving Germany and its problems to his brother Ferdinand. The German religious strife was temporarily settled by the Peace of Augsburg, 1555, which allowed each German prince to choose either Lutheranism or Catholicism. Their subjects had to follow the course of their rulers or move to another province, on the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio*. This action marks the formal abandonment of the unity of the Church. By conceding a territorial basis of religion in Germany, it probably made more remote than ever the hope of a unified Germany. The Peace of Augsburg did not recognize any other forms of Protestantism which had sprung up save Lutheranism. Ecclesiastical princes converted to Protestantism, according to the Peace of Augsburg, had to surrender their property back to the Catholic Church, a concession pregnant with future trouble. The Peace of Augsburg, then, was really little better than a truce.

Luther died in 1546, but his cause prevailed. His influence in history can scarcely be overestimated. He broke the unity of the Catholic Church, a fact which has no mere religious significance, for the breaking of the unity of the Church was a great factor in establishing separate nations in Europe. He established the principle that in matters spiritual the individual might interpret the Scriptures for himself. What is of scarcely less importance, Luther, under the stress of controversy and probably unconsciously, inaugurated the scientific method of investigation as a new approach to the sources of knowledge. Lutheranism spread almost immediately to the Scandinavian countries. And the effect of Luther's revolt swept over Europe. To the growth of the Reformation we now turn.

The church evolved by Martin Luther had its control placed by the Peace of Augsburg in the hands of the prince in whose realm it was accepted. Lutheranism was therefore especially welcomed in those countries ruled by monarchs, particularly when the rulers were partially motivated to revolt against the traditional Catholic Church by the desire to increase the national wealth and revenue by seizing the large property holdings of the Mother Church within their realms. This in no small part explains the relatively quick acceptance of Lutheranism in the Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Norway, and the newly-established Kingdom of Sweden. It

was brought in largely by the rulers, tho they were supported by the aroused nationalist feeling of the people, which resented foreign domination in matters religious and political.

But there was in sixteenth-century Europe one important country ruled not by a monarch but by magistrates elected by the people. This was the Swiss Confederation, a loose union of practically self-governing cantons, whose courageous struggle for independence from the House of Hapsburg need not concern us here. We need now only emphasize that Switzerland was the cradle of a different revolt against the Catholic Church and of a form of Protestantism which by circumstantial necessity had to be adapted to a self-governing people.

The forerunner of this new kind of Protestant church, the originator of the Reformation in Switzerland, was Ulrich Zwingli, a native Swiss, an excellently schooled man, an ordained priest, and an enthusiastic humanist, who about 1520 evolved a reformed church which in matters of faith agreed generally with Lutheranism, but in ecclesiastical organization was not subservient to a prince. It was built rather on the foundation of self-government. Zwingli's Reformed Church in 1549 was merged with that created by a third great leader of the Reformation, John Calvin.

John Calvin was a Frenchman and he was en-

dowed with a mind characteristically French in its ruthless logic. Born in 1509, steeped in classical education and theology at the universities of Paris and Orleans, Calvin studied first for the priesthood but then turned while at Orleans to the secular subject of jurisprudence, which tended only to sharpen his precision of mind. Passionately righteous, probably not forgetting entirely his early inclination towards the priesthood, Calvin was almost inevitably drawn into contact with a group of French spirits who were in sympathy with the Reformation movement. When the French king attacked heretics, Calvin in 1534 fled to the Swiss city of Basel, where, two years later, when he was but twenty-six years of age, he published the *Institutes of the Christian Religion,* which, combining a wealth of information with invincible logic, constituted, according to Mr. Ferdinand Schevill, "the most scientific and critical attempt that had yet been made to reconstruct the Church of Christ on the basis of the evidence supplied by the New Testament." The *Institutes* advanced the thesis that the Church of the Middle Age had made many additions to the apostolic structure not justified by the Scriptures. Rejecting papal infallibility, Calvin insisted upon the infallibility only of the Bible.

When he came to Geneva as chief pastor of the city, Calvin established what he believed to be a Christian commonwealth where the rule of

life was a strict—and at times harsh—application of the New Testament. In this unusual and interesting theocracy were exemplified the three theories or ideas which Calvin contributed to modern religion and for that matter to modern civilization.[2]

Calvin advocated a democratic church government. Each congregation was to be a self-governing body subject neither to prince nor potentate nor to any episcopal hierarchy. This form of ecclesiastical organization was not dictated for Calvin by the democratic form of Swiss political government. Rather, he believed his form to be a model of the original and pure Church as Christ conceived it. All were equal among the twelve disciples. All were equal in those first churches to whom St. Paul preached and wrote. His authority was in Holy Writ. And the championing of this equality among believers had, in contrast to Luther's prince-controlled church, tremendous popular appeal. Here was a church where the man of the middle class found himself on a level with lord and monarch. And here was an idea—the idea of equality—which without doubt gave immeasurable impetus to the rise of the common man, and which—tho nearly 250 years were to pass before its materialization—was to inspire the

[2] For a fuller exposition see Ferdinand Schevill, *A History of Europe* (Harcourt, Brace), p. 132 ff.

world as an ideal for the government of a state as well as for the government of a church.

Calvin's second great contribution was his emphasis on moral conduct. In his theocratic community right living was not a matter of choice. Men, women, and children were moral by coercion. And Calvin's code, as immutable as the law of the Medes and the Persians, was not diluted with the milk of human sympathy; it applied to belief as well as to action. There were no dances, no festivities, no theaters. Church attendance was compulsory. Adultery and heresy were alike punished by death. A poet had his head cut off because his verses were offensive. A Spanish reformer was burned because he did not agree with Calvin about the mystery of the Trinity. A church police force searched out offenders; a civil court imposed punishment. Individualists in thought or action found no asylum in Geneva. The early New England town with its stocks and whipping posts had its counterpart in this theocratic commonwealth.

Calvin's third and probably best-known contribution was a theological one, the doctrine of election or predestination, which at root was the conception of an overwhelmingly omnipotent God. The Creator was majestic, mighty, all-powerful. Man, in contrast, was powerless, insignificant, less than nothing. Hence, Calvin in the unwavering pursuance of his logic deduced that sinful man could gain salvation neither by the

good works recommended by the Catholic Church, nor by the faith preached by Luther. Only God in His infinite mercy could grant to the individual soul salvation, Calvin decreed. And in His omniscience God knows ere a babe is born whether its soul is to be saved or damned. Helpless indeed and hopeless was man's plight under the Calvinistic doctrine. Nothing that man could do would change by jot or tittle his eternal destiny. It would seem—and there were those who prophesied it even in Calvin's time—that such a religion could breed only discouragement and a sense of futility comparable to Oriental fatalism.

That the disciples of Calvinism, on the contrary, have from the beginning proved to be among the most vigorous, courageous, and indomitable of men, has been called repeatedly one of the curious paradoxes of history. But the paradox yields partially at least to resolution. For the true follower of Calvin has, besides an overawing fear of omnipotent God, another passion equally fervid—the burning passion to bring about on earth the kingdom of heaven. Hence, the Calvinist on his knees may be a hopeless determinist; on his feet he is a zealous missionary. The belief in predestination stays not the action of evangelization.

This missionary zeal was manifest from the beginning. From Geneva, where there was a reputable educational system, including an

academy for the training of pastors, scores of apostles went all over Europe carrying the new gospel. To the vitality of their efforts and of the religion they preached and practised, the history of the times attests. Within a century Calvinism was an influence in the English church, became under the dynamic leadership of John Knox the prevailing religion in Scotland, brought about more than any other single factor the revolt of the Netherlands from Spain, was a foremost cause of a civil war in France, and spread even to the rocky coast of New England.

There remains to be considered one other chapter in the Protestant Reformation: the revolt of England from the Catholic Church. This was immediately motivated by political and personal rather than by religious reasons; intellectually and theologically, therefore, it did not assume the importance of the movements led by Luther and Calvin, nor did it produce an outstanding figure to rank with these two.

There were in early sixteenth-century England, it is true, factors tending towards a revolt from Mother Church, similar to those manifested in Germany, the Scandinavian countries, and Switzerland: intellectual groups interested in the Reformation, a feeling that the clergy needed moral reform, a growing sense of nationalism which resented foreign domination in any form, and a strong monarchy jealous of any actual or potential encroachment on its power. But, de-

spite the force of all these factors, the immediate reason why England broke from the Church of Rome in 1534 was that England's king, Henry VIII, wanted a divorce from a queen of whom, for various reasons, he had grown tired; and when the Catholic Church refused to give it to him, he set up a separate Church of England with himself at its head, a church whose ecclesiastical officers had to accede to his wishes.

Henry VIII had married Catherine of Aragon, daughter of the famed Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain. Because she had been the wife of his deceased older brother, Arthur, the marriage required a papal dispensation to circumvent the canon law that a man may not marry his brother's wife—even tho the brother be dead. Henry was apparently contented with Catherine for eighteen years. Not only in marriage had he been a good Catholic; his was the pen which wrote a bitter refutation to Lutheran doctrines, an action for which the pope rewarded him with the added title, "Defender of the Faith," an epithet still borne by English monarchs. But there developed around 1530 two circumstances which changed Henry's attitude towards his marriage: altho Catherine had presented him with six children, only one, a daughter, had survived, and Henry wanted a male heir to secure the succession of the ruling line; and further, about this time Henry experienced a terrific in-

fatuation for a certain black-eyed Anne Boleyn, maid-in-waiting at the court.

Henry appealed, through his trusted Cardinal Wolsey, to Pope Clement VII to have his marriage annulled, contending that since the union was originally legal only by grace of a papal dispensation, it would be a simple matter now to declare it null and void. Clement VII, tho he might have desired to do so, was stayed from granting the request by two difficulties: it was not expedient for a pope to reverse the decision of a predecessor, and it was still less expedient for His Holiness to oppose the Emperor Charles V, foremost Catholic monarch, who supported the natural objections of his aunt, the Queen Catherine, to the proposed nullification of the royal marriage.

After patient delays, Henry, whose passion for the young Anne Boleyn grew daily stronger, ultimately took the matter into his own hands. Step by step he led his subservient Parliament to pass measures denying the authority of the pope and establishing a separate Church of England with the king as its ecclesiastical head.

The change was one of organization rather than of dogma, but it precipitated a conflict which did not end for over a century. Faithful Catholics who continued to affirm papal supremacy were beheaded; Protestants who denied a single Catholic tenet save the supremacy of the pope were burned. On the two scores, thousands

suffered the fate of martyrs. Henry—besides marrying at different times six wives—took just one more major step against the Catholic Church: for reasons chiefly economic he suppressed the monasteries in England and seized their lands and properties.

Henry's strict adherence to the Catholic faith despite his break with Rome did not permit the English Church to become Protestantized until the reign of his son and successor, Edward VI (1547-1553). Under the influence of Somerset, head of the regency for the boy-king, real Protestant innovations were made: English displaced Latin in the church service, ikons were broken, priests were allowed to marry; finally, there was published in 1549 the *Book of Common Prayer,* Archbishop Cranmer's adaptation into majestic English of the ancient services of the Church.

But Edward was succeeded by Mary Tudor, daughter of Catherine of Aragon and spiritual daughter of the Roman Catholic Church, who instituted a full Catholic restoration in England. By Act of Parliament the country was brought back under the pope. Married clergy were expelled. Services were again conducted in Latin. And Mary was taken as wife by his Catholic Majesty, Philip II of Spain.

But Mary's reign was brief. When she died, in 1558, without heirs, the throne passed, as provided by the will of Henry VIII, to Elizabeth,

in whose glorious reign of almost half a century England became again and definitely Protestant. The supremacy of the pope was again denied in favor of the ecclesiastical headship of the monarch. A revised *Book of Common Prayer* was made the uniform manual of worship. The *Thirty-nine Articles* ratified by Parliament imposed a uniform and Protestant doctrine on the Anglican Church: the Scriptures were accepted as final authority, justification was by faith alone, clergy were allowed to marry. The Anglican Church as it exists to-day, in both England and America, is much more the child of Elizabeth than of Henry. Elizabeth was not tolerant towards Catholics in the realm, tho it must be admitted that the death penalty was rarely inflicted for religious beliefs alone; the victims were usually political plotters as well.

The Protestant Reformation broke the authority and the unity of the Catholic Church; a theocracy of the western world with Rome as its head was no longer a possibility after the Reformation. As a corollary the movement undoubtedly lent great impetus to the rise of national states and the spirit of nationalism which made them possible. Notably in England, Scotland, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, forms of Protestantism became national religions. Protestantism, particularly Calvinism, as we have noted, accelerated the trend towards democracy and towards the ascendancy of the middle class and

of the common people. Eventually the Protestant Reformation may have led to the growth of toleration, but the growth was very slow and even to-day one wonders whether toleration has been achieved. Finally, the Protestant Reformation brought about the Catholic Reformation, which some historians prefer to call the Counter-Reformation.

## XV

## THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION AND THE WARS OF RELIGION

UNDOUBTEDLY the passing of the northern races from the Roman fold awakened all ranks of clergy and people in the Catholic Church to the need of a drastic housecleaning. Among the most obvious causes of the revolt of the Protestants was the wide-spread neglect of spiritual duties and obligations and the materialism and immorality among great numbers of the clergy of all degrees, from parish priests to the popes at St. Peter's. That these conditions were without exception in the Church is by no means implied. Furthermore, many who remained faithful Catholics had as vigorously attacked evil conditions within the Church as did the Protestants who left it. But the very nature of the inherent structure of the Church almost demanded that reform to be effective must receive its impetus from the top.

Hence the Catholic Reformation did not seriously begin until the spiritual lethargy of the Renaissance popes was overcome by more vigorous successors. The first of these was Paul III, pope from 1543 to 1549, who began to attack the evils of the Church. The real effort at re-

form did not come, however, until the reign of Paul IV (1555-1559).

The procedure of Paul IV and his successors in setting their house in order undoubtedly found precedent in earlier localized action to reform the Spanish Church. In Spain, under the leadership of Cardinal Ximenes, trusted prelate of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Spanish clergy had been purged of their shortcomings and instilled with new vigor. The spiritual life of the monastic orders had been renewed. Schools and seminaries had been established in answer to the humanists' charge of notorious ignorance on the part of the clergy. Priests had been made sharply aware of the vows of their orders. The influence of the spiritual revival in Spain was slowly but surely felt throughout the entire Church.

Out of Spain, too, came the figure who towered above all others in the Catholic Reformation, the militant and dynamic personality, Ignatius Loyola, founder of that literal militia of pope and Church, the Society of Jesus. Ignatius Loyola was a Spanish nobleman and soldier who, chancing to read a Life of Christ while convalescing from a wound, experienced a religious conversion, forsook all earthly things, and dedicated his life to God and the Church. He soon discovered his need for further education, and at the age of thirty-three he went to Paris and began the study of Latin, theology, and philos-

ophy. No sacrifice or humility was too great for him; in the beginning he, a grown man, studied with small boys in the lower forms. And, ironically enough, it is possible that he later studied in the same classroom with another strikingly similar yet strikingly different religious leader, the Protestant John Calvin.

It was at Paris that Ignatius Loyola gathered six zealous companions who, with him, became the nucleus of the Jesuit order. In 1540 the seven journeyed to Rome, received the blessing of Pope Paul III, and then, with a military regimen and a singleness of purpose reflecting the original profession of their founder, set out to convert the heathen, and more especially Protestant heretics; to educate the young, to preach, and by whatever methods could be utilized, to restore the Church to its ancient power and glory.

The part played by the Jesuits in the Catholic Reformation is an inestimably great one. Gathering and training recruits with special care, establishing hundreds of schools, many of which soon became famous, gaining influence—often by insidious methods—with outstanding Protestant personages, many of whom they converted, the Jesuits, by the end of the sixteenth century, had become a vitalizing factor in the Catholic Church and the driving force in its Reformation. And their work has never lapsed. To convert the Protestant is and always has

been their special mission, but equally important have been their missionary activities—carrying the gospel to the wilds of America and to the farthest Orient.

Another great agency in promoting and solidifying the Catholic revival was the concluding session of the Council of Trent (1562-1563). Its accomplishments were both organizational and doctrinal. The sale of church offices was forbidden, pluralism was stopped—thenceforward bishops were compelled to reside in their dioceses—seminaries were established, and sermons were to be preached, it was suggested, not in Latin, but in the language of the people. Traditional doctrines were reaffirmed and differences of doctrinal opinion were condemned. The pope—thanks largely to Jesuit influence in the council—was declared the supreme authority in the Church, thus ending a long-standing controversy as to whether pope or council was supreme. The council authorized the Holy Father to compile a list of books which faithful Catholics were forbidden to read. And any infringement of these canons or decrees, it developed, was to be summarily dealt with by the ecclesiastical court of the Inquisition, which now greatly accelerated and enlarged its activities, particularly in Italy. Truly the Church was girding its loins for battle. The combat was not long delayed.

The religious upheaval of the two Reformations threw Europe into a series of wars in

which, altho political issues played no small part, the line-up was largely Catholic against Protestant in the effort to determine where each would be supreme. Roughly, these wars divide themselves into three main phases: first, the attempt of Philip II, Charles V's successor in the Iberian peninsula, to Catholicize Europe while adding to the temporal glories of Spain, a struggle which involved wars with England and France, and a long but unsuccessful attempt to check the triumphant revolt of the Protestant Netherlands—all of which ended in the falling of Spain from the first position in Europe; second, the civil wars in France, caused largely by a conflict between Catholics and the French Calvinists, called Huguenots; and third, the Thirty Years' War, a series of combats fought in Germany, where the main issue again arose out of the counter-claims of Protestants and Catholics.

It will not serve our purpose to trace the detailed military developments of the religious wars. Rather, we shall inquire how Europe was affected by this last act in the drama which opened with the revolt of Luther and the election of Charles V and closed with the Peace of Westphalia.

Philip II of Spain must be remembered as, above all else, the arch-enemy of Protestantism. "I would rather," he said, "lose all my states and even a hundred lives, if I had them, than

accept the seigniory of heretics." It appeared at the moment of his accession that he would have to devote his exclusive attention to purely political and dynastic problems. France, under Henry II, once more tried to make good her claims in Italy. The ensuing war between France and Spain lasted from 1557 to 1559. France lost in Italy, but captured Calais from England, Spain's ally by virtue of the marriage of Philip with Mary Tudor. Mary's reign constitutes the Catholic interlude in the English Reformation, and the loss of Calais broke the spirit of the doughty queen, who died in 1558.

The war was ended by the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, which concludes the long struggle between Spain and France begun in 1494. It allowed Philip freedom to embark upon the series of religious wars which fill the rest of his reign. The peace left Spain still supreme in Europe, the Empire still intact. The war might have been prolonged indefinitely had not both crowns been seriously threatened by internal troubles.

Philip turned to the Netherlands, where he left his half-sister, Margaret, as regent. Protestantism was taking root there and Calvinism particularly was popular in the northern provinces. Philip's efforts to suppress it with the Inquisition and similar methods served only to arouse hostility. The inhabitants of the Netherlands disliked Philip in person and on national

grounds, for he was a Spaniard first and always. His attempts to curb political privileges of the cities and the nobility, and his increase in taxes made him further unpopular.

The revolt of 1565, breaking out only after futile attempts to obtain justice by peaceful means, took on a religious character. The Dutch were secretly encouraged by Prince William of Orange, "the Silent," their chief object being the abolition of the Inquisition and the attainment of local autonomy. The outbreak was temporarily successful, and a bit mad. It awakened Philip to the seriousness of the Dutch situation, and his resolve to crush Protestantism without compromise strengthened. The revolting Dutch and Flemish thereupon resolved on independence.

William of Orange, and after his death his brothers and sons, led the revolt. The Dutch gave no quarter and asked none. Philip's governors and generals—Alva, Requescens, Don John of Austria who had defeated the Turks at Lepanto, Alexander Farnese—all between 1565 and 1598, had ultimately to acknowledge defeat. To the Dutch the word seemed unknown. In 1609 Philip III—for Philip II had died in 1598—was forced to sign a truce tantamount to independence. Actual independence came in 1648. However, the independence was only for the northern half, for just as the north was Dutch or Teutonic and the south French or Walloon, so

the north was Protestant and the south Catholic, and it is to be said to the credit of Alexander Farnese that he saved the south (later Belgium) for Catholicism and Spain. But the north formed a Protestant Dutch Republic under the famous House of Orange and rose to play a part second to none in seventeenth-century Europe.

In the course of his battles with the Netherlands, Philip tried in every quarter to stem the rising Protestant tide, only to add to his antagonists. He lent his aid to the Catholic element in France, particularly when the French throne passed to a Protestant king. He succeeded in annexing Portugal, which again became independent in 1640. But his doom was sealed when Elizabeth of England was finally drawn into the conflict on the side of the Dutch. Philip concentrated his forces against her and climaxed his efforts by sending out the "Invincible" Armada to meet Elizabeth's ships. The defeat of the Spanish fleet in 1588 was one of the turning points in modern history, for it marked the beginning of the definite decline of Spain and the emergence of England as a major sea-power.

Philip II, then, had failed in his great ambition to stem the tide of Protestantism. The Spanish sun was setting. The Netherlands had achieved their independence religiously and politically. Both England and France were clearly powers of the first rank. The Catholic

Reformation had lost its most militant supporter.

When Henry II (1547-1549) signed the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis he turned to his own pressing internal problem—the Huguenots, Frenchmen who had come under the spell of Calvinism and who numbered some 300,000 by this time. Henry's sudden death "left France at a critical period with a triple problem—the character of the monarch, the direction of policy, and the challenge of Calvinism to the dominant Roman Catholic Church." The Huguenots took up arms. They were joined by those nobles who were jealous of the Catholic contenders for the throne, the family of Guise. Between these two parties stood Catherine de Medici, widow of Henry II, with three sons, each in his turn entitled to the throne. War was inevitable. Again it was a politico-religious struggle following rather closely a Protestant-Catholic division. The steps of the conflict or succession of conflicts it is bootless to trace. Suffice it that in 1589, after a terrifically devastating internal disturbance, order was restored by Henry of Navarre, who took the throne as Henry IV, the first Bourbon king. Crowned a Huguenot, Henry, to insure the unity and peace of his nation, returned in 1598 to the Catholic fold with the words, "Paris is worth a mass."

To insure peace Henry promulgated the Edict of Nantes (1598), granting to Huguenots al-

most unprecedented religious and civil liberties. The Catholic was the national church, but the Protestant Huguenots were guaranteed liberty of conscience, the right to hold services in certain cities, the right to hold civil offices, and were given control of certain fortified towns. The edict brought a temporary lull in the conflict, but the situation was anomalous and impossible.

When Henry IV was struck down by an assassin in 1610, leaving an heir of nine years and another Medici regent, circumstances augured ominously for a repetition of the civil and religious wars. At a crucial moment in her history, France was saved by one man, Armand Jean du Plessis, known to history as Cardinal Richelieu.

There seemed to be something paradoxical about the man who during the regency worked himself into the councils of state, and who, when the nine-year-old boy reached man's estate and took his crown, became the king's chief adviser. He wore the red hat of a Cardinal, yet he opposed the forces of the Counter-Reformation unceasingly. There was reason for this. Richelieu probably stands just over a great divide in the history of men's loyalties. The ecclesiasts of note before him unfailingly placed devotion to Church above loyalty to country. But Richelieu was first a Frenchman and then a Catholic. And Richelieu stands as a symbol of the hope of a universal and cosmopolitan Catholic Church sub-

merged in the rising tide of nationalism. Hence, he threw his forces against Spain and the Catholic leadership because Spain was the *national* enemy of France. If necessary to the greater glory of France—and to the weakening of the Habsburgs—Richelieu would ally himself with Protestants or infidel Turks against the powers representing his Church. In this he is typical of the usual course of French diplomacy and statecraft modeled on Machiavelli.

At home Richelieu left no stone unturned to solidify the French nation and build up a strong central government. He foreshadowed the absolutism of Louis XIV. He allowed Huguenots their civil and religious rights granted by the Edict of Nantes, but he destroyed those political rights—of holding fortified towns, etc.—which would endanger France. By putting his influence against their private duels and fortified castles, and by building up a strong central administrative system responsible to the crown and executed throughout the realm by commoners, he clipped the wings of a powerful nobility. Domestically, Richelieu must be credited with another important achievement: he succeeded in making unnecessary the calling of the Estates General, an institution partially representing the nation and constituting a potential check on the king's power. This assembly had convened in 1614. Largely through the influence initiated by Richelieu, it did not meet again until 1789.

In international affairs, Richelieu's ruling ambition was to see France the victor over the House of Habsburg. To this end he threw France, at an auspicious moment, into the Thirty Years' War.

The Peace of Augsburg (1555), a temporary settlement of Germany's religious upheaval, contained certain ambiguous clauses. Altho it allowed Protestants to retain all Catholic properties seized before 1552, it said nothing about those taken afterwards. There was, too, the question of Catholic prince-bishops who turned Protestant: Were their holdings to go with them or could the Catholic Church appoint a new prince-bishop to take title to the lands? Finally, whereas the Augsburg treaty provided that princes, and hence their people, might choose between Lutheranism and Catholicism, there was no provision for Calvinists or other Protestant sects. The wonder was that peace under these conditions could be maintained at all.

The war that broke out in 1618 was precipitated by Bohemia's striking for independence from the Habsburg Empire. Bohemia, under Hussite and Lutheran influence, was Protestant; the Empire was Catholic. The revolt immediately divided the Germanies, and then all Europe, into two armed camps. The Catholics in Germany were stronger than the Protestants, and had it not been for outside intervention the German Reformation might have been arrested

in the seventeenth century. But Protestant Europe, notably Denmark first and then Sweden, was determined to make its own the war against the Catholic Habsburgs. And, still motivated by the ambition to glorify France in every possible way, Cardinal Richelieu finally entered into the fray on the side of the Protestants—and not without reward.

The Thirty Years' War or Wars divide themselves into five periods: the Bohemian Period (1618-1620), the Palatine Period (1621-1623), the Danish Period (1625-1629), the Swedish Period (1630-1635), and the French Period (1635-1648). In the sequence it may be seen how the struggle assumed an increasingly wider international character.

Only the terrific effect of the course of the war need be noted here. It strangled Germany for generations to come. The destruction of property was unparalleled in the history of warfare; cities and towns were wiped out and the land reverted to a wilderness, while the population declined by over one-half.

The war closed with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, tho the Franco-Spanish war went on until 1659 and the Baltic struggle until 1661. Its effects on Europe and the religious question may easily be gathered by scanning the provisions of the treaty of peace. In Germany the individual prince, as provided in the Peace of Augsburg, was still allowed to choose his reli-

gion—this time Calvinism was included as one of the choices—and the people in the princes' realm had to conform within three years. On the property question all possessions in the hands of Protestants or Catholics on January 1, 1624, were to remain so possessed. Each German prince was granted sovereign authority to make war or peace without the consent of the emperor—the Holy Roman Empire survived the Thirty Years' War as a mere shadow. Certain internal territorial settlements were made in Germany. Sweden received important territorial additions. France got Alsace—except Strassburg, a free city. Brandenburg made extensive gains in Pomerania. The independence of the Dutch and the Swiss was recognized.

The Peace of Westphalia left supremacy in the north to be fought out between Sweden and the rising state of Brandenburg-Prussia, and left France the dominant power in Europe. The House of Habsburg, in both its branches, saw its dreams fade. Germany was prostrate. The religious antagonists had only learned that bloodshed was useless, that part of Europe would remain Catholic, part would be Protestant. Toleration had not arrived, but henceforth widespread persecution at least was no more, and the religious wars came to an end. The Protestant Reformation stood; the Catholic Reformation produced a Church purged, and far more worthy

than at the height of the Renaissance to call herself the Bride of Christ.

The Renaissance phase of European history is finished. The European man has definitely emerged from passive childhood to active youth. The transition, if soul-wracking, at least affirmed that the European, having discovered himself, the past, and the world, was willing to risk with magnificent virility his own strength in the canny playing of the game with destiny.

## XVI

### THE ABSOLUTE MONARCHY

THE political phenomena of the period from the end of the stormy Reformation in 1648 to the beginning of the equally turbulent French Revolution in 1789 are broadly as follows: first, the development of the absolute monarchy, with kings and emperors in fact insisting that their authority was divinely ordained, and the concomitant manifestation of such an interest in the welfare of their subjects as to label them *benevolent despots* and their time as the era of *benevolent despotism;* second, in England a break in the development of the absolute monarch and a counter-development, with far-reaching results, of a constitutional monarchy in which the king was subject to the will of the elected representatives of the people, or a part of the people; and third, certain momentous conflicts at arms which were to result in important territorial changes not only in Europe but throughout the world.

Political development from the Middle Age through the Renaissance was marked by the evolution of the strong monarchy made possible by the gradual weakening of the power of feudalism, due in no small part to the alliance for national advantage of the newly-risen towns

with the king. The king gained strength, too, from the decreasing influence of the international Church, and from the gradual upbuilding of a feeling of nationalism among his subjects.

The trend towards strong monarchy in several European countries went on uninterruptedly in the era following the Renaissance phase of European history, and in the course of the seventeenth century the autocratic state reached its logical completion in the absolute monarchy.

The absolute monarch is perhaps most completely exemplified by Louis XIV, who inherited the throne of France, a boy of five, in 1642. Two able ministers, Richelieu and Mazarin, both cardinals of the Church, had removed the last obstacles to Louis XIV's assuming, when he took the reins of government in his own hands in 1661, the full prerogatives of a monarch with absolute power, and as such he guided the destinies of his country until 1715.

Richelieu's contributions—the crushing of the political power of the Huguenots, the subjection of the nobility to the throne, and the discontinuing of the Estates General—we have noted. He was succeeded at his death in 1643—his king, Louis XIII, died at almost the same time—by Cardinal Mazarin, who was chief minister to the queen, Anne of Austria, regent for the child king, Louis XIV. Mazarin's great work consisted, in the first place, in suppressing the parlement of Paris in a civil war known as The

Fronde, in which the parlement attempted certain reforms which would have made France a constitutional monarchy. Mazarin's second achievement was the aborting of Spain's final effort to challenge French supremacy.

The way, therefore, was cleared for Louis XIV to step actively into his kingly rôle in 1661 with no person or faction to brook in the slightest his unlimited royal power. He was not unaware of his rôle. "I am the state," is said to have been his boast. He vowed he would be his own prime minister. The sun he chose as his emblem, because, in the words of Mr. Ferdinand Schevill, "he was pleased to imagine that as the earth drew its sustenance from the central luminary, so the life of France emanated from his person." He ruled, he believed, by Divine Right; he was responsible only to God, and to him God had given authority over the destinies of France, and the loyalty of his subjects to their king was to be something akin to their devotion to God himself. In keeping with his exalted position, he built for himself and his court a magnificent royal city at Versailles, southwest of Paris. There is perhaps nothing in Europe so lavishly splendrous. Louis's court at Versailles became the envy and the model of his princely contemporaries.

He filled well the rôle of absolute monarch. Former feudal lords became but his satellites, accoutrements of the luxurious court at Ver-

sailles. Dependent neither upon Estates General nor upon parlements, he collected his revenues and spent them as his wishes or whims decreed. He completed the system of central administration initiated by Richelieu; a military and naval force was under his control, as were the courts of law. Royal administrators collected taxes and constructed and maintained the public works. France, long before Louis XIV's time, had gained the privilege of nominating bishops and abbots; Rome could control him only spiritually.

Louis's absolutism, however, was not merely pomp and ceremony. He worked hard and was conscientious in his practise of the "trade of a king." Before he became immersed in wars of his own making, Louis, with the assistance of extremely able ministers, did much for the improvement of France; his interest in French welfare during the first part of his reign justly places him among the benevolent despots.

Seldom has any monarch been blessed with such an able coterie of ministers. Lionne built up a foreign office and diplomatic staff second to none in Europe. Louvois, minister of war and father of modern military organization, recruited and supported the finest standing army —regulated, disciplined, efficient—the world had ever seen. Under him was an unexcelled military engineer, Vauban, whose fortifications were the proud bulwarks of French defense. But, all things considered, the ablest of Louis's lieuten-

ants was Jean Colbert, holder of practically every important peaceful office in the government, but primarily minister of finance.

Colbert, by way of comparison, can be said to have possessed the combined financial virtues of Alexander Hamilton who economized by increasing revenues, and Albert Gallatin who balanced budgets by the most rigorous savings. He installed a system of accounting, and by this and the elimination of misappropriations he turned deficits into surpluses. But this was not enough. The national wealth must be increased. He promoted agriculture, manufacture, and commerce. He improved public works. Colbert furthermore subscribed to the theory of mercantilism,[1] exploitation of colonies for the sake of the mother country; he purchased new colonies, encouraged settlement in old ones, and built a navy. His particular application of the theory of mercantilism came to be known as "Colbertism." Much of Louis's patronage of the arts was encouraged by the able minister. Colbert gave new impetus to the French Academy, founded by Richelieu, established the Institute of France, built the famous observatory at Paris. Writers, artists, and scientists, many of them attracted from foreign lands, were under his patronage. And he was responsible for numerous architectural structures of the period.

[1] More will be said of mercantilism in the following chapter.

There is one dark blot on the domestic reign of Louis which must be examined before we turn to his wars. In 1685, after persecutions and outrages brought about by the influence of Catholic clergy, Louis revoked the Edict of Nantes, taking away from the Huguenots, now numbering a million, their civil and religious rights granted by Henry IV and affirmed by Richelieu. The outrages committed against them and the revoking of their rights caused Huguenots by the hundreds of thousands to emigrate from France to other countries. What was England's, Holland's, Prussia's, and America's gain was France's irreparable loss.

But Louis was not satisfied with unsurpassed absolutism at home. Of what use his power if it could not be vaunted before all nations? Visions of world empire rose before him like a dream. "Accordingly," writes Mr. Ferdinand Schevill, "he formally inaugurated a career of conquest which, after a few brilliant results, led to such a succession of disasters that the man whose early actions had been attended by clouds of incense wafted by admiring courtiers, closed his career under a deepening shadow."[2]

But until 1667 and for some time thereafter, Louis was the quintessence of absolutism. All over Europe he was envied and copied. The vogue of pompous but relatively efficient and benevolent despotism swept the Continent.

[2] *A History of Europe* (Harcourt, Brace), p. 319.

Altho the era from 1648 to 1789 is known as the Age of the Absolute Monarchy, its more significant political contribution was the counter-development in England of the constitutional monarchy—a form which, when copied, and modified chiefly by the elimination of the monarch and the extension of suffrage, was to result in constitutional democracy.

The question immediately arises: Why did not the English people tolerate an absolute monarchy in which the French seemingly acquiesced? The revolt against absolute despotism in England was led by the middle classes of the towns when they felt the king was not giving them their just dues. They were stronger than the same class in France because commerce and industry had moved ahead faster in England than on the Continent. They were a force to be reckoned with also because many of them had adopted Puritanism, a very liberal type of Protestantism. This threw them in direct opposition to the Stuart kings, who were religious conservatives. Puritanism, too, was more than a church sect. It was a movement for personal and social reform. Politically, it championed the fuller rights of the people. It was characterized religiously by the theology and morality of Calvin. Let us examine the evidences of the English development.

We have noted in connection with the development of strong monarchy that a degree of ab-

solutism was welcomed in England under the Tudor monarchs from 1485 to 1603 as an antidote to civil and feudal wars and as a guaranty of security to the nation. But the Tudors were discreet rulers, and while they were in fact almost absolute, they never insisted on the theory of absolutism, i.e., that they ruled by divine right. Of course, certain jealously guarded English constitutional rights predate the reign of the Tudors. Magna Carta (1215) had come to be thought of as embodying not only feudal but natural law. Parliament's right to tax; freedom of speech for members of parliament; parliament's right to legislate; habeus corpus; trial by jury—all these were recognized constitutional rights before the battle of Bosworth. And it is to be noted that in all their absolutism the Tudors never repudiated these rights; they simply abrogated them. They even pretended the use of old forms. Parliament's main hold over the monarch had always been money; the Tudors were economical, collected taxes, seized church property, and tampered with the currency. Parliament was not often needed to make new grants.

But Elizabeth, last of the Tudors, was succeeded in 1603 by James VI of Scotland, son of Mary Stuart. Henry IV called him the wisest fool in Christendom. There may have been conviction but very little wisdom in his insisting

that the king ruled by divine right and that no one could oppose him.

It is not our purpose to trace in detail the constitutional development in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the general trend can be observed. James I by his theory of divine right, by antagonizing English Puritans, by being extravagant and trying to coerce parliament into granting him money, and by other stretchings of his assumed prerogatives, aroused the opposition of parliament and the country, particularly middle-class Puritans. James was succeeded by his son Charles I. Charles married Henrietta Maria, sister of Louis XIII of France; she was a Catholic, and Charles secretly promised Louis that English Catholics would enjoy certain leniencies. This and his inherited devotion to the theory of divine-right monarchy early assured his unpopularity.

The conflict between king and parliament continued. Charles's first parliament limited the levy of customs duties to one year instead of establishing it for the whole reign as heretofore; and it assailed the Duke of Buckingham, the king's favorite. The third parliament of his reign refused to grant subsidies until he signed the Petition of Right (1628), in which he promised not to levy taxes without parliament's consent, not to quarter his soldiers in private residences, and not to infringe on other rights. The assassination of Buckingham forestalled trouble on

that score. From 1629 to 1640 Charles ruled without parliament. To raise money he resorted to various devices, even old feudal customs. For unconstitutional practises he secured the consent of his appointed judges. In religious matters, through William Laud, archbishop of Canterbury, Charles opposed the Puritans directly by reintroducing into the Anglican Church Catholic practises and dogmas and by insisting upon uniformity. When he attempted these extreme measures against Scotland, rebellion resulted; the Scots deposed the king's bishops. To obtain financial aid necessary to suppress the Scotch rebellion, Charles called parliament again; it dissolved in three weeks, accomplishing nothing. The Scots advanced on northern England. Charles as a last resource in 1640 summoned a new parliament, which, because it lasted until 1660, has been called the Long Parliament.

If the death-knell of divine-right monarchy had not already been sounded, the Long Parliament did it. The Long Parliament abolished the special tribunals set up to punish political and ecclesiastical offenders. It eliminated all irregular means the king had used to raise money. To prove the right of parliament—and in this case of the Commons, which now claimed unusual authority—to impeach ministers of the king, Archbishop Laud and the Earl of Strafford were sent to prison. But the most radical

thing this parliament did was to resolve that it could not be dissolved without its own consent; it furthermore passed the Triennial Act requiring that parliament should be called at least every three years. No longer could kings rule without parliament.

How rebellion arose against Charles, how parliament without regard to constitutional practise took matters in its own hands, the beheading of the king, the protectorate of Cromwell—all these developments have interesting phases, but add little concretely to the evolution of constitutional monarchy. Suffice it to say that, tired of the excesses of fierce Puritanism, England wanted her king back in 1660. Charles II was recalled.

He promised to respect constitutional privileges and not to tamper with religious policy. On this latter score he and his son, James II, both sympathetic to Catholicism, got into particular trouble. They also insisted on the divine-right theory of their ancestors. Under Charles II parliament abolished the last vestige of feudalism. Charles was a spendthrift; parliament grew thriftier and claimed in 1665 the right to grant money for specific purposes and to demand an accounting of expenditures.

On the religious side Charles was particularly high-handed, but parliamentary opposition matched him. He tried to suspend laws oppressing Roman Catholics (also Dissenters) but

failed. Parliament divided itself into Whigs and Tories—two parties. The Whigs tried to exclude Prince James from the throne because of his conversion to Catholicism; the Tories tolerated the prospect as preferable to civil war. The Tory view prevailed and James II succeeded his brother in 1685. An avowed Catholic, he united opposition to himself when, after the birth of two Protestant daughters, he married a second and Catholic wife, who bore him a son. England was definitely anti-Catholic, and the prospect was too much. Mary, James's eldest daughter and an Anglican, had married William of Orange. William and Mary in 1688 were invited to take the throne in order "to save the liberties and religion of England." James II fled to France.

But parliament took no chances about the "liberties and religion of England." It passed on December 16, 1689, a Bill of Rights incorporating promises made by William and Mary when they took the throne. The Bill of Rights is the great document in modern English constitutional history. It provided against infringements by the king on parliament's power; it denied the king's right to suspend laws or dispense particular persons from obeying laws; it declared that no tax was legal without parliament's consent; free election of members to parliament was insured; the king could impose no unusual punishments; it also, together with subsequent en-

actments, insured that parliament must meet at least once a year. The Bill of Rights, moreover, regulated succession to the throne, and required the sovereign to belong to the Anglican Church. With the Bill of Rights was passed the Toleration Act, conceding non-Anglican Protestants the right of public worship. By provision of the Bill of Rights the crown passed in 1702 from William and Mary to Mary's sister Anne, and in accordance with the Act of Settlement (1701) from Anne to her cousin, George I (1714-1727), the son of Sophia of Hanover. In 1707 England and Scotland were united under the title of the Kingdom of Great Britain.

The further curbing of the monarch's power in the period of the early Hanoverian kings undoubtedly arose from the circumstance that these German gentlemen couldn't speak English and therefore paid not much attention to parliament and its doings. The handling of government business was in consequence left to a small group of ministers, the cabinet, which was responsible not only to the king but, as a practical matter, to the leading party in parliament, because the king found that it was most convenient to choose his ministers from the dominating party in parliament. The cabinet was really an "inner circle" of the old Privy Council which had advised with the king in important matters. William had allowed the cabinet a fairly free rein, and the Hanoverian kings didn't at-

tend cabinet meetings at all; thus the cabinet gradually became responsible only to parliament.

The responsibility of the cabinet increased during the era of Whig rule under George I and George II, made possible because the Tories favored a Stuart restoration. Sir Robert Walpole, leading Whig, held office for twenty-one years and became known as "prime minister." And so parliament, which had already curbed the power of the king in England by arrogating to itself the authority to legislate, now controlled the ministers who executed the legislation. The hopes of absolutism in England were nil.

All this constitutional development did not, however, mean democracy in eighteenth-century England, because even the elected House of Commons was chosen by but one-tenth of the male population, the percentage then enjoying the franchise.

We have now surveyed these two counter-developments in Europe following 1648: the absolute monarchy typified by France; the constitutional monarchy as developed in England. That in the world conflict which occurred almost simultaneously with these developments France suffered loss and England enjoyed gain, is by no means wholly attributable to their contrasting types of government.

We left Louis XIV in 1667 basking in undisputed absolutism but determined under the influence of his war minister Louvois on a career

of conquest. Hostilities began in 1667 and lasted to 1678. First Louis fought Spain to secure the Spanish Netherlands, but took only a strip. He then fought Holland, who, after flooding him out of Amsterdam, found allies in Spain and in a number of German princes. Louis got Franche Comté from Spain. By diplomacy he obtained Strassburg, completing the possession of Alsace. And in 1684 he was at the height of his glory. But his money was giving out, and the wars of conquest had created enemies and a coalition headed by William of Orange. Spain, Austria, and various German states joined Holland, and when William was called to England in 1688 he had no difficulty in persuading her to join the coalition. Louis's third war and the first in which England and France are the chief enemies ended in 1697. The results are of little significance.

The question now arose of the succession to the Spanish throne occupied by Charles II, who had neither children nor brothers. One sister was the wife of Louis XIV; the other was married to the Emperor Leopold, heir of the Austrian Habsburgs. If either Louis or the emperor annexed Spain and all her possessions, the balance of power in Europe would be destroyed. And William of Orange, after 1688 also William III of England, was for one unwilling to see the balance destroyed. Louis realized this, conferred with William, and the two agreed to a plan of

partition of Spain and her possessions which apparently preserved the balance of power. But before the Spanish king died he willed his kingdom and empire to Louis's grandson, Philip of Anjou, on the express condition that his possessions would never be divided. Louis weighed caution against ambition but chose the will and repudiated the plan of partition. It meant war with Austria and most likely with England. War soon came. The War of the Spanish Succession broke in 1701 and almost all Europe before it ended took part: England, Holland, Austria, Brandenburg, Portugal, Denmark, and Savoy against France, Spain, and Bavaria. William III died in 1702 knowing the war would be successfully prosecuted by his sister-in-law, Anne, England's queen until 1714. Hence in America, where colonists of the combatants fought, it is known as Queen Anne's War. It was a world struggle.

Louis was defeated. Strong support at home and dissension among his opponents somewhat mitigated the failure. The Peace of Utrecht, 1713-1714, concluded the war. Louis's grandson, becoming Philip V, got Spain on the condition that the crowns of France and Spain never be united. The Austrian Habsburg emperor got the Spanish Netherlands and Spain's Italian possessions. The Dutch received a string of forts on the French border. The elector of Brandenburg was recognized as King of Prus-

sia. Savoy, a duchy, was made a kingdom and given to Sicily. England came out best, receiving from France—in America—Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Hudson's Bay. Important for her Mediterranean trade were the Island of Minorca and the Rock of Gibraltar which she acquired from Spain.

In 1715 Louis XIV died. He had seen a glorious France, over which he held absolute sway, impoverished and weakened by a series of wars fought to satisfy his ambition for conquest. On his deathbed he said to his great-grandson, "Do not imitate me in my taste for war"—but Louis XIV had learned his lesson too late. He had, however, made France the artistic and intellectual center of its day.

But the world conflict went on. To understand the factors of its continuance a brief survey must be made of certain European developments between 1648 and 1789 outside France and England. Two other powers, Russia and Prussia, had begun to raise their standards aloft, and a third, Austria, took a new lease on life. Russia and Prussia in the earlier portion of the period constituted a challenge to Swedish control in the Baltic region, Sweden having become dominant there by the Treaty of Westphalia. The rise of Russia was largely due to the work of Peter the Great (1682-1725) of the Romanov dynasty, who had traveled and studied in Europe with the purpose of making Russia a

Western state and of bringing his country into the concert of Europe.

Charles XII (1697-1718) of Sweden foolishly attempted to conquer Poland. Russia and Prussia thwarted the effort and Sweden paid. Prussia got Swedish Pomerania, freed East Prussia from Poland, and in 1701 became a monarchy with the Elector of Brandenburg as its king. Peter the Great got the eastern Swedish provinces with an opening on the Baltic Sea, and there built his great capital of St. Petersburg, and near by, with the aid of a French architect, built his Versailles in imitation of Louis XIV. It was, too, his "window into Europe." He had now his opening on the Baltic; he also wanted an outlet on the Black Sea, but this accomplishment was left to Catherine the Great (1762-1796).

In 1740 Frederick II, called "the Great," became king of Prussia, a Prussia centralized and enlarged and strengthened by his Hohenzollern ancestors in the hundred years preceding him. He added greatly to their contributions. In the same year there had come to the throne of the Austrian Habsburgs an almost equally capable monarch, Maria Theresa, empress by the grace of the Pragmatic Sanction, a document by which her father Charles VI, last of the male line, had insured the throne's passing to her by consent of his own dominions and the powers of Europe. Frederick wanted Austrian-controlled Silesia. He stepped in to take it and with interested

allies started the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) to strip Maria Theresa of her inheritance. In the beginning she fought alone against Prussia, France, Spain, Bavaria, and Saxony. Frederick received Silesia, but Maria, tho temporarily losing her possession, obtained the aid of allies; Holland and England, to restore the European balance, joined her. It is to be noted that England and France are again at war. The War of the Austrian Succession ended with the Peace of Aachen in 1748. Maria regained her throne but lost Silesia. Regarding England and France there were no results save a restoration of conquests and a postponement of colonial issues.

France and England had become in the eighteenth century rivals not only on the Continent but in colonial expansion in India and North America, hence in the next and greatest conflict of the century, the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), the issue between these two powers was colonial rather than continental. Spain of course fought with France. The line-up of the other powers changed: Prussia this time joined with England against Austria and France. Russia joined the latter alliance. England and France fought for the supremacy of the seas and of America and the Indies; Prussia and Austria for the control of Germany.

By the Treaty of Hubertsburg (1763) Frederick the Great was confirmed in possession of

Silesia. Prussia and Austria after 1763 stood as strong rivals in the Germany hegemony and the end of the Holy Roman Empire was inevitable. By the Treaty of Paris (simultaneous with the Treaty of Hubertsburg) England received from France in America the St. Lawrence Valley, all territory east of the Mississippi River, and the island of Grenada in the West Indies. Spain ceded the Floridas to England. France gave Spain the Louisiana territory. And England took over the French empire in India. As an empire builder Great Britain emerged from this series of wars mistress of the seas; Britannia had begun to rule the waves. And France was temporarily exhausted; she could blame no one more than Louis XV, weak successor to the Grand Monarch.

We have described the absolute monarchy as it was exemplified in France, and noted its counterparts in Prussia, Austria, and Russia. We have traced the counterdevelopment of constitutional monarchy in England. We have followed a world conflict which marked the decline definitely of Spain, temporarily of France, but which saw the rise of Russia, of Prussia, and Austria, and which assured to England ascendency on the waves and dominions beyond the seas. There remains to be considered in the period from 1648 to 1789 what we may broadly call the Intellectual Revolution. To that chapter we now turn.

## XVII

## THE INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION

We have seen in our survey of the political development of Europe from 1648 to 1789 that it was an era dominated by absolutism, modified in England by the evolution of constitutionalism. The personification of absolutism was the absolute monarch who put forward the arrogant claim that his authority was unquestionable because it was divinely ordained; he was invested by God Himself with complete dominion over the subjects within his realm.

A majority of these absolute rulers felt to a greater or less degree that their unlimited power carried with it a tremendous obligation, a responsibility for the welfare of their subjects. Their efforts to shoulder the responsibility gave them the label of benevolent despots. "The monarch," declared Frederick the Great, "is not the absolute master, but only the first servant of the state." He acted on his belief. He encouraged industry, reclaimed waste lands, urged colonization, improved public works. In short, he was a mercantilist—because, he believed, it was a policy which would increase the prosperity of his country.

But he was more; he was a follower and patron of the enlightened thinking of his time.

Voltaire came to his court. He moved for religious toleration, for court reforms, for humanitarianism. The intellectual revolution, which we now consider, was undoubtedly made possible in some degree by the sympathy of Frederick and similar benevolent despots for new ideas.

And new ideas there were! We speak to-day of the triumph of science, but while our science, widespread as are its effects, is chiefly an instrument for bettering the physical condition of man, science in the eighteenth century was an instrument for offering to the mind of man an explanation of the universe in which he lived. The individual who undoubtedly did most to place science on its new pinnacle in the eighteenth century was Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727).

Newton in the year 1656 set forth in his *Principia* the law of universal gravitation, which showed that the force which causes the apple to fall to the ground is the same force which holds the stars in their courses. The universality of this force he explains in the preface to his great work: "I am," he says, "induced by many reasons to suspect that all the phenomena of nature may depend upon certain forces by which the particles of bodies, by some causes hitherto unknown, are either mutually impelled towards each other, and cohere in regular figures, or are repelled and recede from each other." Newton

did a great deal to popularize the use of what we term the scientific method of experiment, the reaching of conclusions from the observation of facts and instances.

That method resulted in other notable scientific advances in the period. Lavoisier (1743-1794), a Frenchman, was the father of modern chemistry and decomposed water into its elements. Edward Jenner (1749-1823), an English physician, discovered vaccine for smallpox. The work of the American, Benjamin Franklin, need only to be recalled. Equally important, in the field of applied science, was James Watt's invention in 1769 of the steam engine.

But the basic ideas of Isaac Newton soon radiated their influence outside the narrow compartment of the physical sciences. They had their effect in economics, politics, ethics, and even penetrated with telling results into the realm of religion. Newton had advanced the thesis, by his law of gravitation, that the universe was ordered, that it was constructed upon and followed definite and discoverable laws. It was a world-machine, this universe, and was considered synonymous with nature. As Mr. John Herman Randall, Jr., says of this eighteenth-century conception: "Nature meant, not only the world of inanimate objects apart from man, as the term is perhaps most commonly used to-day, but the whole rational order of

things, of which man was the most important part."[1]

And "the whole rational order of things" was governed by well-defined and simple laws; simple at least in comparison with the complexity of man-made society. Once these "natural laws," evidently God-given, were discovered, the secret of the universe was found. There was then left the task of making human society—that whole organization which man had so imperfectly built because he was ignorant of the laws of nature—conform to these natural laws. What conformed was reasonable or rational; what did not was unreasonable and irrational and should be at once eliminated or reformed. There is to-day the tendency to think of psychology, sociology, economics, and government as sciences just as exact in principles and methods as are chemistry and physics. Of that which we tend to believe the eighteenth century had no doubt. It entertained, as Mr. Geoffrey Bruun points out, the optimistic philosophy which held that "the emotions of the heart, the workings of the mind, the relations of society, and the business of government could be analyzed by the same method and with the same ease as the

[1] *The Making of the Modern Mind* (Houghton Mifflin), p. 274. Mr. Randall's entire discussion of eighteenth-century thought in this volume is well worth reading. Cf. pp. 253-385.

physical sciences."[1] The analysis, it was believed, would reveal the "natural laws." Further, society, a world, molded in accordance with these laws, would be reasonable, harmonious, happy. Men would in such a society live in a "state of nature," as, the eighteenth-century philosophers verily believed, men once had lived in some near-forgotten Golden Age.

To varied departments of life the thinkers of the time began to apply their theory of naturalism and rationalism. Applied to religion it struck at the fundamental faith in Christianity as decisively as the Reformation had struck at the organization of the Church. There was in this natural and ordered universe, the rationalists maintained, a natural religion. Such a religion, of course, was entirely reasonable; hence miracles, revelation, ceremonies, and even a priesthood had, indeed, little or no place in it. God, they asserted, had created a universe in much the same way as a watchmaker constructs a watch. It was constructed on natural laws; by these laws it ran. With His ordered universe God never tampered; He performed no miracles even in answer to man's prayer. Man's practise of religion, they asserted, consisted in living and striving to live in accordance with natural law, nothing more. No present-day modernist could

[1] *The Enlightened Despots* (Henry Holt), 1929, p. 6. The entire book furnishes a very lucid and extremely interesting account of the period.

be more insistent on reasonableness in religion. Such an attitude represented the rationalists' first step towards complete skepticism; the existence of a God was not denied, yet belief in the supernatural was largely repudiated. This view of religion took the name of deism.

Deism colored the thinking of such well-known personages in England as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, was actually championed by many English leaders, and was for a time an influence in the Anglican Church. That it did not filter from the intellectual classes down to the masses is in no small way due to the efforts of John and Charles Wesley and their disciple, George Whitefield, who near the middle of the eighteenth century conducted in England a popular Puritanical revival resulting eventually in the foundation of Methodism and in the starting of an evangelistic movement within the Anglican Church itself.

When deism reached the continent of Europe it gathered strength as opposition, coming chiefly from the Roman Catholic Church, increased. The chief exponent in France and in Europe of this completely reasonable religion—God the First Cause of a machine-like universe governed by natural law—was François Marie Arouet (1694-1778), known to succeeding generations by his assumed name, Voltaire. Sharp of tongue, sarcastic of pen, fearless at all times, Voltaire became acquainted with deism during a two-year

exile in England, and then proceeded to attack all organized churches with a merry sneer and ruthless logic. But he lacked not sincerity; he had been converted unalterably to the belief in Nature and Reason which had sprung from Newton's science. "The only gospel one ought to read," Voltaire wrote, "is the great book of Nature, written by the hand of God and sealed with his seal."

Unavoidably this rational religion, which in many cases induced complete skepticism, came into conflict with the Roman Catholic Church. Deism preached man's power to perfect himself by discovering and conforming to the laws of nature; the Church proclaimed as of old its exclusive holding of the keys to salvation. Deism stamped as unreasonable miracles, revealed religion, and all supernatural phenomena; the Church insisted on belief in mysteries like the Virgin birth, the bodily resurrection, and the changing of wine into blood as necessary to salvation. What degree of success rationalism achieved in its attacks on the Church may be judged by the fact that due largely to its influence in such movements as Jansenism, "which stressed spiritual illumination as against an excess of outward ceremonies," the powerful Jesuit order was suppressed in 1773 by Clement XIV.

We cannot intelligently consider the application of rationalism to politics unless we remember that the eighteenth century saw the middle

class gather strength increasingly. In France there had been an apparent decay of the nobility when Louis XIV built up at Versailles his notorious butterfly aristocracy. It is to be remembered, too, that he adhered to the policy initiated by Richelieu in selecting government officials from the commoners, who, like the king but from different motives, were antagonistic to the nobility. In England, after a thorough middle-class revolution in 1649 and a subsequent reaction, the rising business men in the towns had with permanent effect united in a compromise with more politically intelligent landed gentry in the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688.

The significance of the action of 1688 was made clear to the Continent in no small degree through the work of its great political apologist, John Locke (1631-1704), already mentioned in connection with deism. In writing his apologia Locke was undoubtedly influenced by the scientific universe governed by natural law which his contemporary, Sir Isaac Newton, had set up. In his *Treatise on Civil Government* (1689) Locke showed this influence in starting the study with a consideration of what man's condition was in a "state of nature" where, of course, natural laws operated perfectly, but where man, altho sociable and happy, was undeveloped and incomplete. He concluded that: "The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone, and reason, which is that law,

teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions." Hence Locke derived his celebrated "natural rights": life, liberty, and property; and the greatest of these, according to him, was property. It is an interesting commentary on the humanity of Thomas Jefferson that in the American Declaration of Independence he substituted for "property" the broader inalienable right of "the pursuit of happiness."

The purpose of government in a civil state, Locke logically concluded, was to guarantee so far as possible the preservation of these natural rights. The government and the ruler at its head, he believed, derived power not from divine ordination, but from a sort of agreement which he labeled a "social contract." In Locke's civil state the people—by which he meant property holders—surrendered those natural rights necessary for communal existence to the government in return for the guaranteed protection of their remaining natural rights, chiefly the trinity of life, liberty, and property. If the ruler failed to carry out his part of the contract, it was the people's privilege to overthrow him. Such was the apologia for the events of 1688 and a telling pin-prick to the bubble of monarchy by divine right.

France, particularly, was impressed by the spirit of Locke's thesis, and a number of French

writers showed their enthusiasm for English liberties by contrasting them with the absolutist régime in their own country. The most popular apostle—tho he contributed little that was original or constructive—was Voltaire. His rapier-like wit and biting sarcasm, his brilliance and cleverness, despite a certain superficiality, made him a colorful figure, admired, feared, and hated. He attacked all sorts of abuses, suggested few remedies, but his very brightness gave him a wide audience. With Voltaire, it has been said, France began to think.

In his revolt against the *status quo* Voltaire was not alone. A man of scarcely less moment in the agitation of the times was Denis Diderot, associate of the most distinguished scholars of the time and editor of the monumental *Encyclopedia,* a work of propaganda for radicalism as well as a library of knowledge. It appeared in 1765 with a prepublication subscription list of four thousand. Its converts to rationalism and deism were many.

However, the truly scholarly and profound study of the period in France was done by Montesquieu, lawyer, student, and thinker. For confirmation of current ideas he sought the sanction of history. He concluded in his work, *The Spirit of the Law* (*L'Esprit des Lois*), that there was no single perfect form of government, but that every people works out the system best adapted to its own needs. He is the author of

the well-known principle of "checks and balances" among the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of government which prevails in the Constitution of the United States.

In their consideration of political government the enlightened thinkers could not, of course, neglect the all-important fiscal function of the state. Economic welfare of the people was of the very essence of good government; hence, quite naturally, certain groups of thinkers applied the popular theories of rationalism and natural laws to the field of economics with conclusions not inconsistent with those reached regarding matters political. Since the rise of the strong monarchy the prevailing economic system of the state had been mercantilism. The major premise of that system, since both kings and subjects desired above all things wealth in order to increase the power and glory of the state, was that all efforts should be bent towards securing for the state an abundance of bullion, gold and silver. This involved a whole series of minor premises: the importation of gold and silver was to be favored and their exportation prohibited; exports should exceed imports that there might be a surplus of bullion; manufacture was to be encouraged; colonies were to be utilized as sources of raw materials and markets for finished products; ocean-borne commerce was to be carried exclusively in native ships.

What answers were the economic rationalists

to give to such a principle? The natural-laws argument was again produced. Economics, like every other social and physical science, was governed by fixed principles. To interfere with the operation of these laws, as the state was doing under a mercantilist policy, was wrong and injurious. Hence, the government should in no wise interfere with private enterprise. *Laissez-faire* (let alone!) was the slogan of the enlightened economic group who called themselves physiocrats.

The great champion of physiocracy was the Frenchman, Quesnay, who had a wide following. A somewhat different slant to the theory of *laissez-faire* was given by the Scotsman, Adam Smith, who in his *Wealth of Nations*, published in 1776, the year of American independence, advocated the removal of all restrictions on trade and individual enterprise. Adam Smith was the economic apostle of the middle class as John Locke had been its political apostle. The protection of property, free and untrammeled business operations—these advocated reforms when realized could not but raise to a commanding position the trader, the shipper, the manufacturer, and all their retinue. And the middle class soon came into its own.

The fitting climax to a chapter on the Intellectual Revolution is Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). In the inclusiveness, the extent, and the color of his revolt, he stands alone. Strangely

enough—and yet as regards a theory of government it is perhaps not strange—this prophet of democracy came out of the same city in which John Calvin reached fame. Rousseau himself was a pathological case. Unable to make a respectable living, immoral, untruthful, fretful, he became in his last years actually insane; but all that need not influence our judgment of his contributions.

During an age when reasonableness and human perfectability through the accomplishments of men's minds were stressed and stressed again, Jean Jacques Rousseau was one of the few who did not forget the emotions of the heart. In *La Nouvelle Héloise* (1759), in *Emile,* and in other works he pointed the road back to feeling, to instinct, to love, love of things of the senses as well as of the works of the mind. Green fields, babbling brooks, the color of sunset, the beauty of a woman, the handiwork of God—all these Rousseau looked upon and said they were good. And he became the father of the romantic movement: a recognition, especially manifested in literature and art, that man was ruled not so much by the cold and austere judgment of the mind as by the throbbing pulsations of the heart.

To give way to all these impulses required a return to a state of nature, an admittedly imaginary entity with Rousseau. But when he sketched ideal government in such a state, he, with his contempt for dry intellectualism, went

in his *Social Contract,* farther than his contemporaries. Locke, who never rejected limited monarchy and who never thought of any sovereignty beyond a propertied class in his social contract, is completely overshadowed by Rousseau. Listen to Jean Jacques:

> The institution of government is not a contract, but a law; the depositories of the executive power are not the people's masters, but its officers; it can set them up and pull them down when it likes; for them there is no question of contract, but of obedience; in taking charge of the functions the state imposes upon them they are doing no more than fulfilling their duty as citizens; without having the remotest right to argue about the conditions.

Rousseau died in 1778. When, fourteen years later, a republic was established in France, Jean Jacques Rousseau was not forgotten. But the rule of a popular majority did not prevail; until the nineteenth century the middle class was to be in the ascendancy.

## XVIII

### THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND NAPOLEON

Spurred on by Voltaire's vehement attack against the abuses of the times and his insistence on applying reason to existing institutions, and fascinated by the picture of the sovereignty of the majority painted by Rousseau, the French people, it became evident in the latter half of the eighteenth century, would tolerate but little longer the oppression of absolute Bourbons.

Louis XIV, who died in 1715, was succeeded by his great-grandson, Louis XV (1715-1774). Under the latter monarch absolutism had become increasingly unbearable. The long colonial struggle with England had drained the treasury. The system of taxation favored a useless nobility and wrought misery on the common people. Versailles, the magnificent royal residence, reveled in more and more luxury and became, in addition, the seat of an almost continuous voluptuous orgy. Headlong towards destruction rushed king, mistresses, and butterfly nobles. "Things will hold together till my death," shrugged Louis XV. "After us the deluge!" affirmed Madame de Pompadour, official mistress.

Death came in 1774, and a grandson, Louis

XVI, mounted the throne, a lad of twenty, well-meaning perhaps, but irresolute. His queen, Marie Antoinette, eighteen and charming, was the daughter of Empress Maria Theresa of Austria. Louis recognized the sad state of affairs, tried to reform it, and failed. His first move was good; he dismissed his grandfather's ministers and called Turgot, an able economist and anti-mercantilist, to clean up the financial situation. Turgot initiated splendid reforms, but his death-knell was sounded when he sought to abolish special privileges and to relieve the abuse of the common people by adopting a uniform tax policy. The privileged classes—all those who profited by abuses—turned against him. The king was too weak to stand by his appointment, and Turgot, who might have saved France a revolution, was in 1776 dismissed.

The financial problem still demanded solution, and the king appointed for the purpose Necker, native of Geneva and a successful Paris banker. By thrift and economic efficiency he reduced the deficit, but the French alliance with the American colonists in a war against Great Britain again drained the treasury. Even Necker's mild reforms angered the parasitical nobility and in 1781 he was forced to go.

In connection with the American war another cause of the French Revolution must be noted. Mr. Alan F. Hattersley contends that:

> Not only did the expenses of the war make impossible [in France] any measure of financial recovery, short of proposals which would have amounted to a revolution; but practical acquaintance with the system of democratic equality among the Americans converted French officers to the ideals of liberty and popular sovereignty. The fact that the Americans had won freedom and independence at the point of the sword, and with help from the French government, was a powerful stimulus to revolutionary thought. Down to the middle of the eighteenth century, political philosophy had scarcely touched the fringe of French society. The works of Montesquieu, Voltaire and Diderot were little read, or regarded as purely theoretical. The Americans, on the other hand, not only proclaimed, but carried into effect, the principles of social equality and the supremacy of the popular will.[1]

After the dismissal of Necker in 1781 matters in France went from bad to worse. The nation became aroused and demanded the calling of the Estates General, the old feudal assembly which had not met since 1614 and which was so dimly remembered that the dissatisfied subjects of Louis XVI thought of it as a body truly representing the nation. Pressed harder and harder, Louis yielded in May, 1789, and sent out the call; simultaneously he recalled Necker.

Popular opinion ultimately discovered that the Estates General consisted of three estates:

[1] *A Short History of Western Civilization* (Macmillan), 1927, p. 185.

clergy, nobility, and commoners. It was further discovered that by tradition they voted as units; hence the privileged orders could outvote the commoners by two to one. Protest arose and Necker ordered that the commoners should send six hundred delegates and the clergy and nobility three hundred each. The question whether the three groups should vote as units or as one assembly was unsettled. The commoners insisted on forming a National Assembly where straight majority rule would prevail; they won their point and on June 27, 1789, the three groups met in one body. Absolute monarchy in France was at an end for the time being.

The limitations of space will not permit us to give detailed treatment of the various stages of the French Revolution. We shall concern ourselves only with enough of its procedure to explain its significance. Beginning in 1789, it passed, until the downfall of Napoleon in 1815—if we consider the whole period as the Revolution—through six definite stages, the first three representing the transition to a democratic republic, and the second three a transition back to absolute monarchy. These stages were:

1. The National Assembly (1789-1791)
2. The Legislative Assembly (1791-1792)
3. The National Convention (1792-1795)
4. The Directory (1795-1799)
5. The Consulate (1799-1804)
6. The Empire (1804-1814)

The National Assembly with commoners in the majority was faced with two great tasks: since the old system was broken down when the Estates General was called, the Assembly had to operate the government during the emergency, and at the same time carry out its main purpose of drafting a constitution for France. The two tasks were not congenial. But, led by such figures as Lafayette, whose name is famous in American history, and Count Mirabeau, a born statesman, the Assembly set to work. It did not work peacefully. The anarchial element of the street besieged it. Louis and the royalist party plotted against it; as a retort to one of these plots a Paris mob stormed the Bastile, a royal fortress and state prison. The fall of the Bastile was regarded as the symbol of French independence, and the date of its fall, July 14 (1789), is a national holiday in France comparable to the American Fourth of July.

To two accomplishments of the National Assembly we must give attention. On August 5, 1789, moved by the report of a committee on disorders throughout the country, the liberal nobles voluntarily gave up their feudal privileges of game laws, exclusive right to military office, and a great variety of feudal dues. The clergy, to be not less sacrificial to country, voted to give up the tithe. The Third Estate, in its turn, agreed to give up all trade monopolies. *Feudalism disappeared from France with one*

*fell swoop*. Almost as a part of the same action church property was confiscated and to meet the financial crisis paper money was issued against it, which, carried to an extreme, resulted in disastrous inflation.

The second great accomplishment of the National Assembly was the drafting of a constitution, which was finished in 1791. It opened with a noble "Declaration of the Rights of Man," one of the famous democratic documents of modern times. The Declaration proclaimed that: "Men are born equal in rights and remain so"; "Law is the expression of the will of all the people"; "Frenchmen are equally eligible to public office." It also provided for jury trial, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion. It justified the watchword, "Liberty, equality, and fraternity." On the side of governmental organization, the constitution made the royal executive weak. Political power was widely diffused among elected officials. A national legislature of but one house was elected every two years by citizens who qualified as property owners, a triumph for the middle class but a thorn in the side of the democratic masses. This limiting of the franchise made the Assembly very unpopular with the common people.

On October 1, 1791, the first Legislative Assembly provided by the new constitution met. The quality of its membership was impaired by a generous ordinance drafted by the National

Assembly prohibiting any of its members from sitting in the succeeding legislature. Hence inexperienced men—most of them radical orators —were given the responsibility of administering the new government. Two parties immediately arose: the monarchists, supporting the constitution, and the republicans, favoring the destruction even of the limited monarchy, and known as the Gironde. The majority followed the republican group. The power of the Girondists or republican party was confirmed when in April, 1792, the king was forced to declare war against Austria. Many nobles had left France when their cause seemed lost, and numbers of them now gathered in armed camps along the Rhine and the Legislative Assembly believed that this threat had the support of Austria; and of course monarchical Europe hated the Revolution.

Prussia allied with Austria, and in the summer of 1792 France was invaded. Republican sentiment arose. Louis XVI was held to be in league with foreign despots. "Down with the king!" was the cry. The Legislative Assembly suspended him; its ministers, led by Danton, took over the government. As practical dictator Danton rallied the forces of France and repulsed the enemy from French soil. France was saved, but not without madness, for to wipe away all possible interference Danton and his republican followers put to death in Paris during September, 1792, two thousand suspected mon-

archical sympathizers. When the king was suspended the Legislative Assembly ordered the election of a National Convention to draft a new and *republican* constitution. This body convened on September 21, 1792.

The National Convention began its career with France freed for a time from invasion. Republicanism was coming into its own, and the Convention was determined not only to secure liberties in France but to become, in Danton's exalted cry, "a general committee of insurrection for all nations." France was going to convert the world to its gospel of "liberty, equality, and fraternity."

The direction the Convention was to take had to be decided in another conflict of parties. Against the Gironde, which supported republicanism but repudiated violence or massacre, stood the Mountain (so called because members of the party had the highest seats in the convention hall) supporting republicanism without humane qualification. Led by Danton, Robespierre, and Marat, the Mountain swung the majority and prevailed. Its first act was to condemn and behead the king; Louis XVI died January 21, 1793.

This act coalesced monarchical Europe against the Convention; England, Spain, Austria, and Prussia joined forces. Before war could be prosecuted the Mountain had to subdue entirely the Gironde. This was accomplished June 2, 1793.

Unchecked now, the Mountain moved to rid France of her enemies in systematic fashion; Robespierre's Reign of Terror was immediately instituted. The Reign of Terror, as well as the effort to overcome France's external enemies, was under a strong executive group, the Committee of Public Safety, made up of twelve members with plenary powers.

The bloody story of the Reign of Terror, which lasted from June 2, 1793, to July 27, 1794, can be but summarily recounted here. During fourteen months some fifteen thousand executions took place. Queen Marie Antoinette was a victim along with many other notables. Merest suspicion was ground for sentence to the guillotine. The City of Lyons, opposing such violence, revolted; the army of the Convention practically razed the city. Toulon, likewise in revolt, surrendered to the English. The skill of a young military officer regained it; his name was Napoleon Bonaparte. Terror finally seized the Convention, even the Mountain itself. His own colleagues united against Robespierre, and he and his fellow terrorists were condemned to death July 27, 1794. The Reign of Terror ended.

It must be admitted that under the rule of the Mountain, France's defense was successfully organized. Credit is due chiefly to Carnot, who conscripted armies even amidst the Reign of Terror. The preliminary preparations bore fruit in 1794. Belgium was conquered; Holland was

seized. Favorable peace was made with Spain and Prussia. This done, the Convention could settle down to its main work of writing a new constitution.

The document was completed in 1795. This Constitutional Convention reversed the policy of its predecessor and declared that two-thirds of the new legislature must be made up of men who had sat in the Convention. Monarchists who had arisen in the reaction against terror resented this self-perpetuating measure and resolved to storm the Convention. They were stopped by a whiff of grape-shot fired by troops commanded by the same Napoleon Bonaparte whose skill had regained Toulon.

The new instrument of government, called the Constitution of the Year III (a new calendar had been set up starting from the year of the execution of the king—when the French Republic was born), had as its main feature the establishment of a strong executive body of five members, called the Directory. The legislature was bicameral and was to be elected by property holders; again the middle class triumphed. And authority replaced violence.

From 1795 to 1815 the history of France is largely the biography of the young lieutenant who had regained Toulon and later saved the National Convention. Napoleon Bonaparte, who was born in Corsica in the year 1768, was but twenty-five years old at the time of his Toulon

triumph; before he was thirty he was the foremost man in France and but a little later he was a figure who towered over Europe like a fearful giant. Napoleon was one of the greatest military geniuses in the history of warfare and one of the greatest civil rulers in the annals of nations and empires. He was a tireless worker with an unrivaled memory even for details. Perhaps his magnetism, his power over men, was his most valuable characteristic; thousands died for him gladly even tho he was among the most unscrupulous of persons. As one commentator has said, he must have answered some lyric cry in the human heart. "Morality," he admitted, "has nothing to do with me." Judgments about him differ. He has been called an "imperial impersonation of force and murder"; it has been said that of the supremely great men only Christ and Napoleon acted out their dreams instead of dreaming their actions.

There is little in the circumstances of his birth or in his early life to explain this genius. His family was of noble lineage. Corsica in his youth was intensely patriotic, trying to throw off French control. At ten young Bonaparte entered the royal military school at Brienne. He graduated in due time as a junior lieutenant of the artillery in the army of a people who were suppressing his native Corsica. Who knows whether the spirit of the French Revolution

or personal ambition caused him to cast his destinies with France?

For his defense of the National Convention the Directory rewarded Napoleon with the command of a small army in Italy, which was to completely overshadow in achievements two larger French armies sent into Germany. When in 1797 he concluded his campaign in Italy, substantial territorial gains were added to France, and Napoleon was a hero. In 1797 the Directory exulted in France's virtual possession of Belgium, Holland, Italy, and the Rhine boundary. Of France's enemies only Great Britain remained in the field. Bonaparte in 1798 with the consent of the Directory tried an attack in Egypt as a threat to England in India. But Admiral Nelson destroyed the French fleet, and left Napoleon stranded with an army in Egypt. Napoleon deserted his army and returned to France, where the people, not comprehending his Egyptian defeat, hailed him as a savior. He came in time; a new coalition of Austria, Russia, and England was threatening from without, and corruption, bankruptcy, and hopeless confusion reigned within. There was talk of a royal restoration. Instead the people turned to Bonaparte. With ease he overthrew by a *coup d'état* the Directory and had himself made First Consul in a government practically concentrated in his hands. The Consulate lasted from 1799 to 1804.

Napoleon's achievements during the rule of

the Consulate merit attention. By 1802 the coalition was quieted. Russia withdrew in 1799 and Austria was defeated the next year, confirming France's possession of the left bank of the Rhine and securing her in Italy. England was too inaccessible to conquer, so a treaty was concluded with her in 1802 on the basis of mutual restitutions. France was to remain at peace until ambition again stirred Napoleon's aggressiveness. Meanwhile his work on the domestic situation was notable. Indeed his internal reforms, not his military successes, remain as his best monuments.

We can but summarize briefly this great work. He resumed specie payment, giving impetus to sound business. He centralized governmental control and introduced administrative efficiency; a people torn by confusion welcomed it even at the cost of the ideal of democracy. Napoleon turned next to religion and restored Catholicism out of a tangle which had resulted from confiscation of Church property, the attempt to establish a national church, and such extreme efforts as the setting up during the Revolution of first a worship of Reason and later Robespierre's cult of the Supreme Being. But the reestablished Catholicism, confirmed by a treaty with Rome in 1801 called the Concordat, was closely dependent on the state, which nominated and paid priests and bishops whose appointments were confirmed by the pope.

We may pass over his attempted educational

reforms to make mention of his revision of the law, which, under the direction of juristic experts, resulted in 1804 in the *Code Napoléon,* the first broad systematic codification since the days of Justinian. It became the basis of law for a goodly part of Europe. Napoleon recognized its importance, and after his downfall declared, "Waterloo will wipe out the memory of my forty victories; but that which nothing can wipe away is my Civil Code. That will live forever."

With his domestic reforms well under way, Napoleon stood at the parting of the roads. He chose to follow the course of the Cæsars, and placed above the welfare of France the satisfying of unbounded personal ambition. It is not without significance that Ludwig von Beethoven, during the time when Napoleon was First Consul, admiringly dedicated to him the Third Symphony, only to change the title to "Sinfonia Eroica, composed to celebrate the memory of a great man," when he heard that Bonaparte had made himself emperor.

The steps towards this realization were easy. In 1802 Napoleon was made consul for life. In May, 1804, he assumed the title of Emperor of the French. Six months later, in the presence of the pope, he crowned himself emperor. The cycle was complete: France had passed from absolutism to limited monarchy, to republicanism, to oligarchical control, and back again to absolutism

—and the whole process took but a decade and a half.

It will not serve our purpose to trace in detail Napoleon's imperial course from 1804 to 1814. In 1805 the French troops crushed an Austrian army at Austerlitz in Moravia. In 1806 the Prussian army was routed at Jena and the French troops entered Berlin. In 1807 a Russian army was defeated at Friedland; in 1809 the Austrian defeat was confirmed at Wagram; in 1812 a former Russian alliance was broken and a half-million troops marched on Moscow only to perish in a wintry retreat.

The territorial additions to France were many. The Papal States were added in 1808. In the same year Madrid was seized and Spain became a subject-kingdom under France. Napoleon's relatives occupied thrones. Against Great Britain, unconquerable because of her navy, a blockade was tried which only destroyed commerce and brought unpopularity to the emperor. Weakened by Spanish uprisings and the loss of an army in Russia, Napoleon faced in 1812 the forces of his encouraged enemies. The Germanies arose against him. English troops advanced under Wellington in Spain. In 1814 the anti-French allies marched into Paris. Napoleon abdicated and was exiled to Elba, a small Mediterranean island, only to stage a triumphal return to power which was finally quelled at Waterloo.

With Napoleon's defeat certain, there occurred in Europe a conservative reaction in which all the forces of the ancient régime—divine-right monarchy, feudal classes, clergy, and nobility—hoped again to enjoy the ascendency. For Napoleon in the eyes of Europe had stood for the Revolution, the triumph of the middle class. That this group received a temporary setback was natural; that they would rise again was inevitable.

Out of this melodrama of the French Revolution and Napoleon, what remained? The right of property, preached by the early apostles of the middle class, was established. If not religious freedom, at least a modicum of religious toleration prevailed. Napoleon, by applying his Code throughout Europe, guaranteed equality before the law. Feudal forms were abolished, and their inequalities were never restored. And nationalism, invigorated by the contagious patriotism of Frenchmen, swept over Europe with telling consequences for the nineteenth century.

## XIX

## NATIONALITY AND DEMOCRACY

When we survey the years from 1815 to 1914 we find that this century is dominated by two great developments: (1) The growth of nationality and democracy, twin offspring of the French Revolution, and (2) the Industrial Revolution, dependent upon the growth of scientific knowledge.

We shall study these in separate chapters, and in the first of the two will note the development of those two ideas, nationality and democracy, which run like two threads through the many and complex phenomena of nineteenth-century Europe. To show the complete evolution of these ideas as reflected in the events occurring from 1815 to 1914 would require a much larger book than this entire volume; we shall attend only to salient currents.

It must never be forgotten that the seeds of these nineteenth-century growths, nationality and democracy, were sown by the French Revolution. It had emphasized the idea that the sovereignty in any government is with the people, which develops a consciousness of nationality while promoting democracy. France had developed a national army, a soldiery imbued with the sentiment of protecting and glorifying

France. And the armies which successfully opposed France were those in which a national spirit had developed. So, to a far greater degree than was realized in 1815, there had arisen among various groups a desire for democracy and a consciousness of nationality. From 1815 to 1914 democracy developed chiefly in England and France (and in America), but far more widely the idea grew that each nationality—people of the same customs, language, and traditions—should constitute a separate state.

The Congress of Vienna, which met in 1814 and 1815 to settle the consequences of the Napoleonic wars, failed, quite naturally in its spirit of reaction, to take into consideration the principles of nationality and democracy. Rather, the four great conquerors: Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England, were animated by two entirely different principles: legitimacy, the reestablishment of all states as they had existed before 1792 in the hands of their "legitimate" rulers, and division of spoils among the conquerors as rewards.

We need not here go into the detailed divisions of Europe made in 1815. Some of them we must take account of. France retained the boundaries of 1790 and had to pay a small indemnity. Louis XVIII, a surviving Bourbon, was put on her throne. Prussia, supported by Russia, nearly caused a war in trying to get Saxony. As buffer states against France, Holland and Belgium (the

Austrian Netherlands) were consolidated under the House of Orange and called the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and Genoa was given to the king of Sardinia. The republic of Venice—and of course republics had not belonged to legitimate rulers—was given to the king of Sardinia. Austria received the republic of Venice, compensating her for the loss of Belgium. Great Britain received her reward in colonies: Heligoland, Malta, Ceylon, and South Africa. Russia got most of the Polish territory, altho Austria and Prussia took their share.

But most interesting from the viewpoint of our study of nationality and democracy are the handicaps which the Congress of Vienna placed on these two movements. In the matter of disregarding the principles of nationality the Congress sinned against the Belgian, Polish, Italian, and German peoples.

The Belgians were placed under Dutch rule in total disregard of their nationalist wishes. The Poles were indiscriminately distributed among Austria, Prussia, and Russia, with Russia getting the lion's share. The Italians were tossed in all directions: Austria received Lombardy, which now included Venetia; the State of the Church was given back to the pope; Tuscany went to a branch of the Habsburgs; Piedmont plus Genoa went to the king of Sardinia; Ferdinand, a Bourbon, was given Naples and Sicily —all this diffusion not to mention the division

of the lesser states of Italy. The Italians were soon dominated by Austria. Germany had been reduced by Napoleon to thirty-eight sovereign states. After Napoleon's fall German national leaders asked that these states be made into a close federal union, but the Congress of Vienna, dominated by Metternich, the Austrian Chancellor, a conservative with ambitions of his own stead, a confederation called the Bund was formed, which was futile as a means of union. which was futile as a means of effective union.

Nationalistic ambitions were apparently quite effectively thwarted at Vienna, but they would not down. Belgium gained her independence as early as 1831. Poland had to wait until after the World War. Italy and Germany we shall discuss later.

The Congress of Vienna, befitting its conservative and monarchical tenor, also took steps to insure Europe against any democratic or liberal movements. The Congress formed two alliances, one, the Holy Alliance, a sentimental agreement drafted by Tsar Alexander and signed by his colleagues in which with mystic phrases they agreed to rule their subjects according to Christian principles.

The second alliance is important. Starting first as a Quadruple Alliance but made Quintuple by the admission of France in 1818, it dedicated itself in the interests of peace and security to see that not one iota of a change was

to be made in the arrangements dictated by the Congress of Vienna. What a damper on progress, particularly towards democracy, when divine-right monarchs were again in the saddle! Not only boundaries but the internal governments of European countries—lest dread revolution again break out—were to be maintained at the *status quo*. That such a condition of affairs could not long exist was obvious.

Unified states based on the principle of nationality did emerge and democratic governments did arise despite the suppressions of the Vienna Congress. Space will not permit an inclusive survey; we shall consider the triumph of the principle of nationality in Italy and Germany and the ultimate success of democracy in France and England. We turn to the unification of Italian peoples into the Kingdom of Italy.

Before 1852 the Italians' efforts to free themselves from Austria were of little avail except to center hopes of unification around Sardinia-Piedmont, which had become a constitutional monarchy under King Charles Albert, who after defeat by the Austrians in 1849 abdicated in favor of his son, Victor Emmanuel II. In 1852 a brilliant statesman was appointed head minister of Sardinia. To Count Cavour must go the chief credit for liberating and unifying Italy. He was determined to drive the Austrians from the peninsula, and to establish a northern kingdom of Italy under Victor Emmanuel, a liberal

monarch, as the first step towards national union.

To do this he patiently enlisted the aid of Napoleon III, nephew of the famous Corsican and now emperor of the French, against Austria. Obtaining Napoleon's aid necessitated Sardinia's siding with France in the Crimean War, and the secret promising of Nice and Savoy to Napoleon in return for French help. But in 1859 France joined Sardinia against Austria. For various reasons Napoleon made an early peace and Sardinia received only a part of Lombardy. But wild nationalistic feeling, greatly stimulated earlier in the century by the writings of the patriot Mazzini, swept over Italy, and despite the original failure, Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and Romagna (the northern section of the Papal States), rose against their princes and begged for annexation to Sardinia. Napoleon's consent to the annexation was secured by cession to France of Nice and Savoy.

Cavour turned to the south. To the two Sicilies he sent the colorful soldier, Garibaldi, with an army. At once the people revolted against their Bourbon king, Francis II. The demonstration was repeated in Naples, and in 1860 Sicily and Naples voted to join the northern kingdom. Anconia and Umbria (eastern territories of the Papal States) followed suit. Garibaldi wished then to attack Rome, held by French troops, but the cautious Cavour interposed a veto. In

1861 Victor Emmanuel II proclaimed himself King of Italy, and in the same year Cavour died. But unification went on. Victor Emmanuel in 1866 received Venice as a reward for his aid to Prussia in a war against Austria. The French troops left Rome during the Franco-German War of 1870, and the soldiers of the Italian king marched in. The pope withdrew to the Vatican palace. Except for Trentino and Trieste, which Italy received in 1919 after the World War, Italian unification was completed in 1870. Italians had given their answer to the non-recognition of the principle of nationality by the Congress of Vienna.

The German answer was equally decisive. German unification, like the Italian procedure, was largely the result of the statesmanship of one man, Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), who became prime minister of Prussia in 1862. And Prussia was the natural leader in unifying Germany: she emerged from the Congress of Vienna comparatively free among non-German peoples; the Napoleonic Wars had brought about internal reforms; she was the head of the *Zollverein*, a German customs union. The great obstacle was Austria, who, having won in 1815 the agreement to a loose German confederation, had to be ousted from the German situation. Then Germany could be merged into Prussia. To oust Austria required war; Bismarck, exponent of blood and iron, soon found the occasion after

insuring the friendliness or neutrality of other European powers.

Schleswig and Holstein, German-inhabited provinces belonging to Denmark, had the opportunity in 1863 of breaking away from that country with German support. Bismarck persuaded Austria to join him in the effort, knowing that the differences over spoils would give him the coveted opportunity of eliminating Austria from the German situation by force of arms. Schleswig and Holstein were quickly taken in 1864. By 1866, after Bismarck had formed an alliance with Italy, the war against Austria was on, apparently to decide the issue of the disposition of Schleswig and Holstein. The real issue was the reorganization of Germany on a more solid basis than the Bund, product of 1815. The war was over in seven weeks, with Prussia as victor and the mistress of Germany. Schleswig-Holstein came definitely under her control and she annexed the northern states she had occupied during the war: Frankfort, Nassau, Hesse-Cassel, and Hanover. A North German Confederation dominated by Prussia was formed to displace the old Bund.

Outside the Confederation were four detached states in the south: Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Baden. Bismarck bided his time until an opportunity should arise to bring these states into the fold. It came shortly and proved to be that best of all instruments for

cementing national feeling—a war. For some time and because of various matters, relations between France and Prussia had been strained. The climax came when Spanish revolutionists, having deposed their queen, asked a Hohenzollern prince, a relative of King William of Prussia, to take the throne of Spain. The prince refused, but the French foreign minister through his ambassador foolishly insisted that King William promise that his relative would never renew the candidature. William refused and Bismarck capitalized the situation by publishing the demand. France, feeling insulted, rushed into war. Would the four south-German states support Prussia? They did, not only because a defensive alliance required it of them but more because the strain and break with France had excited a strong German nationalistic feeling.

German forces without great difficulty won the Franco-German war of 1870 and the German troops returned home to find a greatly intensified national feeling. The oneness of North and South was confirmed in the formation of the German Empire in 1871, which was further enlarged by the cession to it of Alsace and Lorraine as spoils of the war. Bismarck had won and the principle of nationality had prevailed.

We may note in passing that nationalist movements sprang up, and to a large degree triumphed, all over Europe in the nineteenth and in the early years of the present century. We

have mentioned that Holland and Belgium became separate kingdoms in 1831. The Balkan states, with Greece taking the lead in 1829, gradually gained their freedom from the Turks. Norway and Sweden became separate kingdoms in 1905. It took the World War to make possible the realization of nationalistic ideals in Austria-Hungary and Russia.

Let us now follow another principle of the French Revolution, that of self-government, democracy, as it developed in the nineteenth century despite the efforts of the Congress of Vienna to suppress it. What transpired in France itself? It will be remembered that in keeping with the legitimatist policy of the Vienna agreements a Bourbon, Louis XVIII, was placed on the throne. His government, a mild constitutional monarchy, largely because the franchise was based on wealth, represented a triumph of the middle class. Louis XVIII's successor, Charles X, who ruled from 1824 to 1830, attempted a policy of reaction consistent with Vienna principles and brought upon himself the Revolution of 1830. This action brought to the throne Louis Philippe, a member of another branch of the Bourbons, who ruled until 1848 and whose aim was to maintain a rule of the middle class.

The Revolution of 1848 was a strongly liberal uprising. The Industrial Revolution, which we shall discuss in a subsequent chapter, had pro-

duced a working class, many of whose members exhibited socialistic tendencies and were discontented with the limited political franchise. A Provisional Government was established which represented a compromise between moderate republican and socialistic factions, and which agreed to recognize the "right to work" and to accept the socialist proscription of national workshops. But a National Constituent Assembly elected by universal manhood suffrage turned out to be moderate and abolished the workshops and defeated a subsequent socialist insurrection. The weakness of the extreme republican movement was exhibited when the nation chose as president Louis Napoleon, nephew of the great emperor. In 1851 Louis, by a *coup d'état*, made himself president for ten years, and in 1852 was elected emperor by a plebiscite. France was again in reaction against republicanism.

For fifteen years the empire pursued an absolutist policy. Freedom of the press was limited, political meetings were forbidden, and universal male suffrage was abridged to the extent that the whole body of workingmen was deprived of the vote. The policy of the empire was welcomed because it suppressed anarchy, attained some glory in war, and because the country enjoyed prosperity. From 1867 to 1870 the empire gradually became liberal, largely for the reason that Napoleon III had to offer his subjects something to appease their dissatisfaction at the failure of

his foreign policy, particularly at his failure to wring from Prussia annexation which would secure for France the Rhine boundary.

Jealousy of Prussian or German ascendency in central Europe eventually led to the Franco-German war of 1870, in which France was defeated and Napoleon III taken prisoner. But in the course of the war France was proclaimed a republic. Following the war a bitter fight took place between monarchical and radical factions. The radical group was defeated. But the victorious monarchical group could not agree on a monarch, and with one compromise following another, the Third French Republic was evolved between 1873 and 1875. The legislative power was vested in a Chamber of Deputies elected by universal suffrage, and a Senate elected by local departmental bodies. A ministry must command a majority in the Chamber of Deputies; hence the government is parliamentary. A president is elected for seven years by the two houses, but is largely decorative. After a decade of uncertainty the Third Republic may be described as democratic, strongly national, anti-clerical, and dominated by the middle classes, who have consistently enjoyed the favor of the electors. The Republic, too, has been liberal; there has been freedom of the press, freedom of trade unions, free state-school systems—hence the Church no longer controls education. Separation of Church and State was achieved in 1905. Therefore in

France the ideals of the Revolution have triumphed; democracy and liberalism are realities, and the principle of nationality prevails.

In contrast to France's hectic career, Great Britain achieved from 1815 to 1914 a remarkable degree of democracy without bloodshed and without overthrow of the form of government—all this despite the fact that Great Britain was and remains a constitutional monarchy. Let us follow the important steps towards democracy in the island kingdom, which, in 1688, it will be remembered, made its king dependent upon parliament, and in the succeeding century evolved a ministry responsible to the same body. Hence the development towards English democracy in the nineteenth century was a process of extending the franchise. The faction which demanded extension was the rising middle classes who had become a power as a result of the Industrial Revolution.

The political rights in England of 1815 were enjoyed by owners of landed property. Caught in the reaction of the times, the English Government made every effort to keep things as they stood. But it could not last; moderate liberalism became a rising tide. In 1828 and 1829 full civil rights were given to Catholics and Dissenters. In 1832 came a parliamentary Reform Bill which redistributed seats in the Commons sufficiently to end glaring unequal representation and lowered the franchise requirements to an extent that

the total number of voters was almost doubled. The middle classes representing growing industry were now in a position to wrest the power from the old aristocratic landed classes. In 1835 by the Municipal Corporations Act all taxpayers were admitted to town franchise. In 1867 a second parliamentary Reform Bill liberalized the franchise to include the class of skilled workers, and outside towns the property qualification was cut in half. A third bill in 1884 made uniform the borough and county franchise qualifications, the only excluded class now being the lower laboring class. In 1918 universal suffrage to men over 21 and women over 30 was granted. Britain carried the cause of democracy further by making a number of her colonies self-governing.

In the main, the lesser states of Europe, whose history we cannot trace here, followed the example of France and England in democratizing their governments. Some have become republics; some have evolved constitutional monarchies. In the nineteenth century, then, we note that in western Europe the principles of nationality and democracy, the principles of the French Revolution, triumphed despite the reaction after the Napoleonic Wars. It must suffice to say here that where the principles of democracy and nationalism were suppressed in the nineteenth century, chiefly in Russia and Austria-Hungary, the realization of these principles came as a result of the World War.

## XX

## THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Had Socrates, the great Athenian philosopher who died in 399 B.C., by some miracle of earthly resurrection returned to the world of George Washington, who lived from 1732 to 1799, he would have found in man's physical environment very little that was novel. But were George Washington and Socrates to return together to the western world in the present year of grace they would be equally amazed, confused, and unoriented. Washington as much as Socrates would have to learn about and accustom himself to great industrial and commercial cities, to huge factories and mass production, to steam and electric railways and motor-driven ships, to telegraph and telephone and radio, to automobiles and airplanes, to a myriad of switches and levers, push-buttons and accelerators, instrument boards and tuning dials.

This flight of the imagination as well as probably anything else pictures the effect of the revolution in industry and science, a revolution which has virtually remade the world *and remade it largely since the beginning of the nineteenth century.* More than any other one factor it has been responsible for the momentous political changes we have just considered.

## THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

The Industrial Revolution had its beginnings in England. There is in this fact little that is accidental, for the Industrial Revolution is largely, if not solely, the product of the efforts of the middle classes, the large group which with the rise of the towns came to the fore in trade, commerce, and industry. We have noted that this group asserted its political power in England almost a century before it showed strength in other countries; in 1649 the middle classes in England deposed and beheaded a king, and in 1688 they constituted a telling factor in the Glorious Revolution and in the placing of constitutional limits on the monarch. A more significant reason for the early beginnings of the Industrial Revolution in England is that the gilds were suppressed there almost completely by the beginning of the eighteenth century while they still dominated industry in Continental countries.

This suppression of the gilds made way for personal enterprise. In England, therefore, long before it came about in other countries, men depended on their own initiative in business ventures and were in nowise hampered by the minute regulations and limitations of the gild system. This clearing of the way for the full sweep of personal initiative and enterprise in business and commercial procedure must have—and very naturally—stimulated men to call into being "that new and mysterious instrument of

the modern mind, 'the invention of invention.' " And what was the result? In the textile industry, where the need was greatest, there appeared in the half-century between 1740 and 1790 a series of ingenious devices which rendered obsolete all old processes of production in that field. Kay's flying shuttle, Hargreaves's spinning jenny, Arkwright's water frame, Crompton's mule, and Cartwright's power loom —these inventions enabled one man to turn out in the course of a day as much work as five men could do by the older methods. This increased production demanded a faster inflow of cotton, and in 1793 Eli Whitney in America perfected a cotton-gin which could pick the seeds from raw cotton faster than half a hundred negro slaves working at top speed under the crack of the overseer's whip.

But technical advancement was not limited to the textile industry. Necessity indeed is the mother of invention, and the inefficiency of operating these new machines with the motive power of man or water must soon have become apparent. The steam-engine, the invention of James Watt, which in 1769 only pumped water out of mines, was between 1785 and 1789 adapted to driving mill machinery in Nottingham and Manchester.

The steam-engine, furthermore, may be credited with a revolution of its own; it did not long remain a mere adjunct to textile manufac-

ture. In the opening years of the nineteenth century it became an all-important factor in transportation; of this Robert Fulton's steamboat and George Stephenson's steam locomotive are ample evidences. Small wonder that the nineteenth century has been called the Age of Steam! The Age of Steam was to be partially eclipsed only with the appearance of that lusty infant, electricity, which during the century was sufficiently mastered to make possible the telegraph, a transatlantic cable, the telephone, and the wireless, in the order named.

The invention of the steam-engine necessitated the more rapid production of machines and brought in turn the development of the iron trade. But iron machines gave way to steel ones when in 1856 Sir Henry Bessemer made known his process for converting iron into steel, which was followed in 1872 by the discovery of another process which permitted the conversion of the peculiar kind of iron found in Lorraine mines, the richest deposits in Europe.

Iron and coal, in fact, are so essential to machine development that industry apparently thrives on the soil under which they are deposited. Their abundance of iron and coal, indeed, seems to account for the industrial leadership before 1914 of Great Britain, Germany, France, and Belgium. The Continental countries followed England in the Industrial Revolution

as soon as the middle classes in these countries came into their own.

What were the important consequences, social and economic, of this revolutionary movement? There was, quite naturally, a tremendous increase in economic activity. The new machines marked the beginning of mass production. Surprizingly soon almost every article that man used was manufactured more cheaply and in greater quantities. When prices went down more people bought. The production of more goods and the concomitant development in transportation accelerated commerce. Those who profited by increased industrial activity grew wealthy. Fortunes before undreamed-of were made. Surpluses of wealth accumulated, to be in turn invested in enterprises for the making of more wealth.

Indeed, during the Industrial Revolution the capitalist class came into its own. It took capital in the first place to utilize the new machinery. Before the era of the machine, manufacturing was done in the home. But machines were costly; they required factories in which to house them; they needed laborers to operate them. To build factories and buy machines and pay wages required money. The capitalist rose to the opportunity. His investment was great, his profits were great. The credit system increased. Money was invested in the new projects by men who had no active part in their management—hence

the modern investment system. The means of production passed into the hands of the few who reaped its rich profits—a supercapitalist class.

Whereas the Industrial Revolution brought rich harvests to the few, it brought misery and unhappiness to the many. The capitalist class had its antipode, the great mass of workers who reaped for the time being from the new development only unrelieved misery. From the farms they came, or from their little domestic manufacturing establishments now rendered unprofitable, to be the operators and yet the slaves of these new marvelous and yet monstrous machines. Their wages were fixed, their hours of work determined, their lives almost literally handed over to an employer class. They could not assert their rights as individuals and they were forbidden to form combinations for self-protection. Low wages, long hours, unbearable living quarters; sickness, plague, even starvation—all these cast a dark shadow over the otherwise blazing Industrial Revolution.

But despite the high death-rate among the working class, caused by the conditions just mentioned, the Industrial Revolution brought with it a tremendous increase in population; there were 180,000,000 people in Europe in 1800 and 450,000,000 in 1900. The simple reason given is that the production of more goods enabled more people to live. Undoubtedly scientific advances, particularly in medicine, are also

in some degree responsible. There came also with the Revolution a shift in population from the agricultural districts to the towns. During the nineteenth century the number of European cities having a population of over 100,000 increased tenfold. How are these city dwellers fed? Science again is the answer; it has revolutionized the practises of agriculture to the point where those who migrated from the farms to the cities have not been greatly missed.

The improved means of transportation—steamboats and railways—opened up two possibilities: first, raw materials could be brought to factories from widely scattered sources; second, far-flung and hitherto inaccessible markets for the products of the factories were rendered accessible. And when the wants of the peoples of Europe were satisfied, and when the new machines continued to produce more and more, it was only natural that nations began to look beyond their own boundaries for additional markets. The Industrial Revolution thus became in the flow of time a factor of tremendous proportions in world politics. The necessity of looking for markets beyond their own boundaries started the nations of Europe on a fresh phase of colonial expansion which came to be called imperialism. When it is recalled that the three rival leaders in the Industrial Revolution were Great Britain, France, and Germany, this com-

petition for markets becomes pregnant with significance.

It cannot be too often emphasized that the Industrial Revolution, itself the product of their efforts, lifted the already rising middle classes definitely to the saddle of power, and their power was exercised in the political and the social as well as in the purely economic fields of human endeavor. Their policy was at least consistent.

Its roots are to be found in the thought of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Then it was that Sir Isaac Newton launched his ordered universe with the stars in their courses held by the same force which causes the apple to fall to the ground. Then it was that the great rationalistic group, Locke, Voltaire, and Diderot launched their blue-prints of nature and proclaimed that the natural world, the world of inanimate objects, was constructed upon and operated according to natural laws. Man, if he wished to achieve the *summum bonum* of life in this world, had only to allow those God-given laws and principles to operate unhampered and unrestrained.

When this doctrine was carried to the field of economics, its great apostle, as we have mentioned before, was Adam Smith, who advocated the removal of all restrictions on trade and industry—presumably that the universal laws might operate with freedom complete. Hence the

great cry of *laissez-faire* (let alone!). And what more natural than that these middle-class capitalists of the next century should take up the banner of *laissez-faire* and carry it wherever their influence extended? Ere we judge harshly their course of action we must realize that in their minds it was not only expedient but was ultimately founded on by no means unaccepted doctrines.

Freedom from restraint in every action was their goal. And it must be admitted that theirs was but another step—at least they thought of it as such—in that evolution of man's liberties which had been taking place century upon century, and which had given freedom from the bonds of feudalism, freedom from the authority of the Church, freedom from the tyranny of absolute monarchy, freedom from the minute restrictions of the gilds, freedom from the superimposed regulations of the mercantilist system. The individual man, at once unhampered and unaided, was to fight alone in the terrific struggle of life where the fit would survive and the weak perish. The perishing of the weak was inevitable in the rational universal scheme of things.

By uncanny coincidence this justification of the perishing of the unfit was given overwhelmingly eloquent confirmation at the very height of the middle-class supremacy, when in 1859 an English scientist, Charles Darwin, published

his memorable work, *On the Origin of Species,* embodying as one of its central theories the survival of the fittest and the perishing of the unfit in the realm of biology. The captains of industry and all their ilk could now look on the untold misery of the working class they had brought into being with no other reflection than that they were themselves the biological elect.

But the knell of the unbroken freedom of the middle-class industrialists was heard when the working class's wail of despair changed into a hymn of challenge, a metamorphosis hastened by the more sympathetic members of the middle classes who pondered on that oldest of interrogations, "Am I my brother's keeper?" The first relief which the working classes received came not from their own members, but from philanthropically-minded people of the middle class.

That oppressed and miserable workingmen would soon develop a class consciousness was inevitable. Articulate spokesmen of their cause appeared who in books and on platforms attacked the unrestrained activities of the ruling middle classes and championed instead of freedom the second principle of the French Revolution, equality, the equality of all men. These spokesmen preached, therefore, the welfare not of distinguished classes, but of undistinguished masses. To realize this goal the masses, they urged, must unite and wrest from their masters

the scepter of power. The chief apostle of this doctrine was Karl Marx, a German Jew who lived from 1818 to 1883, whose "Workingmen of all nations, unite! You have nothing to lose but your chains" is the slogan, and whose *Das Kapital* is the bible of the working-class struggle for control.

The efforts of Marx and his fellow spokesmen were not without fruit. Socialism became more than a theory; it emerged into a political program taking different forms in different countries and yet having a certain international character. Naturally, socialism assumed varied shadings: there developed the right or conservative wing, like the present-day British Labor Party, and the movement extended with numerous middle positions to an extreme left wing exemplified by anarchism. In some form or other socialism became in all industrial countries a political force to be reckoned with. If a socialist party could not control a government it might at least become a pivotal minority. Of course, the first step was to gain the franchise for the working classes. That done, laborers either formed parties of their own, usually socialistic, or became potent influences in already-organized political groups. In any case the nineteenth century saw the working classes, if not in control, in a position to force the middle classes to meet some of their demands. What they gained, chiefly, was social legislation.

Space does not permit an enumeration of even the varied types of social legislation brought about in the nineteenth century through the influence of the working classes. Germany led and eventually evolved a program of insurance legislation for the benefit of laborers. Britain took a few short steps in the direction of social legislation in the first half of the nineteenth century, and before its close enacted a whole series of laws designed to better immeasurably the condition of the workingman. France's earlier record in social legislation was not so good.

Thus the very group which they had called into being effectively checked in less than a century the restricted freedom of the middle classes.

## XXI

### AMERICA—THE COLONIAL PERIOD

The advent of the Americas into history is the most important phenomenon of modern times. For as far back as human records go, history had concerned itself with the peoples of the Orient and of Europe, and chiefly with those civilizations that grew up around the Mediterranean Sea. In the story of the long and toilsome climb of man from savagery to civilization, the Americas have no legitimate place. All the more significant, then, were the effects of the discoveries of Christopher Columbus and his followers upon world economy and society, politics and culture. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the rôle of the Americas in world affairs was largely a passive one; in the eighteenth and nineteenth that rôle was an increasingly active one, and in the twentieth it can be said to be a dominant one.

When Europeans first came to America they found it inhabited by copper-colored natives whom they called Indians. Something over ten thousand years earlier the ancestors of these natives had migrated from northern Asia across the Aleutian Islands and down the Pacific coast, spreading gradually eastward across the northern and southern continents. The Indians dif-

fered widely in character, in language, in social and cultural development. The majority of them remained in the primitive hunting stage; a few, such as the Mayas of Yucatan, the Incas of Peru, and the Aztecs of Mexico, had attained a high state of cultural development. It was these last with whom the Spaniards first came into contact, and so numerous and powerful were they, that they furnished the solid foundation of all later Spanish colonization in America. The Indians of North America whom the French and English met—the Algonquins, Iroquois, and Muskhogeans—were widely scattered and few in number, and in contrast to those who formed the basis for the Spanish empire, they were not absorbed but eliminated.

The background of European discovery, exploration, colonization and exploitation of America has been traced in earlier chapters. From the fourteenth century on, the rising national states of Europe were engaged in a struggle for the control of the resources and territory of the Far East and the New World. Mercantilism demanded colonies which would contribute to the wealth and power of the state. Where there was no settled population in these colonies, wealth was only potential, and it was necessary to colonize in order to secure it. This was the situation in the New World generally, and especially in North America.

Broadly speaking, the sixteenth century in

America may be said to be the century of Spain; the seventeenth century witnessed the beginnings of Spanish, French and English rivalry; the eighteenth century saw the elimination of France, and the nineteenth the elimination of Spain by the English peoples. The Spanish Empire was for long the most extensive, the most powerful, and the best administered in the New World. It included all of South America, with the exception of Brazil, which had been allotted to Portugal by the Treaty of Tordeselas, 1494; it comprised Central America, Mexico, the vast, unexplored and uninhabited region north of the Rio Grande and west of Louisiana, the Floridas, and numerous islands in the Caribbean. This vast empire was governed with extraordinary efficiency by Spain; its wealth and tribute flowed into Spanish coffers, its trade was carried by Spanish ships, and over its inhabitants, Indian, mestizo, or Spanish, was thrown the protecting mantle of the Catholic Church. And tho with the passing years the mother country was reduced from a power of the first rank to one of the third, her people enervated and impoverished, her power broken and her glory dimmed, yet the far-flung empire held almost intact until the nineteenth century.

The domains of France in the New World were scarcely less extensive, but much less powerful, than those of Spain. France had planted feeble settlements along the St. Law-

rence as early as the sixteenth century, and to these first settlements numerous others were added in the seventeenth century. But despite the paternalistic policy of the home government, the ability of French colonial leaders and the energy of the colonists, these colonies did not flourish. In the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the French Empire came to include all of Canada west to the Rockies, the territory north of the Ohio, and Louisiana—a huge, formless domain, inhabited, in 1700, by some 20,000 peasants, *coureurs du bois,* soldiers and priests. This population had increased to only 70,000 by 1763. The failure of the French to form strong permanent colonies in America can be ascribed to a number of causes, the most important of which are: the paternalistic and illiberal policy of the home government, the refusal to admit non-Catholics—thus excluding the Huguenots—and the climate and geography of the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes-Mississippi River system, which had the effect of discouraging settled agricultural life and dispersing the population over an enormous region. No chapter in American history is more romantic than that which describes French Canada; no empire so vast and rich was ever held together by so puny a force, nor any more worthily served: the names of Champlain, Frontenac, La Salle, Marquette, Verendyre, Montcalm, belong to world history.

England entered upon her colonial expansion rather later than her continental rivals, but, once dedicated to empire, she soon surpassed them all. It must be remembered that the American mainland colonies were by no means the most important part of the empire: India loomed much larger on the imperial horizon than did the struggling settlements along the Atlantic coast, and even the sugar islands in the West Indies were more valuable economically and strategically to the mother country. For the empire was, at least until 1763, primarily commercial in character: it was commerce that was behind the expansion of England, that planted the settlements, exploited the resources, and provided for defense against rivals.

The causes and motives for the English colonization of America were many and varied. The economic transformation of the sixteenth century had introduced wide extremes of wealth and poverty, replaced farms with pastures, and created a large floating population that was a burden on the community and led to the belief that the country was overpopulated. The attempt of the Stuarts to assert the theory of divine right, and to root out religious dissent, made for widespread dissatisfaction. It was out from an England torn by internal dissension, by political and religious strife, that the colonies came, and tho the economic, religious and political causes of the migrations are inextricably in-

termixed, in a broad way it is true that those who came to America came because they were dissatisfied with conditions at home. They came hoping to better their fortunes in a new world, to work out a new way of life. In the words of an early Virginia chronicler:

> We hope to plant a nation
> Where none before hath stood.

Most of the early colonies in America were planted not by the English government but by private initiative. The seventeenth century was the age of joint-stock companies—the forerunners of our modern corporations. These companies were private enterprises, but received their charters from the crown, and it is not fanciful to look upon these charters as the first written constitutions. Virginia, Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, New Netherlands—after 1664 New York—and others owe their existence directly or indirectly to the chartered companies.

Other colonies again were planted by individual or corporate enterprise—by individual proprietors who received land grants from the crown, or by a group of proprietors. Thus Maryland, granted to Lord Baltimore in 1632; Pennsylvania, given to the Quaker William Penn in 1681; the Carolinas, alloted to a group of eight proprietors in 1663; the Jerseys, granted by the Duke of York to Lords Carteret and Berkeley in 1664. Still other colonies were offshoots of

original ones: Connecticut and Rhode Island of Massachusetts Bay, and Delaware of Pennsylvania. New York, conquered from the Dutch in 1664, and Georgia, established as a frontier outpost of empire and a refuge for paupers in 1733, were from the beginning royal colonies.

If the primary purpose of those who planted these colonies was individual or corporate gain or imperial necessity, the motives of the settlers themselves were more varied. Most of those who came over from England in the seventeenth century—and that was the century of the greatest English migration—came for economic reasons. The Pilgrim colony of Plymouth was, to be sure, primarily religious, and religion loomed large in Puritan Massachusetts Bay, in the settlements along the Connecticut River, in the Narragansett Plantations that were eventually consolidated into Rhode Island, and in the Quaker colony of Philadelphia. Numbers of those who came, too, were indentured servants, and not free agents—a factor particularly important in Pennsylvania and the Southern colonies.

By 1688 the population of the colonies had reached some 200,000: about 80,000 in New England, an equal number in the Southern, and half as many in the Middle colonies. Altho negro slavery had been introduced into Virginia as early as 1619, there were at the turn of the century very few black men: the labor was per-

formed by free yeomen and indentured servants.

If the overwhelming majority of the population was English, there was already in the seventeenth century a scattering of non-English stock: Dutch, Swedish, French Huguenots, and German. In the course of the next three-quarters of a century the population grew by leaps and bounds, reaching some 1,500,000 by 1760, including over 300,000 negro slaves. The greater part of this increase was natural, but it was partly due to the fact that during the eighteenth century tens of thousands of immigrants of non-English stock found their way to the English colonies. Sturdy, God-fearing, hard-working Germans settled on the lands of the Penns and drifted southward along the troughs of the Alleghanies into Maryland, Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia, numbering by the middle of the century some 200,000 souls. Even more numerous were the Scotch-Irish from Ulster, scattered everywhere along the frontier, but principally in Pennsylvania and the colonies to the South. Smaller groups of Scotch, Irish, Swiss, and French went to make the American colonies something of a melting-pot even thus early.

The history of the American people, as of any individual, is the story of the adjustment of inheritance and environment. The colonists—English, Scotch, German—brought with them certain typical institutions and folk-ways, the

inheritance of European civilization. That inheritance had to be adjusted to the wilderness environment of America. This process of interaction of inheritance and environment has gone on all through American history down to the present, and given it its unique character and interest.

The institutions, the cultural, political, religious and social ideas of the American colonies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were essentially English, but certain characteristically American features were emerging. Since the principles of English liberalism were not conditioned by age-old institutions, they received wider application, and there was, on the whole, a greater degree of popular participation in the government than elsewhere in the world. There was a wide degree of religious liberty and toleration, even tho the Puritan Church was established in Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Hampshire, and the Anglican Church in the Southern colonies. There was a wider degree of economic well-being and equality than elsewhere. Because of the necessities of life in a wilderness, most men worked with their hands, and except in the South, where slavery became gradually entrenched, such work carried with it no social stigma. At the same time the more formal aspects of culture were not neglected. Churches and schools were everywhere planted, and the half a dozen colleges established before the Rev-

olution attest to the interest of the colonists in the things of the spirit. The country was overwhelmingly agrarian. There were few towns; land-ownership was general, and farms, except in parts of New York and of the tidewater South, were small.

As the best land along the coast was taken up or exhausted by unscientific farming, the colonists pushed into the interior. Migrations into the Connecticut Valley, into the uplands of New Hampshire and Vermont, into the back-country of Pennsylvania, into the Piedmont of Virginia and the Carolinas and the valleys beyond, were going on all through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By 1760 the population of the interior—the so-called Frontier section—was as large as that along the coast. And as the economic interests of the maritime and frontier settlements diverged, as the populations differed in character and composition, and as the problems of long-distance government became more difficult, sectionalism arose. The interests of maritime New England, of New York and eastern Pennsylvania, were commercial; those of the tidewater South were determined by the staple crops of tobacco, rice, and indigo, and by the institution of slavery. In the course of time the older, more compact, more prosperous groups in the East secured control of the colonial governments and managed affairs as

their interests dictated. This development of sectionalism was ominous for the future.

The relations of the colonies to the mother country were primarily commercial, and the colonies were valuable in so far as they fitted into the mercantile system of the British Empire. The commercial relations of the empire were regulated by Acts of Trade and Navigation, acts comparable in their intent to our present-day tariff regulations. Tho the crown was steadily extending its authority over the colonies, that authority rested, on the whole, very lightly on Americans. Comparatively speaking, England allowed her American colonies a great deal of freedom and local autonomy; she also neglected them for periods, and thus accustomed them to self-government. The chief duty of the mother country toward her colonies was that of protection—against Indians, against French and Spanish rivals—and this problem was a constant one all through the colonial period.

During the eighteenth century there existed, on the whole, a remarkable degree of contentment and prosperity in the American colonies. Gradually, however, two great problems were emerging, problems fraught with danger for the future. The one had to do with the question of home rule—with the amount of supervision and regulation and interference with local affairs that the colonies would tolerate. The other had

to do with the more immediate question, Who was going to rule at home?—the question of democracy in the colonies. The development, action, reaction, and interaction of these two sets of problems form the warp and woof of the American Revolution.

## XXII

### THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

THE period of the American Revolution, from 1763 to 1789, is one of the great creative epochs in history. Out of it came not only a new nation —the United States of America—but new political and social institutions of fundamental and far-reaching importance. The War of Independence was merely a part—a very important one, to be sure—of this great movement. What was happening was more than the emergence of a new nation; what was happening was the solution of problems of government and society; the creation of a federal system, the discovery of a new colonial system, the development of democratic institutions in State and in church, and the temporary solution of the problems of home rule and who was to rule at home. And tho the story of these years is interwoven of many strands, the whole forms a pattern of rare clarity and unity.

On the conclusion of the French and Indian War (1754-1763) England was faced with the task of reorganizing her empire. The Treaty of Paris had more than doubled England's possessions in North America, and British statesmen were confronted with problems of peace much more bewildering than those of war. They were

faced with the task of governing some 75,000 French Canadians; of defending a far-flung frontier; of crushing the rebellion of the Indian chief, Pontiac, and establishing friendly relations with the Indians everywhere; of providing for the disposal of western lands, and with a host of other scarcely less vexatious problems. At the same time they were under the necessity of tightening up on the reins of empire, of enforcing the Acts of Trade and Navigation, and strengthening the central government—all without infringing on local autonomy.

The steps of imperial reorganization that led to the War of Independence and the break-up of the empire can be disposed of briefly. The proclamation of 1763, prohibiting settlement beyond the Alleghanies; the Molasses Act of 1764, tightening up the customs service; the Stamp Act of 1765, levying what Americans insisted were internal taxes; the Declaratory Act of 1766, with its threat of parliamentary supremacy, and the Townshend Acts of 1767, indirectly regulating trade—these were the principal steps in the process. They excited widespread dissatisfaction, precipitated the formation of non-importation and other agreements, and led Americans such as Samuel Adams and Patrick Henry to formulate a political philosophy justifying disobedience and resistance.

After the repeal of most of the Townshend duties, there was for some years a lull in the

controversy between colonies and mother country. Then an ill-considered grant of monopoly on tea trade to the powerful East India Company led to the famous Boston Tea Party, December 16, 1773, and reopened the whole conflict. The British government, wearied with compromise, replied with a set of so-called "Intolerable Acts," and organized resistance appeared in the colonies in the form of the First Continental Congress. With sufficient wisdom either at Westminster or in America, affairs might have been patched up. Certainly the intentions of the English government were fair and honorable, and certainly the overwhelming majority of colonials were opposed to independence or even to open resistance.

But events got out of hand, as later events did in 1914, and the battles of Lexington and Concord precipitated an open break. With a large element in the population stubbornly loyal to the British connection, and with an even larger element indifferent, the members of the Second Continental Congress, assembled in Philadelphia, resolved to strike for independence. Their decision was announced to the world in the immortal document penned by Thomas Jefferson and promulgated July 4, 1776.

It was one thing to announce independence, another to achieve it. On the surface it seemed that the colonists were faced with overwhelming odds, but they addressed themselves to the task

with the grim determination expressed in Franklin's sage remark, "If we don't all hang together, we'll hang separately." The first problem was to achieve cooperation, and this was provided for in the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, passed early in 1777 but not finally ratified until 1781. The second problem was to organize resistance.

George Washington, wealthy Virginia planter and trained soldier, was made the commander-in-chief of the American army, and the States were called upon for aid. The ultimate success of American arms is due more to George Washington than to any other single individual. A man of rare courage and fortitude, of persistence and determination, of unimpeachable integrity, he held the little American army together during seven long years of battle, inspired his soldiers with something of his own invincible courage, conducted his campaigns with effectiveness and even brilliance, took advantage of British mistakes, and wrested victory out of a seemingly hopeless situation.

The deciding factor in the war was the alliance with France. This alliance was achieved largely through the happy diplomacy of Benjamin Franklin, of Pennsylvania, the most versatile genius of his time. The aid of France was soon reinforced by that of Spain, Holland, and the League of Armed Neutrality, and by 1778 Great Britain was faced not with a mere insur-

rection in her American colonies but with a powerful, world-wide coalition, determined to hurl her down from her high estate. The end came in 1781 when Lord Cornwallis, bottled up in Yorktown by the American army and the French fleet, surrendered. Two years later England concluded a peace recognizing the independence of the former colonies and ceding to them all the territory east of the Mississippi, with the exception of the Spanish possessions in Florida.

The achievement of independence was only one phase of the conflict. Equally important was the creation of new States, the development of democratic institutions and of a larger degree of social and economic democracy, the achievement of religious liberty, and the working out of a new colonial system. The war itself, and the breakdown of the old political bonds, furnished the opportunity for the practical application of the principles of democracy and liberty that had been voiced in the preceding years. State constitutions, embodying democratic principles, were drawn up, and the institution of the Constitutional Convention as the proper method of creating a democratic government was discovered. The slave trade was prohibited, and the institution of slavery put well on the way to extinction in the Northern States. The frontier demand for land was partially satisfied by the confiscation of crown lands and the great estates

of the loyalists and proprietors. Quit-rents were abolished, and primogeniture and entail disappeared. The Anglican Church was everywhere disestablished, and a wide degree of religious liberty and equality instituted.

Victory brought its problems to Americans in 1783 as it had to Englishmen twenty years earlier. Essentially the same questions—imperial organization, control of commerce, western lands, and Indian affairs—clamored for solution. The years after 1783—the so-called Critical Period—were years of economic depression and distress, years when it seemed that the new nation would fall prey either to the forces of internal dissension or to some hostile foreign power.

Yet during these years the fruits of victory and the democratic advances were being consolidated. And during these years, too, a new land system and a new colonial policy were being worked out. The first was outlined in the Land Ordinance of 1784, drawn up by Thomas Jefferson, and was followed in its essentials until 1862. The second was the famous Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which a distinguished historian has called the most important law ever passed in the New World. This ordinance provided for the admission of new States carved out of national territory, after a probationary period, on a basis of absolute equality with the original States, and, further, prohibited slavery in all the territory north of the Ohio. Had Eng-

land been willing to recognize her colonies as equals, the War of Independence might have been averted.

The chief problem of the Revolutionary period, however, remained. It was the old one of imperial order—the problem of how to organize an empire so that centralization and strength would be achieved without infringing on local autonomy. Some plan had to be found whereby the States would fulfil their obligations under Articles of Union, and yet preserve sovereignty over local affairs. England had attempted to work out a solution to this knotty problem in the years after 1763, and had failed. Americans, faced with the same difficulties, attempted to solve them in the Articles of Confederation, but these proved inadequate. It is the most signal achievement of Americans in the Revolutionary period that they finally worked out a solution to the problem of imperial order: the federal system.

The defects and inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation made it almost impossible for the new nation to negotiate satisfactory commercial treaties, or to make any provision for the payment of the foreign or the domestic debt. A period of economic depression in the years 1784-86 accentuated the difficulties of the Confederation. The outbreak of a rebellion in western Massachusetts seemed to many a portent of the approaching demise of the new nation. It

was under these circumstances that a group of determined and far-sighted men met at Annapolis to consider ways and means of saving the situation. The most prominent of the members of the Annapolis Convention were Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and George Washington. The result was a call for a convention to meet in Philadelphia, May, 1787, to "revise" the Articles of Confederation.

Twelve of the States sent delegates to this Constitutional Convention, Rhode Island alone remaining aloof. It was a matter of rare good fortune for the future of the American nation that most of the delegates were men of high caliber. From the Old Dominion came the most brilliant group: George Washington, James Madison, George Wythe, Edmund Randolph, and George Mason; Pennsylvania sent the venerable Franklin, the learned James Wilson, and the financier Robert Morris. From New York came Alexander Hamilton, from Massachusetts the able Rufus King and the wealthy Elbridge Gerry; from Connecticut William Johnson, President of Columbia College, the shrewd Roger Sherman, and Oliver Ellsworth, later Chief Justice of the United States. South Carolina sent Charles Pinckney and his cousin C. C. Pinckney, and John Rutledge; Maryland sent Luther Martin; and Delaware the famous lawyer, John Dickinson. These were the most distinguished of the delegates, and of these James

Madison and James Wilson deserve particular mention. The contributions of Washington and Franklin were primarily in the prestige their presence lent to the gathering.

The members of the Convention soon abandoned the idea of a mere revision of the Articles and proceeded to draw up an entirely new Constitution. The essential features of the Constitution they produced are as follows: it is federal in character; it applies immediately to all citizens, and not through the intermediary of the State; it possesses the necessary sovereign powers: taxation, and regulation of commerce. The question of the enforcement of laws was solved by making the Constitution the law of the land, and providing that it should be enforced by all the judges of the States. The lack of an Executive was remedied by providing for a President to be chosen indirectly. A Supreme Court with extensive powers was established, and States were forbidden to impair the obligations of contracts, to emit paper money, or to enter into alliances with other powers.

The new Constitution had still to run the gantlet of ratification. It was provided, in flagrant disregard for the Articles of Confederation, that when nine States had ratified the new Constitution it should go into effect. The struggle over ratification divided the country socially and economically. The professional classes, the merchants and traders and bankers, were gen-

erally in favor of it; the small farmers and laborers on the whole opposed. For a time ratification was despaired of. Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia were the pivotal States. Ratification was secured in Massachusetts by the influence of John Hancock and Samuel Adams, and by a series of fortunate circumstances that played in the hands of the Federalists, as those who supported the Constitution came to be called. Ratification was secured in New York largely through the genius of Hamilton and the fear of isolation. In Virginia the Federalists were successful through the influence of Washington and Randolph, and the eloquent persuasiveness of Madison and John Marshall. Had the new Constitution been submitted to popular vote it is extremely doubtful that it would have been accepted. That ratification was secured is a tribute to the far-sightedness and commonsense of the leaders of the American people in the eighteenth century.

## XXIII

### THE NEW NATIONALISM

The period from the ratification of the Constitution to the conclusion of the War of 1812 was a period of the welding of the union, of the achievement of a certain sense of nationalism, of the development of democracy, and of physical expansion and material progress. When Washington took the oath of office as first President of the United States, the nation consisted of thirteen States strung out along the Atlantic coast, with a vast and comparatively uninhabited hinterland between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, and it boasted a population of approximately four million, including some half-million negro slaves. Thirty years later there were twenty-three States, the area of the country was doubled, and the population more than doubled. In these years, too, the nation had achieved a certain stability and apparent permanence, a security from foreign aggression, and a political and social self-consciousness that assumed driving force in the idea of Manifest Destiny.

It is said that when Washington read his inaugural address, his hand shook and his voice trembled with emotion. Well it might, for perilous indeed was the condition of the young na-

tion as it embarked upon its great experiment of republicanism in a troubled world. It yet remained to be seen whether either independence or union could be maintained against the forces of internal dissension and external hostility. The greatest achievement of the administrations of Washington and his successor, John Adams, is that they guided the new nation through the dangers of international politics and world war, vindicated its independence, consolidated the fruits of neutrality and isolation, and laid firmly the foundations for future political and economic development.

The first task was the formation of a government—the task of clothing the constitutional skeleton with flesh and blood. Quickly departments were created, organization developed, a judicial system established, a temporary revenue secured, and the government machinery set in motion.

The second task was the fiscal and economic one—the task of paying off the foreign and domestic debt and establishing the credit of the new government, This involved the entire economic policy of the country and precipitated questions and issues of profound and permanent significance. The financial problem came under the special jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton. As a statesman-economist Hamilton was the American equivalent of the Enlightened Despot of eighteenth-

century Europe, and he hoped to develop a powerful and wealthy state by bringing to the support of the government all the propertied classes of the country. In this ambition he was eminently successful. His financial legislation included the funding of the national debt, the assumption by the Federal Government of all State debts, the establishment of a National Bank, and the encouragement of industry and commerce. All these policies were adopted against tremendous opposition from the South and the West—from the agrarian and the propertyless classes.

The third task facing the government was that of vindicating the terms of the Treaty of 1783 and formulating an American policy in foreign affairs. The Treaty of 1783 had been honored more in the breach than in the observance: the retention of the Northwest posts and the refusal to conclude a commercial treaty were particular grievances against England. After the two countries had been led to the brink of war, Washington, in 1795, sent a special emissary, Chief Justice John Jay, to London to make a final effort for peace. The result was Jay's Treaty—a treaty which averted war and secured the evacuation of the Northwest posts and the adjudication of boundary difficulties, but was completely unsatisfactory in most other respects. That ratification was secured despite widespread popular opposition was due

to the influence of Washington and the driving lash of Hamilton and his party aids.

The debates over Jay's Treaty revealed a wide divergence of political opinion in the country. The fact is that political parties were developing and were dividing on questions of foreign affairs, because the conduct of foreign affairs seemed to involve fundamental issues and principles of political belief. The outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789 and the ensuing European war had a tremendous effect upon American politics. On the one hand it diverted European nations from American affairs and left the United States relatively free to pursue its own course. On the other hand the war precipitated questions and aroused sympathies that threatened to draw the United States into its vortex. The majority of Americans, sensing in the French Revolution a struggle for liberty and democracy, sympathized with France and were correspondingly antagonistic to England. The commercial and business interests of the country, on the other hand, were favorable to their greatest customer, Great Britain. Washington wisely pursued a cource of neutrality, and steered the American ship of state safely between the French Scylla and the English Charybdis.

In the administration of John Adams, relations with France became so strained as to make war seem almost inevitable. Indeed, American

and French men-of-war fought pitched battles and preyed on each other's commerce. The danger of war and the fear of Jacobin sympathizers at home led the Adams government to adopt unwise and ill-considered measures of repression—the Alien and Sedition Acts—laws similar in their purpose to the Espionage and Alien Enemy Acts of the World-War period. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, leaders of the embryo Republican (now Democratic) party, at once directed an attack upon these harsh measures, and in the famous Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions denounced them as barefaced party measures and pronounced them illegal and void.

The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions were the opening guns in the campaign of 1800. The war scare passed away, but the party division widened and deepened. That division was not primarily over the conduct of foreign affairs. It was primarily a division between those who believed in an individualistic agrarian democracy, a frugal and limited government, and those who believed in a powerful centralized government, closely linked up with commerce, industry and finance. Jefferson was the leader of the first group, Hamilton of the second. In these two men, indeed, in their characters, their careers, and the principles they represented, are epitomized a large part of American history. Jeffersonianism and Hamiltonianism are still live

issues in American politics, and the struggle between the forces of agricultural democracy and a centralized industrial state is not yet ended.

Tho denounced as an atheist from every pulpit and as a radical from every forum, Jefferson defeated John Adams for the Presidency in 1800. Jefferson himself called this election "The Revolution of 1800," and in so far as it represented a revolution in attitude of mind, he was not incorrect. To be sure, he instituted no sweeping reforms, no radical changes, no new departures. In his eloquent inaugural address, he stated that "we are all Federalists, we are all Republicans," and announced as his ideal "a wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned."

Jefferson succeeded in simplifying the government, reducing expenses and, with the aid of his great Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, cutting the national debt in two. His first administration was a period of growth and prosperity: the year 1803 saw Ohio, the first State carved out of the Northwest Territory, admitted to the Union. In the same year Jefferson consummated the purchase of Louisiana from France for $15,000,000, doubling at one stroke the territory and potential resources of the

United States. By his skilful and moderate policies he succeeded in consolidating his own party and seriously weakened the Federalist.

Jefferson's second administration was not so happy. An attempt to curb the growing power of the judiciary met with a severe rebuff at the hands of John Marshall, greatest of Chief Justices. And the President's party leadership was threatened by the independence of John Randolph of Roanoke and his followers, the "Quids." Finally, the continuation of the European war and the flagrant disregard of American neutral rights made the maintenance of peace more and more difficult.

Despite repeated provocation, President Jefferson resisted the temptation to defend American rights by resort to arms. Instead, he tried diplomacy, and that failing, induced Congress to declare an embargo on American ships. The embargo—the modern commercial boycott—was an attempt to bring recalcitrant European powers to terms by cutting off American trade and supplies. That it failed was due partly to circumstances beyond the control of Jefferson, partly to the refusal of Americans to observe it.

Tho Jefferson failed to secure recognition of American rights on the high seas from either France or Great Britain, he did succeed in keeping his country out of a war that would have been disastrous. His successor, James Madison of Virginia, was not so fortunate. During

his administration the country drifted more and more rapidly toward war. The Congressional election of 1810 had brought a new group of men into national affairs—men chiefly from the South and the West—the so-called "war-hawks." Chief among these were Henry Clay of Kentucky, John C. Calhoun and Langdon Cheves of South Carolina, and Peter Porter of New York. These men had reached maturity since the achievement of American independence, and were intensely nationalistic and sensitive to what they felt were slights inflicted upon their country. They represented, too, the first faint glimmerings of the idea of Manifest Destiny. Their ambition looked to the annexation of Canada, of the Floridas, and of the Spanish Southwest, and their policy included the annihilation of the Indians who had terrorized the border for years.

It was this group of lusty war-hawks that pushed Madison and the country into war in 1812. New England, the one section with extensive commercial interests, was opposed to the war, and the Middle States were at best lukewarm in their support. It was the South and the West that wanted the war. The annals of that war, like those of the poor, are short and simple. The American invasion of Canada was repulsed at all points, and the United States was invaded along the Maumee, the Niagara, and the Champlain frontiers. The city of Washington was

burned, and American commerce driven from the high seas. The tiny navy alone acquitted itself with credit, winning victory after victory from the larger and more experienced opponents and inflicting tremendous damage on British commerce. By 1814, however, the overwhelming superiority of British armament had told, and even the gallant little American navy was reduced to impotence. At the battle of Put-in-Bay, however, Commodore Perry saved the Great Lakes for the United States, and in the battle of Plattsburg the greatest invading army was hurled back with serious loss. And finally Andrew Jackson's repulse of Pakenham at New Orleans, tho it came after the conclusion of peace, added immensely to American prestige and gave to the war a semblance of victory.

The Treaty of Ghent, concluded in 1815 by the American Commissioners, J. Q. Adams, Henry Clay, and Albert Gallatin, and the British, said little about the ostensible causes of the war, but recognized the *status quo*. Its chief significance was that it ended the era of American concern with European affairs and inaugurated a period of almost exclusive concern with domestic affairs and of unparalleled material and physical development. The War of 1812, unsuccessful as it was from a military point of view, had the effect of consolidating the nation and developing the sentiment of nationalism and

of unity, and of creating conditions favorable to the rise of democracy.

In the years after 1815 the tempo of American life increased precipitately, and its complexity grew correspondingly. Our concern has to do more and more with economic and social factors, and less with the purely political and diplomatic. The generation after the War of 1812 was a period of vast material development, of the exploitation of natural resources, and the significant things are not so much the things of the spirit as the things of the flesh: such phenomena as the rise of the Cotton Kingdom and the Westward Movement. Nor is there any simple and single interpretation of these years. The period is, on the contrary, one of bafflingly contrary tendencies and developments: sectionalism and nationalism, democracy and capitalism, materialism and humanitarianism, slavery and abolition, agriculture and industry, all clamor for recognition on the crowded stage of this act of our history.

The close of the war inaugurated a period of feverish material development. Already before the war the movement into the West had notably accelerated, and, gathering volume with the years, it became a veritable flood after 1815. The decline of commerce in New England and the exhaustion of farm-land in the seaboard South combined with the lure of cheap land in the West, the elimination of the Indian danger,

and the development of means of transportation and of marketing, to populate the West. From New England, from the Middle States, from the Old South, men, women, and children by the thousand plodded along the great trails into the West or, after 1816, took passage on one of the snorting monsters that plied the western waterways. The population of the new West increased by leaps and bounds; the new States of Indiana, Illinois, Mississippi, Alabama, Missouri, were admitted to the Union; land values soared, and the New West became politically articulate.

As a section the West was intensely nationalistic and intensely materialistic, and it succeeded in imposing these two characteristics upon the period as a whole. It wanted internal improvements that it might market its produce. It wanted easy money and adequate banking facilities. It wanted cheap land. It wanted a protective tariff. Its representatives in Congress, men like Henry Clay of Kentucky and Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri, were the spokesmen of these demands.

The new nationalism was reflected in the politics, the law, diplomacy, and culture of the country. A protective tariff was passed, a second National Bank established, internal improvements at State and National expense provided for. In the realm of constitutional law the decisions of Chief Justice Marshall strengthened

the power of the Federal Government and struck at the doctrine of State sovereignty. In the field of diplomacy, the Rush-Bagot agreement, the acquisition of the Floridas, and the Monroe Doctrine, announced by President Monroe in his annual message of 1823, indicated an aggressive and independent attitude on the part of the United States. And even American culture reflected the new nationalism: in art, in literature and the press, in history, and in drama, Americans were inspired by a sense of nationalism, by a new concept of the destiny of the nation.

Alongside of the movement from New England and the Middle States into the old Northwest and the trans-Mississippi regions, went a parallel movement of population from the Seaboard South into the Gulf Region and the old Southwest. In 1793 a Connecticut Yankee, Eli Whitney, visiting an estate in Georgia, had perfected a cotton-gin which made the large-scale growing of cotton possible and profitable. The exhaustion of the older tobacco and cotton lands led to the migration into new and more fertile regions, and within a few years a series of new cotton commonwealths came into existence, and land-hungry planters were clamoring at the gates of Texas. In the first half of the nineteenth century this New South, known as the Cotton Kingdom, came to develop a distinct sectional outlook—developed its own society, its own culture,

its own political philosophy. Fundamental to all these, of course, was the institution of negro slavery, upon which the Cotton Kingdom rested.

Slavery had been introduced to the colonies in the seventeenth century, but not until the eighteenth did it fasten itself upon America with any permanence. Even then it was looked upon as at best a necessary evil, and one which would eventually be eliminated. It was not until the second quarter of the nineteenth century that Southerners came to accept slavery as a positive good and to make it the corner-stone of their system. The institution itself was, on the whole, a remarkably humane one. It was a transitional process through which the African negroes passed on the road from savagery to civilization. Because each slave represented a considerable investment, it was merest business sense to treat him with intelligent care and consideration. The burden of slavery rested, indeed, much more heavily upon the slave-owners themselves than upon the slaves, who were for the most part contented with their lot.

Nevertheless, the very existence of the ownership of man by man aroused resentment in some sections of the country. In the eighteenth century Virginia had furnished the opposition to slavery. In the nineteenth century the Abolitionists, as the more extreme antagonists of slavery came to be called, were for the most part from New England. Men like William L.

Garrison, the poet J. G. Whittier, the orator Wendell Phillips, the statesman J. Q. Adams, the journalist Elijah Lovejoy, were the most prominent among the Abolitionists. This group, at no time very numerous or powerful, was vociferous in its unrestrained denunciations of slavery and the South, and forced the South to come to the defense of its peculiar institution.

The Abolitionist crusade in the North was merely a part of a world-wide humanitarian movement. It was a period of reforms in every camp—of idealisms, of enthusiasms, of Utopias. The old Calvinistic theology was giving way to a more liberal religion. Internationalism and world-peace movements were gaining widespread support. Dorothea Dix led a movement for the reform of asylums and the treatment of the deaf and dumb. Prison and penal reforms were making headway in many States. Woman suffrage gained converts and labor organizations were formed. In the realms of thought and literature the reform movement was reflected in Transcendentalism, an optimistic philosophy whose leading figure was Ralph Waldo Emerson.

Some of these reform movements were called forth by the development of industrialism and urban life. The United States had always been primarily agricultural, and it remained so until after the Civil War. But the years after the embargo and the War of 1812 witnessed the rise of manufactures in New England and the Middle

States. Along with this went, inevitably, the growth of cities and the appearance of those evils almost invariably associated with urban life. And in the decade of the thirties immigrants from Ireland poured into these eastern cities by the thousands, and in the forties and fifties these were joined by other thousands of Germans.

The rise of the new West, the growth of cities and industrialism, and the development of new humanitarian ideas, gave a decided impetus to democracy in America. Tho in the old, slave-holding South the tenets of democracy were being repudiated, they found lodging and support in the North and the West. The principal manifestations of the new democratic spirit are to be found in the constitutions of the New States with their broadening of the suffrage. In national politics democracy found expression in the elevation, in 1829, of Andrew Jackson to the Presidency.

Jackson, the first really popular President of the American people, personified many of the characteristics of Americans of his generation. He was a Westerner, and represented Western frontier democracy. He was a thorough going nationalist, and fought the forces of disunion that appeared in the South during his administration with unrelenting vigor. He combated privilege wherever he saw it—in the banking and industrial circles of the East, in the Su-

preme Court, in the slave-holding aristocracy of the South. His presidency may be said to close one era in American politics and inaugurate another. With Jackson new issues appear; the Texan question, the slavery controversy loom ominously on the horizon. New men take command: Webster, Davis, Douglas, Walker. Political parties perfect their organization and the Whig party comes into existence. Union and Democracy, the dominant characteristics of the preceding period, are both put on trial.

## XXIV

## CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

The years following Jackson's presidency were years of almost unprecedented expansion, years when the continental limits of the nation were rounded out. This territorial expansion and the political and economic problems precipitated by it occupy the front place in the historical annals of these years. They were years, too, of the beginnings of modern America—the beginnings of the economic, industrial, scientific, and agricultural revolution that was so greatly accelerated by the Civil War.

The story of territorial expansion, enormously significant as it is, can be disposed of briefly. Ever since the decade of the twenties Americans had been filtering into the broad, fertile fields of Texas, which was still under Mexican rule. In the thirties the infiltration became something approaching a flood. Failing to secure a satisfactory degree of local autonomy, and reacting from the oppressive measures of a far-distant government, the American settlers of Texas organized, revolted, and in 1836 established an independent republic.

There followed immediate efforts to secure annexation to the United States, efforts that met with decided opposition from elements in

the United States as well as from Mexico, which still refused to acknowledge the independence of her rebellious province. Annexation became a major issue in American politics, Southerners and Westerners generally favoring the step, New England and anti-slavery men everywhere opposing it. It was only after ten years of agitation, and not until the election of Polk to the presidency in 1844 revealed the will of the people, that annexation was actually accomplished. By joint resolution of both houses the State of Texas was incorporated into the Union, March 3, 1845.

Such action could not be taken without affronting Mexico. Yet it was not annexation, but a boundary dispute that eventually precipitated war between the two powers. In 1846 two American armies moved on the ill-fated Southern neighbor, one from Vera Cruz under General Winfield Scott, another from the Rio Grande under Colonel Zachary Taylor. Tho the Mexican opposition was stubborn it was not highly intelligent, and after a series of brilliant engagements Mexico City was captured and the unhappy nation forced to sue for peace. The terms of the conquerors were harsh indeed. By the treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo the United States acquired possession of the Territories of New Mexico, Arizona, and California—some 800,000 square miles.

While the United States was rounding out its

territorial limits to the south, it was negotiating for the great Northwest—the Oregon country. For half a century possession of this rich region had been disputed by England and the United States. Early in the 1840's American emigrants by the hundreds began to find their toilsome way to the fabulous land along the great Oregon Trail, and by 1846 there were several thousand Americans in the region south of the Columbia River. The presence of this population, combined with the pressing emergency in English politics at the time, made the conditions of negotiation for the territory favorable to the United States. The Oregon Treaty of 1846, extending the boundary between this country and Canada along the forty-ninth parallel, must be looked upon as a distinct victory for American diplomacy.

Hard on the heels of the acquisition of California from Mexico came the discovery of gold in the Sacramento Valley, making California a veritable El Dorado for the world. From all parts of America and Europe thousands of wild-eyed fortune hunters and adventurers flocked to the gold fields, creating inside of a year a populous and prosperous, if somewhat turbulent, commonwealth.

Indeed, the whole of the Far West was being filled up, thousands of emigrants crowding the Oregon and California trails to the promised lands on the Pacific. At the same time the

Mormon State of Deseret—later Utah—attracted to its fertile acres other thousands who laid here in what was supposed to be a desert wilderness the foundations for a prosperous and progressive commonwealth.

These new areas could not be acquired and inhabited without raising a host of questions, all centering about the problem of slavery in the Territories. Should the new States be admitted with or without slavery? On that question the sections, North and South, divided. So serious was the division, that by 1850 an open rupture appeared inevitable. That such a break, which would in all probability have been disastrous to the Union, was avoided was due largely to the genius of the aged Henry Clay, who, with the aid of Daniel Webster, pushed through the Compromise of 1850.

That compromise, tho it averted secession and war at the time, was but a stop-gap. The decade from 1850 to 1860 was bathed in the sunlight of prosperity, but the black clouds of slavery loomed ominously in the offing. There were other issues, too, dividing the North and the South: the tariff, the banking system, the question of free lands, the railroads. In reality two fundamentally different civilizations, two hostile social and economic systems, were crystallizing. Viewed from the perspective of three-quarters of a century, it appears that a conflict between them was inevitable.

The incidents that led up to that conflict can be disposed of briefly. The repeal of the well-nigh sacred Missouri Compromise threw open the West to settlement, and led to the break-up of the Whig party and to armed warfare in Kansas Territory. The decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case seemed to deprive the advocates of freedom in the Territories of their constitutional argument. These conditions, the growing sectional alinement, and the general disfavor into which the Whig party had fallen, led to the formation of a new party—the Republican—pledged to oppose the extension of slavery into the Territories and to promote the industrial and agricultural interests of the East and the West.

The new party rolled up over a million votes for its candidate, John Frémont, in 1856. Four years later it nominated a comparatively unknown Illinois lawyer who had distinguished himself in a series of debates with Stephen A. Douglas—Abraham Lincoln. When the Democratic party broke up into several parts, the election of Lincoln was inevitable.

Abraham Lincoln, into whose hands the destiny of the American nation was now entrusted in the most awful crisis of its history, was a man of the people. His democracy was a rugged frontier democracy, not unlike that of Andrew Jackson. He was not a political philosopher or a doctrinaire, but an astute politician, a states-

man guided by experience and a solemn sense of duty, and inspired by a fundamental honesty, an integrity of character, a sincerity and understanding beyond that of other men. The conflict, whose leadership he was forced to accept with hesitation and sorrow, was not of his making. It was a struggle not against the institution of slavery, but in defense of the Union. The Union was preserved, but at enormous cost, and in the fiery cauldron of war the old America, the America that Lincoln represented, disappeared.

The election of Lincoln was the signal for the secession of the South. South Carolina led off in December, 1860, and Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas followed her lead. In February, 1861, representatives of the seceding States met in convention at Montgomery, Alabama, formed the Confederate States of America, drew up a Constitution modeled closely after the Federal one, and chose Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, President.

The South was desirous of seceding peaceably, and a powerful sentiment in the North favored "letting the erring sisters go in peace." Yet, with both sides trying to avert hostilities, the force of events plunged them into war. On April 12, 1861, the batteries of Charleston opened fire on Fort Sumter, out in the harbor, and the war was on. Lincoln called for volunteers; Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and

Arkansas seceded, and the destiny of America was laid in the lap of the God of War.

The war itself we must pass over hurriedly. The task of the Confederacy was essentially a defensive one: to preserve its territory intact, to secure recognition abroad, and to weary the North into acquiescence. The military task of Lincoln was infinitely harder. He had to reduce the South to submission—to subdue a proud, numerous, and compact people, fighting on interior lines in defense of their homes and their institutions.

Through four weary years the Blue and the Gray dashed themselves against each other while the casualties ran into hundreds of thousands and great areas were reduced to a wilderness. The campaign in the East focused on the Confederate capital, Richmond, and here Robert E. Lee, the greatest soldier America has produced, led the army of the South with dauntless courage and incomparable skill, hurling back army after army, defeating one Union general after another. In the West the Union army was more successful. While Admirals Porter and Farragut secured the Mississippi and split the Confederacy in twain, Generals Thomas and Grant drove the Confederates back in Tennessee and Alabama, and Sherman drove a wedge through Georgia and the Carolinas. Pierced on all sides, its transportation system ruined, its commissary broken down, its States quarreling with each other, its

cotton spoiling in the warehouses and its people starving, the South became demoralized and gave up the struggle. On the ninth of April, 1865, at historic Appomattox, Generals Grant and Lee signed terms of capitulation. Five days later Abraham Lincoln was assassinated.

The murder of Lincoln was an irreparable blow to both sides, for at a critical moment it removed from the helm the pilot who alone might have guided the ship of state through the stormy waters of reconstruction, and gave it over to a band of pirates. Well has the Reconstruction period been called the "Tragic Era." During these years, 1865-1876, a powerful, organized group of radical Republicans controlled the politics of the country, flouted the Constitution, inflicted upon the defeated South a Punic peace, and gave over the resources of the nation to dustrialists, financiers, special interests, and politicians.

Over the details of the Reconstruction drama we may well draw the curtain of silence. Military rule was imposed on the South, the negroes were given civil and political rights, the State governments handed over to "carpet-baggers," and it was not until 1877 that home rule was restored throughout the South. In the meantime the radicals had taken the control of the government out of the hands of President Johnson, had attempted to impeach him on trumped-up charges, had flouted the Constitution and the

Supreme Court, and intrenched their party in power.

Of more importance was the social and economic revolution that was accomplished during these years. The emancipation of four million negro slaves, the destruction of the plantation system, the overthrow of the planter class, and the rise of the small farmers and poor whites to power, meant a revolution in Southern society —a revolution from which the "New South" emerged. A corresponding revolution was being effected in the North. The Homestead Act of 1862, granting 160 acres of public land to any settler, threw open vast new stretches of farm lands in the West. The Tariff Act of 1862, the National Banking Act of 1863, the railroad land grants and the Fourteenth Amendment gave to big business and capital a position of dominance from which they have never been dislodged.

It was a period in which the economic foundations of modern America were being laid. Industry, arm-in-arm with science, advanced with giant steps. The use of the McCormick Harvester, the Oliver chilled plow, and a host of other inventions worked a revolution in agriculture. The West was populated, its mineral resources exploited, its Indians subjugated, its millions of acres of grass used for grazing and the development of the Cattle Kingdom. In the seventies and eighties the transcontinental railroads penetrated the last reaches of the West, tying the

nation together with thongs of iron and opening up additional millions of acres for settlement.

It was a period of corruption in national, State and local politics, and of demoralization in American life. The Crédit Mobilier, the Star Route frauds, and the Whisky Ring scandal shook confidence in the national government, and particularly in President Grant and his cabinet. At the same time the Tweed Ring in New York City and the Gas Ring in Philadelphia looted the public treasuries of millions. Political parties became instruments of spoils, and a get-rich-quick mania permeated the whole country. There was a let-down of standards and morals that was reflected in the literature and society of the nation as well as in its politics.

But the era in which politics were of primary importance was rapidly disappearing. The generation after Reconstruction was to see the rise and development of economic and social forces that swept political institutions and barriers aside and determined the course of national destinies: the rise of capitalism and industry, the corporation movement, economic imperialism, the development of urban life, the rise of labor, immigration, the passing of the farmers' West, the development of new sources of power and energy—water, gas, and electricity. These form the substance, the warp and the woof of American history in its most recent phase.

## XXV

### MODERN AMERICA

The history of modern America is the history of a highly organized, rapidly expanding, industrial society, essentially dissimilar from the America of an earlier day. This period, roughly from 1876 to the World War, witnessed the extremest development of wealth and poverty, the enormous growth of cities and urban life and interests at the expense of the country and agrarian interests, the passing of the frontier and of that old West with unlimited quantities of cheap land that had long been the safety-valve of American society, and the consequent rise of labor problems and troubles on a wide scale. It witnessed an enormous increase in immigration, and a significant shift in the source of that immigration from the British Isles and northern Europe to Russia, Austria, Italy, and Greece. The melting-pot has been forced to boil more furiously than ever before, and it remains to be seen whether millions of Southern Europeans can be assimilated to American culture and institutions. The period witnessed the rise of social consciousness, the social-welfare movement, and the growth of the so-called Progressive movement. It witnessed, finally, the development of

economic imperialism, the acquisition of noncontiguous territories, the passing of isolation.

It is bootless to trace here the manifold triumphs of science and the giant strides of industry. Seldom in history has the Scriptural dictum to "multiply and subdue the earth" been more faithfully obeyed. But the conquests of nature and the exploitation of natural resources, the rearing of towering smokestacks and the gathering of enormous conglomerations of people into cities—all these could not be accomplished without raising hosts of social and economic and cultural problems. To what extent should industry and business be controlled by the government, to what extent should traditional American individualism be permitted to hold sway? What were to be the relations of industry and trade to society as a whole, and what were its functions to be in the new order of things: personal gains or community welfare? What was to be the share of labor in the new wealth that was being created and in the direction of the new forces that were let loose? Could political democracy exist without economic equality, and could economic equality be said to exist where the bargaining power of capital and labor was so disproportionate? And finally, what would it profit America if she gained the whole world and lost her soul?

These problems, precipitated by scientific and industrial development everywhere and world-

wide in their pertinence, received practical formulation in the issues of social democracy. It is significant that the generation that witnessed the greatest expression of individualism in the realm of economics was likewise the generation of the furthest development of social democracy and social and humanitarian consciousness.

This new social consciousness found early expression in some of the Supreme Court decisions, the most important of which was *Munn vs. Illinois*, laying down the doctrine of "public interest" in private business. The doctrine of public interest received further expression in a series of State and Federal laws regulating railroads, trusts, and combinations. The most important of these were the Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, both of which remained relatively ineffective until a later day.

At the same time labor was improving its condition through organization (the American Federation of Labor) and agitation, sometimes taking the form of strikes. Gradually labor was given a juster proportion of the fruits of its efforts; gradually the number of hours of work were reduced, conditions of labor improved, compensation for injuries secured, and laws regulating the labor of women and children put on the statute books.

The new social consciousness began to discover "How the Other Half Lives" and to awaken to

the conditions in the larger cities of the East that threatened to justify all the dire prophecies of Thomas Jefferson a century earlier. Poverty, housing, sanitation, drunkenness, all clamored for reform, and energetic efforts were made to remedy the glaring evils of modern urban life. Social-welfare work, temperance societies, visiting-nurse associations, all became familiar features of American urban life, and men like Jacob Riis, women like Jane Addams, became national characters.

An element of the population that suffered equally with labor from the new economic conditions, was the farmer. Agriculture was unable to adjust itself to the circumstances of modern scientific and industrial life, and tho the value of farms and of farm products increased absolutely, it declined relatively, and the actual income of the farmer declined precipitately. Everywhere in the South and the West there was distress if not actual want. Tenant-farming increased at an alarming rate. These conditions led to organizations of farmers rivaling those of labor, the most important of which were the Grange and the Farmers' Alliance. In 1890 these organizations entered politics, and in 1896 the discontented agrarian element in America found a champion in William Jennings Bryan—the "Peerless Leader."

That Presidential campaign of 1896 was historic in many respects. The defeat of Bryan by

William McKinley, a rather colorless member of the Ohio dynasty, was an unmistakable announcement that manufacturing and capital were the dominant forces in our national life and that Jefferson's dream of an agrarian democracy was dissipated. It was a victory for the East, for conservatism, for an urban-industrial civilization, and the dictum of the electorate in that election has stood unaffected by the passing years.

It was under McKinley that the United States embarked upon a policy of imperialistic expansion whose end is not yet. The occasion was the Spanish-American War. Spanish misgovernment in Cuba, and the explosion of the ill-fated battleship, the *Maine,* precipitated the American government into a war for which neither it nor the country was prepared. But despite this lack of adequate preparation, or even of any great popular enthusiasm, the war was marked by a series of brilliant successes. The Spanish navy was well-nigh annihilated; Cuba was cleared of the enemy, Porto Rico overrun, and the Philippines wrested from their Spanish masters.

Peace brought up the problem of the disposition of these conquests. The decision of the administration to keep Porto Rico and the Philippines was fraught with significance: it meant that the United States, for the first time in its history, was embarked upon the sea of imperialism. It meant that the United States was

definitely committed to an interest in Far Eastern affairs, and was caught up in the web of world politics. It meant the end of "splendid isolation."

When President McKinley was assassinated by a fanatic in 1901 he was succeeded by Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt continued the policy of imperialism inaugurated by his predecessor, by taking an active part in world politics and, more especially, by "taking" Panama in order to construct a canal there. On the other hand, Roosevelt broke with the conservative policy of his Republican predecessors by inaugurating the Progressive Era in American politics, an era that lasted until 1917. For tho Roosevelt differed radically in politics and in character from Woodrow Wilson, and entertained for the latter a profound dislike, the two men were not essentially dissimilar in their social attitudes. Both of them—and William Howard Taft, whose administration came between those of the other two—were enlightened liberals. Both sought to articulate the political and social and constitutional structure of the government to the new economic conditions; both strove to curb the power of business, to elevate labor to a position of equality with capital, to introduce the theory and practise of government control and regulation of activities affecting public welfare, and to elevate the tone of public life. Roosevelt enforced the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; under Wil-

son the Clayton Anti-Trust Act was passed; Roosevelt enforced arbitration between capital and labor; under Wilson the Adamson Eight-Hour Law was written on the statute books. Roosevelt was particularly identified with the conservation of natural resources, Wilson with farm relief and financial reform.

The first years of the Wilson administration gave promise of the most significant reform period in American history. In rapid succession this astute and high-minded college Professor turned statesman, who controlled his party with an iron grip and read public opinion with consummate skill, pushed through one law after another, inaugurated one policy after another. The Underwood Tariff, the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, the Federal Reserve Act, and the Farmers' Loan Act are the principal reform laws of his administration. The Mobile Speech of 1913 announced a new and more liberal policy toward South America, and the reconsideration of that ancient shibboleth, the Monroe Doctrine. Toward our distracted neighbor to the South Wilson preserved a policy of masterly inactivity, or "watchful waiting," and resisted the demands of chauvinists and imperialists and professional patriots everywhere for a war.

With his reform program only partially consummated, and with the Mexican situation still extremely delicate, foreign affairs of a serious and threatening nature commanded the un-

divided attention of the administration. We refer to the World War, which flared out over Europe in August, 1914, threatening even America with its all-devouring flame.

## XXVI

## THE WORLD WAR

"Let the science and research of the historian find the fact, and let his imagination and art make clear its significance."[1] So concluded Mr. George Macaulay Trevelyan in his inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge in 1927.

In considering the World War even eleven years after its close it is to be remembered that the patient and unceasing labors of scores of historians have not yet disclosed all the important facts about it, and that we are still too near it to pass ultimate judgment and to give to this cataclysm its full significance. This is particularly true in regard to its causes. In our all-too-brief survey we can only look upon the broad tendencies which seemed to lead towards the inevitable outbreak in 1914.

We have already hinted that the Industrial Revolution, bringing into being improved means of transportation on land and sea, and at the same time making possible a tremendous increase in the production of goods, had caused the nations of Europe to look beyond their own boundaries for markets for their manufactured

[1] *The Present Position of History* (Longmans, Green & Co.). London, 1927, p. 29.

products. And while industry and trade were in the hands of private individuals, these capitalists found their governments ready and willing to support them in their efforts to find new markets. It was a policy of self-interest for all concerned. The industrialists received aid and the guaranty of security from the government, and made more money; the government collected more taxes. It was only natural, since almost any inhabited area was both a profitable market and a fruitful source of raw materials, that each nation sought to help its trading group by annexing and bringing under its political control such territories as were actual or potential markets and had not already been annexed in the eighteenth-century colonial struggle. The competition for markets, then, became a fierce national struggle for colonial possessions; we commonly label the struggle which took place between 1871 and 1914, imperialism. Thus in the last three decades of the nineteenth century the islands of the Pacific, great areas in Asia, and most of Africa had been appropriated in the fierce competition of rival powers. In 1900 not much remained. The next decade and a half witnessed a struggle over the Ottoman Empire, Persia and China, and Morocco.

The competition, growing more fierce as annexable colony-markets became fewer and as localized counter-claims developed, was intensified by still another force: the definite yet al-

most indefinable phenomenon called nationalism. There are, broadly, two stages of nationalism, one following the other progressively: the first, a determination on the part of peoples of the same language, race, ideals, customs, traditions —in short, of the same interests—to be incorporated into the same political state; second, the determination of such peoples incorporated into the same political state to give to that state the greatest possible glory, prestige, and power. When the Italian peoples were subjects of various principalities their great determination was to be welded into one united kingdom. Once this was accomplished their determination was sublimated, so to speak, into a burning desire to add greater and still greater glory to the Kingdom of Italy, their country, their native land. England, Germany, France, Italy, in fact, virtually all of western Europe, had by 1870 reached this second stage. The nationalism of their peoples in its second stage, i.e., the desire to further the glory of England or Germany or France, served to intensify the competition for colony-markets. This competition, which we call imperialism and which was national in organization, was definitely one of the large forces operating to bring about in 1914 the irrepressible conflict at arms.

As regards the bringing about of war, however, the sentiment of nationalism, from 1871 to 1914, was more than a contributing impetus

to the force of imperialism. We have noted in a preceding chapter that most of the countries in western Europe by the last quarter of the nineteenth century were indeed the achievements of groups who had aspired towards national self-determination. But in eastern and southeastern Europe there were those peoples who had not achieved the goal of nationalism in its first stage; those of like interests who had not been able to unite themselves into politically sovereign states. Their efforts to do so, particularly as those efforts affected the great powers of Europe, constitute in themselves another cause of the World War. Furthermore, these nationalistic struggles by sympathetic contagion intensified the sentiment of nationalism all over Europe. In fact, it is difficult to overemphasize the tenseness of this feeling in the era we are considering.

So strongly, indeed, did the forces we have just described—nationalism and imperialism—influence the actions of the governments of Europe from 1871 to 1914 that the era has been called one of nationalist-imperialist foreign policy, and, in the specific events which took place in the period, nationalism and imperialism do enter as motives again and again.

Before turning to the specific happenings of the period, however, we must take account of another definite cause of the World War—militarism. Militarism is of course an instrument rather than a motive of a nation's foreign pol-

icy. But certainly the adoption of universal military service, the increasing of armaments, the intensified development of military tactics and science constitute a policy—militarism—which, tho an instrument for carrying out a nationalist-imperialist program, was itself in this crucial era a force leading to war. It was the continuance of militarism by the various powers which made Europe at the turn of the century an armed camp. Such action was a flagrant admission that the ultimate means for settling their differences—arising out of the nationalist-imperialist policy—was, and would be, war. Let us note in the actual events which took place between 1871 and 1914 how the forces of nationalism and imperialism with the threat of armies and navies always in the offing, operated, despite the efforts of skilful diplomacy, to make inevitable the catastrophe of 1914.

The chief actors in the international drama were Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. We shall note but briefly the actions of the play which followed one another breathlessly.

After the Franco-German War (1870-1871), Bismarck desired for the preservation of peace to isolate France, who naturally vowed to get back Alsace-Lorraine. His first effort resulted in the league of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany. The two latter could not long remain allies with the Turkish question between them.

Russia felt she did not get her just dues from a victory over Turkey, and withdrew in 1878, ending the so-called League of Three Emperors. Bismarck formed a defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary. In 1881 Italy and France had an imperialistic quarrel over Tunis in Africa. France seized Tunis, and Italy in indignation joined the German alliance with Austria.

Against the Triple Alliance of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy, it was natural that France and Russia, now two unattached powers, should associate themselves. And these two, despite obvious dissimilarities, formed in 1891 a Dual Alliance. Between these two leagues the balance of power in Europe swung. Great Britain to this time had not been seriously interested in European affairs.

But the Straits of Dover were too narrow to allow for long a policy of splendid isolation. The two alliances, including the five powers, would quite evidently concern themselves with more than purely continental matters. Each of them had an imperialist policy, the pursuance of which would naturally be aided by the power's allies and opposed by her enemies. When imperialism became the concern of the two European leagues, England, whose possessions included a quarter of the habitable area of the earth, could not remain unattached. Under William II, who ascended to the German throne in 1888 and dismissed Bismarck in 1890, industrialist Ger-

many became definitely imperialistic. Germany had towards the end of the Bismarckian régime acquired territory, mostly in Africa. William resolved to advance the policy chiefly by constructing a large navy, a step which obviously made his country a rival of England's. Great Britain, largely because of this step, cast her lot with the Dual Alliance. This resulted in what was known as the Triple Entente when, in 1904, France and Great Britain reached an agreement the substance of which was to give the former a free hand in Morocco and the latter control of Egypt, and when, in 1907, Russia and Great Britain by agreement assumed control respectively of northern and southern Persia. Imperialism was looming larger and larger as a motive in the ultimate alinement of great powers. From 1907 it was the Triple Alliance of Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary against the Triple Entente of Great Britain, France, and Russia. By this arrangement German imperialism was definitely checked in the important areas of Africa. Germany turned towards the Ottoman Empire; the Berlin-to-Bagdad railway was the pet idea.

In fact, the decay of the Ottoman Empire was one of the serious problems in Europe. The last of the sultan's possessions in Africa, Tripoli, was seized by France in 1911. During the nineteenth century, on the basis of national determination, Greece, Montenegro, Rumania, and

Bulgaria had become independent. But the Congress of Berlin (1878), attempting to settle satisfactorily for all concerned the Russo-Turkish war, violated twice the principle of nationality; Bosnia, together with Herzegovina, was placed in the control of Austria, and Macedonia, the very center of the Balkan peninsula, was turned back to the sultan. Bosnia was a Serb-inhabited land and Serbia was sure to make nationalist claims against Austria. The Balkans would not long see Macedonia under Turkish rule. Turkey continued to hold besides Macedonia the territory around Constantinople. When the "sick man" of Europe died, who was going to get the spoils? The independent Balkan states wanted to enlarge their territories; Austria wanted to confirm her hold on Bosnia. And the dream of the Tsars for generations had been Constantinople.

Germany did more than dream. She projected a Berlin-to-Bagdad railway. When this project became known the powers of the Triple Entente were alarmed. The railway would not only assure Germany's control of the Ottoman Empire when the "sick man" died, but would also give her a magnificent land route from Europe to the Orient, which, as a glance at the map will show, would render obsolete England's sea route by the Suez Canal. The pursuance of the German project after 1903 almost caused a war.

How to stop the Berlin-Bagdad railway? The

question faced the Triple Entente. The railway ran through Serbia, through her capital, Belgrade. Serbia was unfriendly towards Austria-Hungary, Germany's ally, because of the Dual Monarchy's control of Bosnia, a land which for reasons of nationality should belong to Serbia. Were Serbia to be encouraged against Austria-Hungary, the Bagdad-Berlin railway project might be checked. Serbia became a focal point in the diplomatic considerations of both the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente.

Austria in 1908 assumed complete sovereignty over Bosnia, which she had hitherto only occupied. The ghosts of the Congress of Berlin were stalking in the Balkans. Serbia immediately protested; the inhabitants of Bosnia were Serb nationalists. The Triple Entente backed Serbia. Germany supported Austria. War loomed, but the hour had not yet come. The Entente gradually withdrew its support from Serbia; the Triple Alliance had won a diplomatic victory. Settlement was only an interlude; European diplomatists were fighting a losing battle.

Tension followed tension in the Balkans. There was the Young Turk revolution in 1908, the Albanian uprising in 1909, the former a democratic and the latter a nationalist demonstration. Macedonia, left to Turkey in 1878, suffered untold misery; the Balkan states bordering on Macedonia decided in 1912 to act, and a short war in 1912 and 1913 defeated the sultan. The

spoils included not only Macedonia but Thrace, leaving European Turkey nothing but Constantinople and a small surrounding area. But the allies, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro, quarreled over the division of spoils. Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro joined against Bulgaria to settle the dispute. The allies, aided by Rumania, won. The Turk was virtually out of Europe, but the Balkan situation was not settled.

The burning sore spot was still the bitterness between Austria and Serbia over Bosnia. The province belonged by nationalist rights to Serbia; Austria held it in possession. Serb societies poured into Bosnia propaganda against Austria and the Habsburg monarchy. On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, and his wife were riding through the Bosnian capital of Serajevo. A group of Bosnian youths murdered them.

Austria acted resolutely and at once. On July 23, 1914, an ultimatum was sent to Serbia, the purpose of which was supposedly to quell finally all Serbian nationalist agitation; but from the nature of the demands in that document and from the fact that Serbia was given only two days in which to reply, there arises the question of whether Austria ever expected Serbia to meet them. Serbia didn't, and on July 28 Austria declared war on her. It must be said to the credit of both the Russian and English foreign offices

that they tried to preserve the peace; the former demanded modification of the Austrian terms and the latter, through Sir Edward Grey, pleaded for mediation.

Germany, as early as July 5, is believed to have given Austria a blanket promise of support. The underlying reason for her support of Austria undoubtedly was that Serbia menaced her imperialist designs in the Balkans, particularly her Berlin-Bagdad railway project. Russia, because she was the leading Slav power and because of her imperialist ambitions in the Balkans, came to the aid of Serbia. Between July 25 and July 30 Russia mobilized. German action was now almost inevitable.

To understand Germany's action it must be said that since 1871 she had become increasingly militaristic-minded. Perhaps the seed had been planted by Frederick the Great, but the full flower did not bloom for a century. German unity and German prosperity were credited to her arms, and her arms were held to be the only protection against hostile encirclement of the Fatherland by European powers.

And when Russia mobilized it was the militarists who brought pressure on the German government to act. Germany gave Russia twelve hours to withdraw the mobilization order, and when Russia ignored the request, the German emperor on August 1 ordered general German mobilization and declared war on Russia. France

was willingly bound by the terms of her alliance and by special understandings to support Russia. Germany asked France to declare her intentions and after receiving a non-committal reply declared war on her. German militarists knew that France and Russia had to be crushed, and there was hope that Paris could be captured before Russia's full force was felt.

But what of Great Britain? Germany probably believed that Britain would remain neutral. Sir Edward Grey is known to have tried repeatedly to secure peaceful settlement, and to have maintained that nothing in the terms of the Triple Entente impaired England's freedom of action, tho there were numerous reasons why she should support France, if not Russia. When Germany decided to violate the neutrality of Belgium in invading France, the issue for Britain seemed clear; she must throw her lot against Germany. Britain declared war August 4.

Italy, contending that the Triple Alliance bound her to support her allies only in case of defensive war and that the declaration of Austria against Italy was offensive, refused to support Germany and Austria. Her action was undoubtedly influenced by a secret Franco-Italian agreement made in 1902 wherein Italy promised not to engage in war against France. Japan was bound by a treaty signed in 1902 to stand with Great Britain in protection of their interests in the Pacific Ocean. This, combined with imperi-

alist ambitions towards the German-controlled Shantung peninsula, brought Japan to the side of the Triple Entente.

The line-up on August 1, 1914, therefore, was Germany and Austria-Hungary, known as the Central Powers, against the Allied or Entente powers: Russia, France, Great Britain, Serbia, Belgium, Japan, and Montenegro. The great forces of nationalism, imperialism, and militarism had dominated too long the policies of European nations. Once again the god of war rode over the earth to threaten for four years the civilization which the peoples had builded.

It is not our purpose to follow in detail the military progress of the war. It was fought on an unprecedented scale, rallying men, resources, machinery, and science to its prosecution. The German offensive in the West, aimed at the capture of Paris, fell short of its goal when French forces stopped it at the battle of the Marne. The struggle in the West became an endurance test of French warfare from 1914 to 1918. But at the end of 1914 Germany had occupied the coal fields of Belgium and North France, and the iron district in French Lorraine. She had stopped the Russian invasion and secured the aid of Turkey.

In 1915 Italy joined the Allies. France and England attempted by the Dardanelles expedition to capture Constantinople, but failed. Bulgaria in 1915 joined the Central Powers after the Germans in a great eastern offensive cap-

tured Warsaw and brought about the collapse of Serbia.

The next year of the war, 1916, was notable for the failure of a German offensive centered on Verdun; they did not pass. Rumania in this year joined the Allies only to have her country quickly overrun by the armies of the Central Powers. Britain and Germany engaged in 1916 in a naval battle at Jutland which confirmed the superiority of the British fleet. The British were effectively throwing a naval blockade around Germany, an action which caused Germany to resort to submarine warfare. As the war went on this became more and more unrestricted against neutral as well as enemy nations.

The year 1917 witnessed the failure of a Franco-British offensive in Champagne and Flanders, the success of an Austro-German offensive in Italy, and the withdrawal, after an internal revolution, of Russia from the ranks of the Allies. But the Allied cause was given hope when the United States of America entered the war, an action made inevitable by Germany's continuance of unrestricted submarine warfare. American public opinion had become highly incensed when the *Lusitania,* with numbers of American nationals aboard, was sunk in 1915. America insisted that the rights of neutrals be maintained. After a patient exchange of notes for nearly two years, America entered.

The final year of the war witnessed Germany's

last attempt, an effort to win on the western front before the United States could throw her full weight into the decisive Allied counter-offensive. The German offensive, lasting from March 21 to July 18, made severe dents in the Allied lines, but the defenders held. The Allied forces, now under the supreme command of Marshal Foch, from July to November drove the armies of the Central Powers out of France, a move greatly aided by American money, supplies, and men. Simultaneously important Allied victories took place on the Balkan and Italian fronts, a combination of circumstances which led to the overthrow of the Hohenzollern and Habsburg monarchies and the agreement of the Central Powers to an armistice on November 11, 1918.

After this all-too-rapid survey of the salient events of the World War we turn to the peace, the supposed compensation for thirty-three millions of casualties and an expenditure of money and resources which mortgaged the western world for generations to come. The large results of the Treaty of Versailles with Germany and similar treaties with other nations we shall consider briefly under three large heads: punitive measures against the Central Powers, settlements on the basis of the principle of nationality, and the League of Nations.

To France Germany was forced to surrender Alsace-Lorraine and the coal mines of the Saar

Basin. The final destiny of the Saar Basin, exclusive of the coal fields, was to be settled in fifteen years by a plebiscite, and was to be administered meanwhile by the League of Nations. Danzig became a free city. To Poland she surrendered Posen and West Prussia. Plebiscites also decided the future of East Prussia and Silesia; the eastern area voted to join Poland and the western area Germany. The northern part of Schleswig voted to become Danish; the southern part remained German. Malmedy voted to join Belgium. All the German colonies were left to mandatory administration subject to the League of Nations.

From the Central Powers also Rumania received Transylvania, the Bukovina, Bessarabia, and half the Banat. Italy gained the Trentino, Trieste, and Istria. Greece gained from Bulgaria the Ægean seaboard, and from Turkey she gained Thrace from Adrianople to Chatalja. (Turkey later received back Eastern Thrace.) In addition the Central Powers, chiefly Germany, were made to restore all damage done in the conflict, to surrender their naval and military equipment, and to reduce their armed forces to absolute minima; also to make payments of tremendous amounts in goods and money. Never had combatants submitted to such humiliating terms.

President Wilson of the United States went to the Peace Conference determined that in the re-

adjustment of Europe the principle of nationality should prevail. Five of his famous Fourteen Points bore directly on that determination. To a degree it did prevail; where there was a question, Allied opinion of course won out. But the effort had these results: an independent Poland; four independent republics—Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, and Finland—in the Baltic region; the splitting up of the old Dual Monarchy, Austria-Hungary, into Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Jugo-Slavia.

What were the outstanding breaches of nationality—due in some cases to the near-impossibility of determining boundaries on national principles and in other cases to the demands of the victors—manifested in the peace treaties?

Of the territories given Italy, Southern Tyrol is German and most of Istria is Slav. In Czecho-Slovakia millions of Germans reside, as well as Magyars and Little Russians. Poland has not only Poles, but Ukrainians. The inhabitants of the republic of Austria voted for union with Germany, but the victors, fearing a strengthened Germany, forbade it.

But by far the greatest accomplishment of the Peace Conference was the formation of a League of Nations, the instrument on which Woodrow Wilson staked his all. The League of Nations was launched as an organization "to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security." The three fea-

tures of the League are an Assembly, a Council, and a Secretariat. The Assembly consists of representatives of every state which is a member of the League, each state having one vote. The Council was originally to consist of representatives of the five great Allied powers (the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan—but the United States did not ratify the Covenant) and four representatives of four other members of the League chosen by the Assembly. The five were considered permanent and the four rotating or non-permanent. The Council now consists of fourteen members; five—the British Empire, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan—permanent; and nine non-permanent. To the Council are given most of the functions necessary to the carrying out of the main purpose of the League, the preservation of peace.

The Secretariat is a permanent international civil service carrying out the day-by-day functions of the League, an organization of experts and assistants doing the League's routine work.

A supplementary creation of the Covenant of the League is a Permanent Court of International Justice located at the Hague.

## XXVII

### POSTLUDE

If the record of the World War is set down with presumption by the writer of history because he is too close to it to perceive its meanings, then the present, the last decade, should be considered as almost entirely without his realm. The concern of history in the last analysis is "what really happened long ago in that land of mystery which we call the past." The present, like an exciting experience of but a moment ago, is too much with us to tell "what really happened"; hence, the historian who stays in his rôle leaves the present to the philosopher, the critic, and even to the prophet.

We can, however, in the remaining pages record a few outstanding events and developments of the past ten years which seem, without the advantage of perspective, to be fraught with some significance. We shall limit ourselves closely and consider but a few phenomena: first, two developments which followed—chronologically if not causally—the World War, namely, the League of Nations and other efforts at world peace, and the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia and of Mussolini in Italy; second, a movement almost world-wide on the part of great masses of men and women to better themselves mate-

rially and to gain a broader outlook on life by means of education; and, finally, the domination of science and the machine.

"The League of Nations," declared an English historian, "is the cardinal fact of post-war Europe. . . . It has failed to perform miracles, but it has already done a great deal of useful work." In October, 1929, the League of Nations Association in New York reported that fifty-four states were then members of the League. The League of Nations listed among its more important achievements the handling of nine controversies in which war was threatened or actually begun; the holding of a conference of forty-five nations, including the United States, in 1925, at which an agreement was framed for control of international arms traffic, and for prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare; the facilitating of reconstruction—in particular the saving of both Austria and Hungary from economic collapse; the befriending of minorities by the establishment of machinery whereby the complaints of racial, religious, and linguistic minorities in fourteen nations became known to the world. Scarcely less important were the accomplishments of the League in public health and control of illicit traffic. It had carried on an effective warfare against epidemic diseases. It had made progress in stamping out traffic in women and children, and had done much to limit each country in the manufacture

of harmful drugs. Perhaps the greatest achievements of the League were intangible; it had served as an international forum, it had been the great factor in cultivating international-mindedness, and it had brought face to face each year the statesmen of the many nations who, in merely gathering at Geneva, had done much to lay the foundations of mutual trust among the peoples of the world.

Turning to other efforts towards better international understanding, we can only recall the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armaments in 1921-22, at which progress was made towards thwarting a race in the building of battleships, and towards a better understanding, a clearing up of affairs in Asia; the settlement for a time at least of Inter-Allied debts; the adjustment of German reparations by two commissions headed respectively by Mr. Charles G. Dawes and Mr. Owen D. Young; the prospective inclusion of the United States in the World Court; the Locarno Conference, at which the powers of Europe guaranteed boundaries and as a result of which Germany was admitted to the League of Nations; and, finally, the Briand-Kellogg Peace Pact, in which the leading nations of the world renounced war as an instrument of national policy.

These agencies and efforts did not, of course, insure the peace of the world, and yet it is almost safe to say that there was in the world of

1929 an unprecedented sentiment against war.

Aside from the League of Nations and other attempts at world peace, the most significant result of the World War was probably the triumph of the Bolshevist régime in Russia, a dictatorship of the proletariat. When the Romanov dynasty was overthrown in 1917, altho liberal opinion throughout the world applauded, Russia herself was in a wild state of confusion. A moderate democratic group under Kerensky failed to resolve the situation, with the result that the Bolshevists, an extreme socialistic group led by Lenin and Trotsky and later by Stalin, came into power—and, it must be admitted, temporarily saved Russia—with a program of giving citizenship and the control of the government only to all useful workers. Representation was on the basis of industries, which chose delegates to the "soviet" or governing body. Each locality had a district soviet; over these were provincial soviets, and, finally, there was at Petrograd (now Leningrad) a supreme soviet.

The Soviet government succeeded in maintaining its powers by a policy of suppression and terror against all who opposed it. As a result of Bolshevist domination, Russia had remained almost an international outcast; her form of government, which by propaganda she had tried to perpetrate on the rest of the world, was feared and resisted. The Soviet government had since 1923, however, compromised its principles by

the admission of private capital. What state of affairs had existed in that vast nation during the past few years was a matter almost of speculation, so varying were reports on it. It is sufficient to say that Russia constituted the most interesting social, economic, and political experiment of the post-war era.

The state of chaos in Italy following the World War was scarcely less alarming than that in Russia. Socialist groups in many parts of the country took over the industries, and the government could only acquiesce. But conditions grew worse. Bankruptcy set in and anarchy reigned. Rigorous action, it must be admitted, was eminently necessary. It came when in October, 1922, an army of Black Shirts marched on Rome, and their leader, Mussolini, was invited by King Victor Emmanuel II to become prime minister. The black shirt was the ominous emblem of the Fascisti, a patriotic group organized when their country's plight was darkest in the World War, to maintain Italian perseverance in the struggle. Their leader, Mussolini, proclaiming himself a spiritual son of the Cæsars, succeeded in at least bringing order out of chaos and in making his country in the next seven years one of the strongest powers in Europe. True it is that his methods harked back to the ancestry he claimed; the Fascisti remained in power by suppressing and terrorizing opposition. Mussolini was called

the only figure in present-day Europe comparable to the ex-Kaiser. But if the parliamentary dreams of a Cavour were forgotten, it was nevertheless admitted that the Italy of 1929 was finding as never before her place in the sun.

Is there uncanny significance in the undoubted fact that the two most patently manifest political phenomena of the post-war world were, paradoxically, the rise of dictatorships and the unprecedented pursuance of a policy of peace?

If the observer's gaze were turned for a moment, however, from the world of political affairs to the activities of the undistinguished masses in the post-war world, he discovered men and women of all ages and stations making an effort unprecedented in the annals of human aspiration to fit themselves by the obvious means of education for a higher plane in the social and economic scale. That the aim of this effort was merely material self-betterment was a generalization of too sweeping proportions. There somehow arose after the vast carnage ended in 1918 the world-wide conviction that the key to salvation for the individual and the group lay in education. Hundreds of thousands apparently were interested not only in finding out from text-books and lectures, by discussions and laboratory experiments, how day-by-day tasks might be better and more profitably done, but

also in discovering by the same means, if possible, the heritages of the past, the tendencies of the present, and the possibilities of the future.

Wherefore else could the observer explain the story told by mere statements and figures? Since 1920 the number of college students in America alone had doubled, and the total by 1928 had reached three-quarters of a million. During the same period enrolment in high schools also had doubled and included in 1928 more than half the children fifteen to eighteen years of age. What was true of America was true in slightly lesser degree throughout the world. When before had the armies of Europe set up by spontaneous demand schools and colleges for the training of young men in non-military subjects? In China, in Russia, in Czecho-Slovakia, and in Germany, there were definite youth movements with the seeking of education, mental and physical, as one of their paramount aims.

More significant still perhaps were the numbers of mature men and women the world over enrolled in schools of adult education, workers' colleges, correspondence schools, and radio courses, most of whom gave up for study hours usually devoted to pleasure and rest.

What the entire educational movement would lead to, what its immediate significance was, the historian could scarcely foretell. A hint may have been given when an English bishop, speak-

ing before the World Association for Adult Education held at Cambridge, England, in 1929, declared, "I see in the spread of adult education one of the greatest safeguards for international good-will."

If there was another and no less important phenomenon which characterized the world of 1929 it was the domination in all countries of the West—and the penetration into the Orient had more than begun—of science and the machine. If America was an extreme example, she was, none the less, but in the vanguard of a movement which encircled the globe.

Since the turn of the century—even since the close of the war—the Industrial Revolution had accelerated its progress a hundred-fold. Science, while not lessening its efforts in pure research, had turned also to utilitarian application, and made myriad contributions; "standardized parts" and "mass production," the two new instrumentalities of the god of the machine, had made possible the turning of each contribution into millions of units. The most obvious illustrations told the story. There was in America in 1929 a telephone for every six persons. There were in use more than twenty million automobiles, or one for every family. In the same year there were in American homes more than seven million radio sets. The electrical generating plants in the America of 1929 produced, accord-

ing to Mark Sullivan,[1] more than a hundred billion horse-power-hours.

To go on elaborating by example the manifestations and even the efforts of science and the machine in the world of 1929 would be a work of supererogation; the evidences were everywhere.

Let us in bringing to a close an outline of the history of the world remember that the Industrial Revolution, far from being ended in 1929, was still gathering momentum. Its two promising instrumentalities, science and the machine, had in the last century remade—nay, were still remaking—the world in which man lived. In the development of the ideas of nationality and democracy they were forces of tremendous influence. The World War, at least in the largeness of its proportions, was their monstrous offspring. And as the fourth decade of the twentieth century was about to open, there was probably neither man nor child within the compass of western civilization who had not come under the touch of their mighty steel fingers.

For better or for worse? That was the question the historian asked and the philosopher pondered.

It was pointed out, even by casual observers, that notwithstanding widespread protests

[1] Cf. "Thirty Years of Progress" in *World's Work* (Doubleday, Doran) for November, 1929.

against the standardization which it imposed upon the race, the rapid conversion of the findings of pure science into numerous utilities of common use had nevertheless for even the masses of toiling men spectacularly wiped out the limitations of mere space; and it was further pointed out that for men at their work and women in their homes the identical process had literally turned back the hands of time—so abundant was the leisure provided.

It was also recognized by those whose eyes saw beneath and beyond the mere general adoption of the fruits of science in the realm of life's utilities, that the day must surely come when the age-old values of life and the world must undergo the inevitable process of transvaluation. But there prevailed the hope that when the day should come no value that was real would be cast as rubbish to the void—but rather that all would be conserved in that perfect unity of civilization towards which the whole creation seemed to move.

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